Illinois Publ'g & Printing Co. v. Indus. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 22 October 1921
• Docket Number: No. 14012.,14012.
• Citation: 132 N.E. 511,299 Ill. 189
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: ILLINOIS PUBLISHING & PRINTING CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.

299 Ill. 189

132 N.E. 511

ILLINOIS PUBLISHING & PRINTING CO.

v.INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.

No. 14012.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 22, 1921.

Error to Circuit Court, Cook County; Oscar M. Torrison, Judge.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Alice H. Coates, opposed by the Illinois Publishing & Printing Company. An award by the Industrial Commission was affirmed by the circuit court, and the employer brings error.

Judgment affirmed.

Roy D. Keehn, of Chicago (Edward G. Woods and Charles Center Case, both of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

George D. Anthony, of Chicago (George A. Schneider, of Chicago, of counsel), for defendants in error.

THOMPSON, J.

Philip A. Coates, deceased, was employed by the Illinois Publishing & Printing Company as an advertising solicitor for the Chicago Herald and Examiner, a newspaper published by it. He went from place to place in the city of Chicago and elsewhere for the purpose of securing advertising to be published in said newspaper. He was paid $50 a week and allowed an expense account. Deceased used his own automobile in making his calls and was permitted to place on his expense account a charge for automobile transportation. October 21, 1919, he reported for duty about 8:30 in the forenoon and was directed by the advertising manager to call upon certain prospects. Pursuant to these directions he started in his own automobile to make his calls. While he was driving on the public streets of Chicago he was killed in a collision between his own car driven by him and another car driven by Abraham Rubenstein. Compensation was claimed and awarded on the theory that the enterprise or business of the employer was extrahazardous within the meaning of paragraph 8 of section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Laws [299 Ill. 191]1919, p. 539), and that the provisions of the act applied automatically to the employer and all its employees. This writ of error is prosecuted to review the judgment of the circuit court of Cook county confirming the award of the Industrial Commission; the contention of plaintiff in error being that decedent was not engaged in any of the hazardous occupations mentioned in section 3.

Section 3 of the Compensation Act of 1919 provides that the provisions of the act shall apply automatically and without election to all employers and their employees engaged in any of the enterprises or businesses which are declared by the act to be extrahazardous. It is admitted that plaintiff in error is engaged in an enterprise in which statutory and municipal ordinance regulations are imposed for the regulating and guarding of machinery and appliances for the protection and safeguarding of its employees and the public. There are located in the ten-story building which it occupies typesetting machines, printing presses, and other machinery used in printing a newspaper, and electrically propelled elevators used for carrying passengers and freight from floor to floor. It is contended by plaintiff in error that the only employees covered by the act are those directly exposed to the hazards peculiar to the business or enterprise of the employer, and that it does not cover such employees as salesmen, bookkeepers, and stenographers, who are not exposed to the special hazards. It is contended by defendant in error that, if an industry is covered by the terms of a compulsory compensation law based upon a hazardous classification, it is covered as to all the employees therein, regardless of whether or not they are all actually exposed to the peculiar hazards of the business. The determination of this question is one of far-reaching effect. To adopt the theory of defendant in error is to extend the provisions of the act to a class of employees, thousands in number, not heretofore considered to be covered by the provisions of the act; while to adopt the theory of plaintiff in error is to exclude this large group of employees from the beneficent provisions of the act.

Prior to July 1, 1917, any employer in this state had a right to elect whether he would provide and pay compensation for accidental injuries sustained by his employees arising out of and in the course of the employment in accordance with the provisions of the act. The act of 1913 as originally adopted and as amended in 1915 enumerated certain occupations, enterprises, and businesses which brought the employer engaged in any of them under the act unless he filed notice in writing of his election not to provide and pay compensation according to the provisions of the act. Under these elective statutes this court has held in several cases that some employees of an industry might be covered by the act while other employees engaged in a different branch of the business or enterprise might not be covered by the act. In Vaughan's Seed Store v. Simonini, 275 Ill. 477, 114 N. E. 163, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 713, the employer had several branches or departments in its business. Without deciding whether one or more of these branches of the employer's business came within the enumerated businesses or enterprises of section 3 of the Compensation Act of 1913, this court held that a laborer employed upon one of its farms was not engaged in one of the enumerated occupations. The employer had not elected to provide and pay compensation under the provisions of the Compensation Act, and it was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Board unless it was engaged in an occupation, enterprise, or business enumerated in section 3 of the act. Its election to be covered by the act was entirely voluntary, and the theory of the decision was that the employer ought not to be presumed to elect to provide and pay compensation according to the provisions of the act except as to that branch or department of its business which was declared by the statute to be hazardous. In Oriental Laundry Co. v. Industrial Com., 293 Ill. 539, 127 N. E. 676, a solicitor for laundry business slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk some distance from the laundry. The laundry company had not elected to provide and pay compensation under the act, and the court held that the work of the solicitor was not in any way connected with the hazardous part of the laundry company's business, and that the Industrial Commission was without jurisdiction to award compensation to her. In that case we specifically stated that the decision was made under the elective features of the Compensation Act, and that we were not intending in any way to determine the effect of the compulsory features of the act in effect on and after July 1, 1917. In Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Industrial Com., 296 Ill. 511, 129 N. E. 771 (a case arising since the compulsory feature of the Compensation Act became effective), the point here under consideration was not discussed, and it does not seem to have been raised. The decision, therefore, is not controlling in the case now before us.

It seems to be well established by this court that it is the business or enterprise of the employer that controls. In Suburban Ice Co. v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 630, 113 N. E. 979, the employer was engaged in the business of manufacturing, storing, and selling ice. Its business was among those declared by statute to be extrahazardous. One of its teamsters while feeding a team in its barn was kicked in the head by one of its horses and killed. It was contended that the accident did not arise out of and in the course of employment in that branch of the business declared to be extrahazardous, but this court held that the business of the employer controlled, and that the Industrial Board had jurisdiction to award compensation. In Gibson v. Industrial...