Imperial IrrIGAtion Dist. v. State Wat. Resources Control Bd.

• Decision Date: 21 November 1990
• Docket Number: No. D008521,D008521
• Citation: 275 Cal.Rptr. 250,225 Cal.App.3d 548
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT, Appellant, v. STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, Respondent. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., Intervener.

Page 250

275 Cal.Rptr. 250

225 Cal.App.3d 548

IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT, Appellant, v. STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, Respondent Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., Intervener.

No. D008521.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Nov. 21, 1990.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing

Dec. 12, 1990.

Review Denied March 13, 1991.

Horton, Knox, Carter & Foote, J. Penn Carter and Reginald L. Knox, Jr., El Centro, Jennings, Engstrand & Henrikson, Paul D. Engstrand and Richard G. Opper, San Diego, for plaintiff and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Andrea S. Ordin, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., R.H. Connett, Asst. Atty. Gen., and M. Anne Jennings, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

John W. Krautkraemer, Washington, D.C., for intervener.

FROEHLICH, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate brought by Imperial Irrigation District (IID) to overturn a decision of the State Water Resources Control Board (Board).

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND STANDARDS FOR REVIEW

In 1980 a private citizen requested the Department of Water Resources to investigate alleged misuse of water by IID which had resulted in a rise in the level of the Salton Sea, flooding the citizen's farmland. After an investigation, an initial conclusion of water waste, and unproductive communications with IID, the Department of Water Resources referred the matter to the Board for investigation and action. The Board held a hearing which encompassed a period of six days late in 1983, taking testimony and receiving evidence from a number of sources including the original complaining citizen, the Department of Water Resources, IID, a number of other governmental agencies, and the intervener herein, the Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.

On June 21, 1984, the Board issued its Decision Regarding Misuse of Water by Imperial Irrigation District, designated Decision 1600 (hereafter sometimes referred to as "Board Decision") which consisted of a 71-page review of the history of the proceedings, the evidence taken by the Board, the Board's findings and conclusions, and an order requiring certain action be taken by IID. The Board gave reconsideration to its decision upon the request of several parties, including IID. By order dated September 20, 1984, all modifications sought were denied and the previous decision was affirmed.

IID thereupon brought action in the superior court seeking review of the Board's action. By stipulation of the parties, the trial court bifurcated its review and undertook first to determine the question of the Board's jurisdiction. IID contended the Board did not have the power to render the adjudicatory decision contained in Decision 1600. (Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1160, 1162, 231 Cal.Rptr. 283; hereafter cited as "Imperial I.") The trial court agreed with IID, ruling that "[t]he orders contained in Decision 1600 are without binding effect on [IID]." (Id. at p. 1164, 231 Cal.Rptr. 283.) An appeal to this court followed, resulting in reversal of the trial court's ruling, the court stating: "[W]e hold ... that the Board's authority includes the power to adjudicate the article X, section 2, issue of unreasonable use of water by IID." (Id. at p. 1171, 231 Cal.Rptr. 283.) The appellate court also ruled that a plenary review of the Board's decision should be by way of writ in the superior court. (Ibid.)

The case then being returned to the superior court, said court undertook to review by writ of mandate the substance of Decision 1600. Using the independent judgment test (as directed by this court, ibid.), the court determined that the Board's findings were supported by the evidence, that its decision was "a reasonable and balanced directive for achieving compliance with Article X, Section 2," and that the writ should be denied. This appeal followed.

The appellate court's function, in reviewing determinations made by the superior court in its "independent judgment" review of an administrative agency decision, is to apply the substantial evidence test to factual findings. Factual determinations by the trial court will be upheld if substantial evidence, gleaned from the administrative record, supports them. (Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist. v. Commission on Professional Competence (1977) 20 Cal.3d 309, 314, 142 Cal.Rptr. 439, 572 P.2d 53; 8 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Extraordinary Writs, § 254, p. 879.) The trial court's determinations of issues of law, however, are fully reviewable by this court,

and we are bound neither by the preliminary resolution of same by the Board nor by the subsequent trial court decision. (9 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, §§ 241, 242, pp. 246-249; Shoban v. Board of Trustees (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 534, 541, 81 Cal.Rptr. 112.)

POSTURE OF APPEAL

As IID concedes in its brief, the essential facts of this case are not in dispute. The experts on any particular issue were never in complete agreement, but their differences were of degree, not kind. For instance, estimates of water lost through "canal spill" ranged from 53,000 to 135,000 acre feet per annum; and water lost through excessive "tailwater" ranged from 312,000 to 559,000 acre feet per annum. There was no dispute, however, that very large quantities of water in each case were being lost. The dispute is whether such loss (and this is but one example of such decisions made by the Board) was or was not reasonable.

Such ultimate characterization of factual issues is, we apprehend, more a conclusion of law than an issue of fact. Since, as is conceded, there are no real factual issues, we are not required, at least as to the principal issues on appeal, to sift through the administrative record to search for "substantial facts" supporting the court's decision. To the extent ultimate conclusions are factual, such as the key determination made by the Board and the trial court that IID's use of water was "unreasonable," our identification of substantial evidence in support of the court's conclusion can rest upon undisputed facts before both tribunals and our independent analysis as to whether any reasonable court could come to the ultimate conclusion of fact reached by the Board and the court. (See 9 Witkin Cal.Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, §§ 296-298, pp. 307-311.)

IID's assertions principally attack the conclusions of law made by the Board, as the same were approved by the trial court. We are therefore required to consider whether the Board's determinations, contained in Decision 1600, are sustainable in terms of its jurisdiction, its interpretation of statutes and regulations, and its legal conclusions.

In this regard we note that the very same Decision 1600 was before this court previously, in Imperial I, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d 1160, 231 Cal.Rptr. 283. Our court at that time, citing existing statutory and judicial precedent, ruled that the Board had full authority to exercise adjudicatory and regulatory functions in the field of water law (id. at p. 1165, 231 Cal.Rptr. 283); that it had "broad authority to control and condition water use, insuring utilization consistent with public interest" (id. at p. 1166, 231 Cal.Rptr. 283); that in such adjudication the Board could consider the interests of concerned persons who might not be parties to court action (id. at p. 1167, 231 Cal.Rptr. 283); that article X, section 2 of the Constitution requires that all uses of water conform to a standard of reasonable use, and that the Board has a duty to ensure this mandate (id. at p. 1168, 231 Cal.Rptr. 283); that the Board's adjudicatory authority is "all-encompassing" (id. at p. 1169, 231 Cal.Rptr. 283); and that the Board shall take all necessary action in executive, legislative and judicial forums to prevent waste and unreasonable water use. (Ibid.)

We also note that although the entire administrative record was before this court at the time of its prior hearing, and the court was obviously most conversant with the facts before, and decision of, the Board, it made no suggestion of any errors or transgressions by the Board in its interpretation and application of law. In light of this posture of the case it seems an uphill climb, to say the least, for IID now to assert claims of lack of jurisdiction and erroneous construction of legal principles by the Board.

However, we concede that our prior decision was somewhat limited in scope, and that we did remit the case to the superior court for further consideration. We also recognize the acknowledged expertise of counsel now before the court in the subject of water law, and the historic and practical

importance of the issues raised (or re-raised) by IID. We therefore address anew the legal contentions of IID. These contentions are several, and receive different characterization in the briefs of appellant and respondents. Our effort to summarize the contentions results in the following outline of issues:

1. Did the Board err in the definition and exercise of its jurisdiction? Specifically:

(a) Since the Legislature has never set standards for the reasonableness of use of irrigation water, but has left the same for the determination of local agencies, does the Board have the power to establish standards of reasonableness?

(b) Does the Board have power to interfere with vested water rights?

(c) Is the Board's action a violation of the separation of powers doctrine?

2. Assuming the Board acted within its jurisdiction, did it err in the exercise and application of its adjudicatory powers? Specifically:

(d) Did the Board apply the correct measure of deference to the determinations of IID, considering that IID acted in a legislative capacity and its determinations should be reversed only upon a finding of abuse of discretion?

(e) Assuming the Board can adjudicate controversies between disputant water users, does it have any right to investigate and regulate water use of a...