Suburban Ice Co. v. Indus. Bd

• Citation: 274 Ill. 630,113 N.E. 979
• Decision Date: 24 October 1916
• Docket Number: No. 10766.,10766.
• Parties: SUBURBAN ICE CO. v. INDUSTRIAL BOARD et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

274 Ill. 630

113 N.E. 979

SUBURBAN ICE CO.

v.INDUSTRIAL BOARD et al.

No. 10766.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 24, 1916.

Error to Circuit Court, Cook County; Oscar M. Torrison, Judge.

Proceeding by Balanche C. Gylfe under the Workmen's Compensation Act to recover compensation for the death of Albert W. Gylfe, opposed by the Suburban Ice Company, employer. An award of the committee of arbitration confirmed by the Industrial Board was confirmed by the Circuit Court on certiorari by the employer, and the employer brings error. Affirmed.Waite & Donovan, of Woodstock, for plaintiff in error.

Cheney & Evans, of Chicago (F. J. Griffen, of Chicago, of counsel), for defendants in error.

CARTER, J.

October 27, 1914, Blanche C. Gylfe, widow of Albert W. Gylfe and administratrix of his estate, commenced a proceeding before the Industrial Board of Illinois to recover from plaintiff in error compensation for injuries to her husband which resulted in his death April 28, 1914. After a hearing before a committee of arbitration an award of $3,500 was granted, which was confirmed by the Industrial Board April 10, 1915. On May 10 of the same year plaintiff in error filed a petition in the circuit court of Cook county for a writ of certiorari to review this decision of the Industrial Board. July 16 following, the circuit court found that said board had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter and did not exceed its jurisdiction in making its finding and award, and thereupon ordered the writ quashed. From that decision plaintiff in error, being unaware of the amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act which took effect July 1, 1915, prayed an appeal to the Appellate Court for the First District, which appeal, on motion of the plaintiff in error, was dismissed January 25, 1916. Thereafter a motion filed by plaintiff in error in the circuit court of Cook county to set aside the order of July 16, 1915, as not being entered in compliance with said amendment of July 1 to section 19 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, was allowed. Later the circuit court entered an order finding that the Industrial Board had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter, following the provisions of said amendment of July 1, 1915. This last judgment of the circuit court, and the record upon which it was entered, have been brought to this court by writ of error.

Defendant in error urges that the judgment of July 16, 1915, being in proper form under the common-law writ of certiorari, was a final and binding judgment and is still in force because the circuit court was without jurisdiction to set aside that judgment after the term had passed. Under the provisions of section 4 of chapter 131 (Hurd's Stat. 1916, p. 2577), as construed by this court, a proceeding begun under the statute before its repeal, by amendment or otherwise, proceeds in matters of practice, after the repeal takes effect, according to the new law. Farmer v. People, 77 Ill. 322. The judgment of July 16, 1915, having been entered after the repeal of the act of 1913, the judgment of the circuit court should have been entered in the form provided by said amendment of July 1, 1915. The trial court therefore did not err in setting aside the former judgment and entering the judgment in conformity with the provisions of the amended act.

Counsel for plaintiff in error urge that the Industrial Board had no jurisdiction in this case, as no written claim for compensation was filed with the Industrial Board within six months from the date of the accident. Section 24 of the act of 1913, which was in force at the time this accident occurred, provided:

‘No proceedings for compensation under this act shall be maintained unless claim for compensation has been made within six months after the accident, or in the event that payments have been made under the provisions of this act, unless written claim for compensation has been made within six months after such payments have ceased.’ Laws 1913, p. 351.

The recordbefore us shows, without controversy, that the widow in person presented her claim for compensation verbally to the secretary and treasurer of plaintiff in error within about two weeks after the death of her husband, but that no written claim was filed with plaintiff in error until more than six months had elapsed after the accident occurred. The provisions of the statute quoted above do not state that a written claim, in the first instance, must be filed. This section of the statute, however, does provide later that if payments have been made under the provisions of the act, then a ‘written’ claim must be made within six months after such payments cease. The requirement that the claim should be written, under the later provisions in this same sentence, would seem to indicate that the Legislature did not intend that the claim made within six months of the accident must necessarily be in writing. This provision of the Illinois Compensation Act was taken substantially from section 2, paragraph 1, of the British Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897, which section was re-enacted in the British Compensation Act of 1906, reading as follows:

‘Proceedings for the recovery under this act of compensation for an injury shall not be maintainable * * * unless the claim for compensation with respect to such accident has been made within six months from the occurrence of the accident causing the injury.’

In Powell v. Main Colliery Co., 1900 App. Cas. 366, the injured workman sent an informal written notice to his employer stating that he claimed a certain sum per week as compensation for injuries received at the employer's colliery. It was there held that the claim for compensation need not be in the form required by ordinary legal procedure. Since that decision the courts of that country have held that the notice given the employer by the employé may be verbal and need not be in writing. Lowe v. Myers & Sons (1906) 2 K. B. 265; Thompson v. Goold & Co. (1910) A. C. 409; Luckie v. Merry (1915) 3 K. B. 83.

It has long been a settled rule of construction that where a statute is adopted from another state or from Great Britain it will be presumed that the Legislature intended it to receive the...