Illis v. United Steelworkers of America

• Decision Date: 14 August 1985
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 84/184.
• Parties: Ivan ILLIS, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL/CIO-CLC and Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands

615 F. Supp. 1081

Ivan ILLIS, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL/CIO-CLC and Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., Defendants.

Civ. No. 84/184.

District Court, Virgin Islands, D. St. Croix.

August 14, 1985.

Barbara Twine, Legal Services of the Virgin Islands, St. Thomas, V.I., for plaintiff.

John R. Coon, Christiansted, St. Croix, V.I., for United Steelworkers of America, AFL/CIO-CLC.

Linda Shelby, Birch, de Jongh & Farrelly, St. Thomas, V.I., for Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHRISTIAN, Chief Judge.

This is a typical Vaca/Hines action. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 47 L.Ed.2d 231 (1976). Plaintiff Ivan Illis sues his former employer, Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. ("HOVIC"), for breach of collective bargaining agreement pursuant to § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 185. Additionally, plaintiff sues the exclusive representative for the relevant bargaining unit, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC ("Steelworkers"), for breach of duty of fair representation.

Before the Court is the motion of defendant HOVIC for dismissal of the complaint as to it for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In evaluating said motion we look beyond the pleadings to the affidavit of Ivan Illis and the collective bargaining agreement ("the Agreement") between defendants HOVIC and Steelworkers. (The Agreement is attached to the complaint, as Exhibit A.) Accordingly, we treat the motion of defendant HOVIC as one for summary judgment. Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(b). We deem the facts alleged in the complaint and recited in the Illis affidavit established for purposes of assessing said motion.

The material facts, thus established, are as follows:

(1) Plaintiff Ivan Illis was hired by defendant HOVIC in 1968 as an "A" Operator.

(2) Plaintiff served HOVIC in this job classification for some 15 years.

(3) On June 7, 1981 defendants HOVIC and Steelworkers entered into a collective bargaining agreement which remained in force throughout the period relevant to this action. During the said period, plaintiff Illis was a member of the bargaining unit covered by said agreement.

(4) On the advice of his physician plaintiff requested a temporary job change in early 1982.

(5) Said request resulted in plaintiff's transfer to "the lab" as a "C" Operator in April, 1982.

(6) In September, 1982 plaintiff was advised by his physician that he could return to work as an "A" operator.

(7) Plaintiff so advised his supervisors.

(8) Plaintiff was thereupon advised (a) that he would not be returned to his position as an "A" Operator and (b) that he had lost his 15 years seniority.

(9) On or before September 8, 1982 plaintiff requested that George Flores, shop steward for Steelworkers Local # 8526, assist him in filing a grievance concerning the denial of his request for return to "A" Operator status.

(10) Flores thereupon directed plaintiff to obtain a statement from his physician indicating that he was physically capable of returning to his "old job."

(11) Plaintiff obtained such a statement on September 8, 1982 and delivered same to Flores.

(12) Plaintiff subsequently asked Flores "on numerous occasions if his grievance had been filed."

(13) On each such occasion Flores "assured plaintiff the request had been filed and it would be resolved soon."

(14) Neither Flores nor any other Steelworkers representative ever filed a grievance on behalf of plaintiff.

(15) In February of 1983 plaintiff was laid off by defendant due to his relative lack of seniority as a "C" Operator.

(16) The complaint against defendants HOVIC and Steelworkers was filed with this Court on June 20, 1984.

On these facts plaintiff prays "that this Court determine that Defendant Company discharged Plaintiff without just cause, in breach and violation of Plaintiff's rights under the Collective Bargaining Agreement, and that Defendant Local Union breached its duty of fair representation owing to Plaintiff in the processing of the grievance filed on Plaintiff's discharge."

We find this prayer for relief puzzling. Plaintiff does not allege, in the body of his complaint, that he was dismissed without just cause. Rather, he alleges that he was laid off due to HOVIC's wrongful failure to honor his seniority. Nor does plaintiff allege that any grievance was filed upon his discharge or even that he requested the filing of such a grievance. Rather, plaintiff alleges that he requested that a grievance be filed concerning the refusal of HOVIC to reinstate him as an "A" Operator with accrued seniority. For purposes of evaluating the motion before us, we will ignore the discrepancy between plaintiff's allegations and his prayer for relief on the assumption that plaintiff could amend his complaint to allege facts sufficient to support his prayer for relief.

Accordingly, we view the complaint as alleging (1) that defendant HOVIC violated plaintiff's rights under the collective bargaining agreement (a) by refusing to return plaintiff to "A" Operator status, with attendant seniority, in September, 1982, and (b) by laying off and/or discharging plaintiff in February, 1983, and (2) that defendant Steelworkers breached its duty to represent plaintiff fairly (a) by failing to grieve HOVIC's refusal to return plaintiff to "A" Operator status, with attendant seniority, in September, 1982, and (b) by failing to grieve plaintiff's layoff and/or discharge in February, 1983.

Defendant HOVIC contends that "while Plaintiff may have a meritorious action against the Steelworkers for failure to file a grievance on his behalf, Plaintiff has no cause of action against Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp." due to his admitted failure to exhaust contractual remedies. This contention is entirely without merit. An employee "may bring an action against his employer in the face of a defense based upon the failure to exhaust contractual remedies, provided the employee can prove that the union as bargaining agent breached its duty of fair representation in its handling of the employee's grievance." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186, 87 S.Ct. 903, 914, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967).

Under Vaca, plaintiff's claims against the union for breach of duty of fair representation and against his former employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement are "inextricably interdependent." Metz v. Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc., 715 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir.1983). To prevail against either HOVIC or the Steelworkers, plaintiff must not only show that his rights under the collective bargaining agreement were violated by HOVIC's actions but must also carry the burden of demonstrating a breach of duty by the union. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 570-71, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 1059-60, 47 L.Ed.2d 231 (1976). Therefore, we must measure the sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint against HOVIC in light of his allegations not only as to HOVIC but as to defendant Steelworker, as well.

So viewed, the complaint, if timely, plainly recites a cognizable claim against defendant HOVIC. The complaint clearly alleges that plaintiff's failure to avail himself of the contractual dispute resolution mechanisms available under the collective bargaining agreement was the result of a breach by defendant union of its duty to represent plaintiff fairly. The question remains whether this claim was asserted within the applicable limitations period.

Some four months after plaintiff was laid off by defendant HOVIC, the Supreme Court of the United States held, in DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), that the six month limitations period applicable under Subsection 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), to actions based on unfair labor practices, governs both contractual claims under § 301 and claims for breach of duty of fair representation.¹ Defendant HOVIC contends that this action is time barred under DelCostello and that the complaint should consequently be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff counters that the action is timely as the statute of limitations did not begin to run until April 10, 1984 when plaintiff first received "clear, unequivocal notice that Defendant Union would not provide Plaintiff any assistance in pressing his grievance."

The general rule is that a statute of limitations begins to run immediately upon accrual of the cause of action it limits. The cause of action, of course, accrues the moment the right to commence an action based on said cause comes into existence. Plaintiff contends that his hybrid § 301/fair representation cause of action did not accrue until he received "clear, unequivocal notice" that defendant union did not intend to pursue his grievance. We find this contention unrealistic, contrary to the strong federal policy favoring "relatively rapid disposition of labor disputes," United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 63, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 1564, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981),² and against the weight of authority.

While the Supreme Court in DelCostello did not address the question of when a hybrid § 301/fair representation cause of action accrues, the lower courts that have reached the question seem uniformly to have concluded that such a cause accrues "when the claimant discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the acts constituting the alleged violation." DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 588 F.Supp. 902, 908 (D.Md.1984) (on remand from Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit following Supreme Court decision cited above). See also Scott v. Local 863, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 725 F.2d 226, 229 (3d Cir.1984) (remanding to district court for determination of "when the futility of further union appeals became apparent or should have...