Illinois Steel Co. v. Fuller
| Decision Date | 06 November 1939 |
| Docket Number | 27253. |
| Citation | 23 N.E.2d 259,216 Ind. 180 |
| Parties | ILLINOIS STEEL CO. v. FULLER. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Appeal from Jasper Circuit Court; Moses Leopold, Judge.
Hanley & Hanley, of Rensselaer, Knapp, Allen & Cushing, of Chicago, Ill., and Bomberger, Peters & Morthland, of Hammond, for appellant.
Gavit & Richardson, of Gary, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a judgment in damages in favor of appellee for an alleged occupational disease contracted by him through appellant's negligence. The errors assigned are, that the trial court erred in overruling the demurrer to the complaint and in 'refusing to grant' appellant's motion for a new trial.
Liability was asserted under the Indiana Employers' Liability Law § 40-1101, Burns' 1933, Sec. 10100-1, Baldwin's 1934. Negligence was predicated upon the alleged failure of the appellant to supply appellee with serviceable gas masks, as required by Section 40-1011, Burns' 1933 Sec. 10085, Baldwin's 1934, and in failing to provide appellee's work place with sufficient means of ventilation, as required by Section 40-1013, Burns' 1933 Sec. 10072, Baldwin's 1934.
The issues of law were: (1) whether an action for occupational disease may be maintained under our Employers' Liability Law, and (2) whether the statutes requiring an employer to supply serviceable gas masks and to provide sufficient means of ventilation are so vague and indefinite as to deny due process, under the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution, U.S.C.A. or constitute a delegation of legislative power, in violation of Article 3, Section 1, of the Constitution of Indiana. The issues of fact were: (1) whether appellee was suffering from benzol poisoning or its results, and (2) if so, whether such poisoning was proximately caused by the negligence of the appellant.
Appellee has suggested that the assignment that the court below erred in 'refusing to grant' appellant's motion for a new trial does not present anything for review, because, under Rule 18 of this court and the established practice of this state, such an assignment must be based upon the 'overruling' of the motion for a new trial. In the case of Board of Commissioners of Harrison County v. Byrne, 1879, 67 Ind. 21, this court held sufficient an assignment that 'the court below erred in not granting a new trial.' We regard appellee's contention as highly technical and hold that the assignment under consideration is not improper.
We shall first consider whether an action on account of occupational disease occurring prior to the enactment of the Indiana Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act, Acts 1937, Ch. 69, p. 334, § 40-2201 et seq., Burns' 1939 Pocket Supp., Sec. 16499 et seq., Baldwin's May 1937 Supp., could be maintained under the Employers' Liability Law. The paramount purpose of the Employers' Liability Law seems to have been to restrict the use of the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and negligence of a fellow servant. As to the duties imposed upon those coming within its terms, it has been said that the act is declaratory of the common law. Emerson Brantingham Co. v. Growe, 1922, 191 Ind. 564, 572, 133 N.E. 919. While it has been disputed, the weight of authority sustains the view that an action for negligence resulting in damages from an occupational disease was known to the common law. The cases bearing on that subject have been carefully collected and annotated in 105 A.L.R. 80. In the case of In re Jefferies, 1938, 105 Ind.App. 349, 352, 14 N.E.2d 751, 753, our Appellate Court said that, 'in the enactment of the Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act, the Legislature created new rights and remedies not theretofore existing under the common law or statutes of this state.' But, it may be observed that the Jefferies case was an appeal from the Industrial Board of Indiana, in which class of cases no right of transfer to this court is recognized under the prevailing practice. To the extent that the Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act authorizes compensation for occupational diseases not caused by the employer's negligence, it is true that said act created new rights not theretofore existing under the common law or statutes of this state, and it does, of course, create distinctly new remedies. We do not recognize In re Jefferies, supra, as authority for the conclusion, however, that a common law action for the negligence of an employer, resulting in an occupational disease, could not have been maintained in this state prior to the compensation act of 1937.
As a corollary to what we have said, it must follow that the Employers' Liability Law embraces injuries from occupational diseases unless these are excluded by its terms. The title and body of the act purport to make it applicable to liability for injuries, rather than to accidental injuries. The word 'injury' is a generic term of broad designation. As applied to the human body, it may result from other causes than trauma. Disability from an occupational disease may be no less an injury than one resulting from accident. While the applicability of the Employers' Liability Law to occupational diseases does not seem to have been specifically considered by this tribunal, in at least three cases judgments obtained thereunder have been sustained by our Appellate Court. McBeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Brunson, 1919, 70 Ind.App. 513, 122 N.E. 439; Nat. Rolling Mill Co. v. Heishman, 1924, 80 Ind.App. 673, 141 N.E. 470; General Printing Corp. v. Umback, Adm'x, 1935, 100 Ind.App. 285, 297, 195 N.E. 281, 286. In the last mentioned case that court said: * * *'
The first issue of law stated above is resolved in favor of the appellee.
Appellant has attacked the constitutionality of the legislative acts upon which the charges of negligence contained in appellee's complaint are based. Section 1, Chapter 39, Acts 1919, § 40-1011, Burns' 1933, requires employers of workmen employed in any enclosed room or structure, in which there may be dangerous, noxious, or deleterious gases, 'to supply such workmen with serviceable gas masks, to be worn while such work is being performed.' (Our italics.) Section 15, Chapter 142, Acts 1899, § 40-1013, Burns' 1933, Sec. 10072, Baldwin's 1934, provides that 'there shall be sufficient means of ventilation provided in each workroom of every manufacturing or mercantile establishment.' (Our italics.) Violations of the above provisions are charged as the proximate causes of the appellee's injuries. Appellant urges that the requirements that the employer shall supply 'serviceable gas masks' and shall provide 'sufficient means of ventilation' are so vague, indefinite, and uncertain as to be unenforceable; that to enforce these provisions would result in a denial of due process of law; and that to do so would amount to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to courts and juries.
Courts are always reluctant to strike down legislative enactments, especially when they have been long acquiesced in, and he who raises the question of constitutionality must assume the burden of making it clearly appear. When it is asserted that a statute is so indefinite that its enforcement would result in a denial of due process or amount to an unauthorized delegation of legislative functions, the court must consider the enactment in the light of the problems with which the Legislature was undertaking to deal. Meticulous exactitude and absolute precision is rarely attained, nor is it required, in the drafting of statutes of this character. It may be observed that in the adoption of the gas mask and ventilation statutes here under consideration, the General Assembly was undertaking to impose safety measures with respect to factories, establishments, and industries of many kinds. For example, masks that would be serviceable and a means of ventilation that would be sufficient in a gaseous mine might be wholly unsuited or inadequate in a factory where poisonous chemicals or explosives were manufactured, or vice versa. It would, no doubt, be impossible to prescribe by law definite specifications as to what particular type of gas mask or what peculiar means of ventilation would be serviceable and sufficient under all the varying circumstances to which these acts are applicable; and if there is an inflexible and comprehensive rule for determining when statutes of the character of those now under consideration meet the requirement of due process, our attention has not been called to it. Perhaps it is enough to say that such statutes are valid when they clearly designate the dangers and hazards against which the Legislature sought to provide protection and reasonably indicate the means or methods by which that is to be accomplished.
We are not altogether without the guidance of persuasive precedents in dealing with this problem. In Jeffersonville Mfg. Co v. Holden, 1913, 180 Ind. 301, 102 N.E. 21, and Marietta Glass Mfg. Co. v. Pruitt, 1913, 180 Ind. 434, 102 N.E. 369, this court considered the validity of a statute of this state requiring certain machinery when used in factories to be 'properly guarded.' There, as here, it was urged that the requirement was unconstitutional and...
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