Imerys Talc Am., Inc. v. Ricketts

• Decision Date: 19 December 2018
• Docket Number: No. 4D17-3815,4D17-3815
• Parties: IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC. f/k/a Luzenac America, Inc., Appellant, v. Judith RICKETTS, Johnson & Johnson, Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc. and Publix Super Markets, Inc., Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

262 So.3d 799

IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC. f/k/a Luzenac America, Inc., Appellant,

v.Judith RICKETTS, Johnson & Johnson, Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc. and Publix Super Markets, Inc., Appellees.

No. 4D17-3815

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[December 19, 2018]

David M. Gersten, Joseph A. Sacher and Christopher A. Noel of Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, Miami, for appellant.

David J. Sales and Daniel R. Hoffman of David J. Sales, P.A., Jupiter, and Todd R. Falzone and Karina D. Rodrigues of Kelly Uustal, PLC, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee Judith M. Ricketts.

Kuntz, J.

Imerys Talc America, Inc. appeals an order denying its motion to dismiss a products liability action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Imerys is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in California. Imerys did not have contacts with Florida, either generally or specifically related to the actions leading to the complaint. As a result, Imerys is not subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida, and we reverse the circuit court's order.

Background

Judith Ricketts filed a seven-count complaint against Johnson & Johnson, Johnson & Johnson Companies, Inc., Imerys, and Publix Super Markets, Inc. Ricketts sought "recovery for damages as a result of developing ovarian cancer

, which was directly and proximately caused by the wrongful conduct of the Defendants, the unreasonably dangerous and defective nature of talcum powder, and the associated effects of developing ovarian cancer."

Imerys moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Relevant to the personal jurisdiction issue, the complaint stated:

At all material times, the Defendant, IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC. F/K/A LUZENAC AMERICA, INC., was and is a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in California.

At all material times, the Defendant, IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC. F/K/A LUZENAC AMERICA, INC. was engaged in the business of mining and distributing talcum powder for use in talcum powder based products, including the PRODUCT. Imerys Talc is the successor or continuation of Luzenac America, Inc., and Imerys Talc America, Inc. is legally responsible for all liabilities incurred when it was known as Luzenac America, Inc.

* * *

At all material times, all above Defendants were engaged in the research, development, manufacture, design, testing, sale and marketing of the PRODUCT, and placed such products into the stream of commerce with knowledge and intent that such products be sold in the State of Florida.

* * *

The Defendant, IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC. F/K/A LUZENAC AMERICA, INC., has substantial and not isolated contact with the State of Florida and is subject to the general jurisdiction of the Florida courts.

Imerys argued the complaint failed to establish general or specific personal jurisdiction over it. In support of its lack of contacts with Florida, Imerys also filed an affidavit of its director of engineering and quality.

The affidavit stated that Imerys "does not mine talc in Florida," "does not directly sell talc to [Johnson & Johnson] in Florida," "does not directly ship talc to [Johnson & Johnson] in Florida," and "does not directly distribute talc to [Johnson & Johnson] in" the state. Ricketts did not file an affidavit in response to Imerys's motion to dismiss or in support of personal jurisdiction.

The circuit court held a hearing on Imerys's motion and concluded the hearing by stating that "this Court will follow the Florida Supreme Court and not the Supreme Court of the United States in this particular case." The court issued an order denying Imerys's motion.

Analysis

Determining whether a court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant involves a two-step inquiry. Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais , 554 So.2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989) (citing Unger v. Publisher Entry Serv., Inc. , 513 So.2d 674, 675 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), rev. denied , 520 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1988) ). The court must determine whether the allegations in the complaint bring the action within Florida's long-arm statute and, if so, whether sufficient "minimum contacts" exist between the non-resident defendant and Florida to satisfy due process. Id. (citing Unger , 513 So.2d at 675 ).

Personal jurisdiction can be general or specific. Rolls-Royce, PLC v. Spirit Airlines, Inc. , 239 So.3d 709, 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (citing Marina Dodge, Inc. v. Quinn , 134 So.3d 1103, 1106–07 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) ).

General personal jurisdiction allows a court to hear any claims against a foreign corporation. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown , 564 U.S. 915, 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011) (citation omitted). It exists when the defendant's "affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State." Id. (citation omitted); see also Daimler AG v. Bauman , 571 U.S. 117, 138, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014) (In Daimler , the plaintiffs asked the Court to "approve the exercise of general jurisdiction in every State in which a corporation ‘engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business.’ That formulation, [the Court held], is unacceptably grasping.").

Ricketts alleged in her complaint that Imerys was subject to the general personal jurisdiction of the Florida courts. But in response to Imerys's motion to dismiss, Ricketts argued Florida courts can exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Imerys. On appeal, Ricketts explains that she "argued to the trial court that Imerys is subject to specific jurisdiction, not general jurisdiction." Because of these concessions, we proceed to the specific jurisdiction analysis.

"Specific personal jurisdiction exists when ‘the alleged activities or actions of the defendant are directly connected to the forum state.’ " Rolls-Royce, PLC , 239 So.3d at 713 (quoting Caiazzo v. Am. Royal Arts Corp. , 73 So.3d 245, 250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) ). When analyzing specific personal jurisdiction, the analysis "focuses on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ " Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. , 465 U.S. 770, 775, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner , 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977) ).

The Supreme Court has explained that for specific personal jurisdiction to be appropriate, "the defendant's suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State." Walden v. Fiore , 571 U.S. 277, 284, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014). And the connection must arise out of the defendant's own activities, not those of the plaintiff or a third party. Id. (citations omitted).

The Supreme Court applied this principle in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980), and rejected the "assertion that a consumer 's unilateral act of bringing the defendant's product into the forum State was a sufficient constitutional basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County , 480 U.S. 102, 109, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987) (discussing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. , 444 U.S. at 295-96, 100 S.Ct. 559 ).

Later, the California Supreme Court held that specific personal jurisdiction was appropriate because some valves sold by Asahi, a Japanese manufacturer, were in California. Id. at 110-11, 107 S.Ct. 1026. The United States Supreme Court unanimously disagreed, with none of the three separate opinions garnering five votes. A plurality opinion written by Justice O'Connor explained that the "substantial connection" required between a forum state and the defendant "must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State." Id. at 112, 107 S.Ct. 1026 (plurality opinion) (emphasis removed) (citations omitted). The Court stated in the plurality opinion that "[t]he placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State." Id. (plurality opinion).

The test set forth in Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion is known as the "stream-of-commerce" test. Even though the Court's opinion left many questions unanswered, the Court did not address the test again until fifteen years later. See generally J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro , 564 U.S. 873, 131 S.Ct. 2780, 180 L.Ed.2d 765 (2011). "The decades following Asahi did little to clarify the stream-of-commerce confusion," and in some respects J. McIntyre "did little to refine the lines originally blurred in Asahi. " Jessica Jeffrey, The Stream of Commerce Flows On , 46 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 137, 137, 145 (2013).

In J. McIntyre , the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the courts of that state "can exercise jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer of a product so long as the manufacturer ‘knows or reasonably should know that its products are distributed through a nationwide distribution system that might lead to those products being sold in any of the fifty states.’ " 564 U.S. at 877, 131 S.Ct. 2780 (citing Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd. , 201 N.J. 48, 987 A.2d 575, 591, 592 (2010) ). Six justices on the Supreme Court agreed to reverse the holding.

A plurality opinion written by Justice Kennedy and joined by three justices explained that "[a]s a general rule, the exercise of judicial power is not lawful unless the defendant ‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’ " Id. at 877, 131 S.Ct. 2780 (plurality opinion) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla , 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958) ). There may be exceptions to this general rule, "[b]ut the general rule is applicable in this products-liability case, and the so-called ‘stream-of-commerce’ doctrine cannot displace it." Id. at 877-78, 131 S.Ct. 2780 (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy wrote that "[t]he defendant's transmission of...