Imperial Knife Co. v. Calise, 2201

• Decision Date: 26 June 1953
• Docket Number: No. 2201,2201
• Citation: 97 A.2d 579,80 R.I. 428
• Parties: IMPERIAL KNIFE CO., Inc. v. CALISE. Equity
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 579

97 A.2d 579

80 R.I. 428

IMPERIAL KNIFE CO., Inc. v. CALISE.

Equity No. 2201.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 26, 1953.

Boss & Conlan and John T. Keenan, Providence, for petitioner.

Isidore Kirshenbaum, Providence, for respondent.

CONDON, Justice.

This is an employer's petition for review of an agreement providing workmen's compensation to respondent for total incapacity. After a hearing in the superior court a decree was entered ordering petitioner to pay compensation for partial incapacity. From that decree petitioner has appealed to this court.

At the conclusion of the hearing the trial justice reserved decision and later filed a rescript in which he reviewed the evidence, made express findings thereon, and decided that respondent was no longer totally incapacitated but was partially incapacitated notwithstanding that ordinarily she should be able to perform certain light work which petitioner had offered her. Such findings are set out in the decree as follows:

'1. The employee is not now totally incapacitated.

'2. The employee is disabled from operating a power press such as she was working on at the time of her injury.

'3. The employee is partially incapacitated as a direct result of her injury.

'4. The employer has in good faith offered the respondent the following employment in its factory, at a wage equal to her average weekly wage at the time of her injury, which she should be able to perform except that she now has a fear complex which she should first make reasonable efforts to overcome:

'a.) Sorting miscellaneous knife parts, including blanks, unfinished blades, and knife springs.

'b.) Set up work--removing semi-finished knives from metal tray and placing in wooden tray.

'5. The employee is able to do other types of work which do not require the use of the injured fingertips.'

The petitioner filed five reasons of appeal from the decree the first three of which are generally that it is against the law, the evidence, and the law and the evidence. The fourth and fifth are more specific and are as follows: '4. The Court erred in its finding of fact that the employee is partially disabled by reason of a fear complex which prevents her from doing the work offered her in good faith by the employer. 5. The Court's decision that the employee is entitled to compensation for partial disability is based upon a misconception of the evidence.'

At the hearing before us petitioner confined its contentions in support of its reasons of appeal to those specific reasons and further narrowed its argument solely to the claim that there was no evidence upon which a finding could be based that respondent was incapacitated by a 'fear complex' from doing the light work which was offered her. In answer to that claim respondent contends that the finding of partial incapacity is not necessarily based on a 'fear complex' referred to in paragraph 4, as such finding is expressly and independently stated in paragraph 3. In other words she contends that that finding if supported by some evidence furnishes a basis for the decree and she insists there is such evidence.

We are of the opinion that respondent's interpretation of the decree is incorrect. Paragraphs 3 and 4 are necessarily based upon the view that respondent, although in general partially incapacitated, is not so incapacitated with respect to the specific jobs mentioned in paragraph 4, except that presently she has a 'fear complex' which in the opinion of the trial justice amounts to actual incapacity even as to those jobs.

On that view the only question for determination here is whether there was any evidence of such a 'fear complex' as to those jobs or any evidence from which the trial justice could reasonably draw an inference to that effect. Of course if there was such evidence even though it was slight we cannot disturb those findings. In workmen's compensation cases we do not weigh the evidence or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. DiFiore v. United States Rubber Co., 78 R.I. 124, 79 A.2d 925. Those matters lie exclusively within the province of the superior court by virtue of the Workmen's Compensation Act which expressly provides that findings of fact by that court shall be conclusive in the absence of fraud. General laws 1938, chapter 300, article III, § 6.

The petitioner concedes that such is the law but contends there is no evidence that respondent had a 'fear complex' as to jobs described under (a) and (b) in paragraph 4. We agree that there is no direct evidence of that nature, but after carefully reading the transcript we are of the opinion that there...