In Interest of J.D.Z., 880031
Decision Date | 08 November 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 880031,880031 |
Citation | 431 N.W.2d 272 |
Parties | In the Interest of J.D.Z., a Child. Arnie RUMMEL, Petitioner and Appellant, v. J.D.Z., a child, and K.P., his mother, Respondents and Appellees. Civ. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
James Allen Hope (argued), Asst. States Atty., Dickinson, for petitioner and appellant.
Freed, Dynes, Reichert & Buresh, PC, Dickinson, for respondents and appellees; argued by Ronald A. Reichert.
At a hearing before the juvenile court concerning a petition to declare J.D.Z. (hereinafter Joe, a pseudonym) to be a delinquent child, the court suppressed the confession of the minor child finding it was obtained in violation of his statutory and constitutional rights. The court ordered the petition to be dismissed and this appeal followed. We affirm.
A drilling rig truck and a Ditch Witch trencher belonging to American State Bank of Dickinson and stored near the Plaza Del Toro building in Dickinson were vandalized on or about May 31, 1987. Damage to each vehicle was in excess of $2,000. An officer of American State Bank discovered the damaged vehicles and notified the officer in charge of those particular vehicles who then called the Dickinson police.
The Dickinson police began an investigation of the scene. A Crimestopper call was received which identified a possible suspect and also a potential witness, Joe. This information was relayed to Arnie Rummel, a Police Youth Bureau officer, who decided to talk with Joe, a minor child, about the incident.
Rummel went to the home of Joe, his mother, K.P. (hereinafter Karen, a pseudonym), and his stepfather, B.P. (hereinafter Bob, a pseudonym). All four sat down in the living room and Rummel began to question Joe. After a few initial questions, Rummel got the impression that Joe was not telling the truth and told him so. 1 Bob, the stepfather, also told Joe that he, too, knew Joe was not telling the truth. Rummel informed Joe that he was not under arrest and did not have to answer any questions. At that point Bob began asking Joe about the incident, stating that the questions would be answered and Joe would tell the truth because Bob wanted to get to the bottom of this. 2 It is at this point that Joe confessed to having engaged in the vandalism of the vehicles together with another minor child.
A juvenile petition was later filed alleging Joe to be a delinquent child. A hearing was held on the petition during which Joe moved to have the confession suppressed and, barring that, to have the petition dismissed for lack of corroborative evidence.
The district court suppressed the confession and found there was insufficient corroborating evidence to support the confession. The court said:
In appealing from the Order Dismissing the Petition Rummel asserts that the juvenile court erred in suppressing Joe's confession and in finding that Rummel failed to corroborate that confession. Without responding to these assertions, Joe's counsel contends that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the North Dakota and United States Constitutions protects Joe from a rehearing.
The dispositive issue is whether or not Joe was denied the statutory right to counsel guaranteed by section 27-20-26, N.D.C.C. For if he was, it is immaterial whether or not he was denied a constitutional right. We find that Joe was denied this right and therefore the confession was properly suppressed.
This Court's scope of review under the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, pursuant to section 27-20-56, N.D.C.C., is equivalent to the former procedure of trial de novo. McGurren v. S.T., 241 N.W.2d 690 (N.D.1976). This Court will independently review the evidence presented to the juvenile court at the hearing on the motion to suppress. In Interest of K.B., 244 N.W.2d 297 (N.D.1976). Although the juvenile court's findings of fact are entitled to appreciable weight, this Court is not bound by those findings. In Interest of R.W.B., 241 N.W.2d 546 (N.D.1976).
Section 27-20-26(1), N.D.C.C., provides a right to counsel under the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, and states in relevant part:
We have recognized that the "stages of any proceedings" are not limited to those instances which take place in the courtroom but include circumstances in which an officer has focused his investigation on a particular suspect and is intent on gathering evidence, not merely investigating a complaint. In In re J.Z., 190 N.W.2d 27 (N.D.1971), a petition was filed alleging J.Z. to be a deprived child as a result of paternal abuse, in particular, severe injuries resulting from a broken toy telephone jammed down the five-month-old baby's throat. A juvenile supervisor met with the parents concerning termination of parental rights. We said:
[Footnote omitted.] Id. at 32.
In In Interest of R.W.B., supra, 241 N.W.2d 546, an anonymous report was received by the Grand Forks County Social Service Center that R.W.B. was not being properly cared for by his parents. As a part of its investigation, the parents were interviewed by a representative of the agency which initiated the petition seeking termination of their parental rights. Questions were asked which were designed to elicit evidence of child abuse. Relying on In re J.Z., supra, we held that the parents "were entitled to be advised of their right to counsel pursuant to Sec. 27-20-26(1), N.D.C.C., because the investigation being conducted by [the representative] had focused upon them." 3 Id. at 556.
In the instant case, the initial questions by Rummel to Joe about his knowledge of the incident may not constitute a stage of the proceedings. However, once Rummel became aware that Joe may have been personally involved in the vandalism, his line of questioning, and the investigation, focused on Joe. This focus, and the questions designed to elicit evidence of vandalism, caused the interview to become a "stage" of the "proceedings." 4 Before being asked any more questions, Joe was entitled to be advised of his right to counsel under section 27-20-26, N.D.C.C. Rummel merely told Joe that he was not under arrest and that he did not have to answer any questions. No mention was made of his right to counsel.
Section 27-20-26, N.D.C.C., not only provides that a party is entitled to representation but specifically states: "Counsel must be provided for a child not represented by his parent, guardian, or custodian." [Emphasis added.] We have held that the mere presence of a parent does not constitute representation. In State v. Grenz, 243 N.W.2d 375 (N.D.1976), a seventeen-year-old was charged with first degree robbery. The minor child's parents were present at the waiver-of-jurisdiction hearing, but [Citation omitted.] Id. at 380.
While Joe's mother, Karen, and his mother's husband, Bob, were present during the...
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