In Interest of T.J., No. 12-03-00331-CV (TX 3/14/2005)
| Decision Date | 14 March 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 12-03-00331-CV.,12-03-00331-CV. |
| Parties | IN THE INTEREST OF T.J., A CHILD |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Appeal from the County Court at Law Cherokee County, Texas.
Panel consisted of WORTHEN, C.J., GRIFFITH, J., and DeVASTO, J.
The Attorney General of Texas appeals from a judgment denying full faith and credit to a Michigan child support arrearage order against Jordan Jones. In three issues, the Attorney General contends that the judgment is valid, enforceable, and entitled to full faith and credit. We reverse and render.
Peggy and Jordan Jones were divorced in 1974 in Macomb County, Michigan. Under the terms of the divorce decree, Jordan was ordered to pay weekly support for T.J., the couple's minor child, and a monthly service fee to the Friend of the Court while the support order was operative. Jordan failed to pay as ordered and subsequently moved to Texas. Michigan's child support enforcement agency forwarded a petition to enforce Jordan's child support obligation.
The District Attorney for Cherokee County, Texas prosecuted the action and, in 1983, obtained an arrearage order under the Texas Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA). The order included a finding that the amount of Jordan's arrearage under the Michigan divorce decree was $3,384.1 In 1988, the Attorney General initiated a proceeding to enforce the 1983 order. In that proceeding, the trial court found that, since 1983, Jordan had incurred an additional arrearage of $1,307.13. The court then entered judgment for Jordan's total arrearage, which appeared to include the unpaid portion of the arrearage that was established by the 1983 order. On May 6, 1991, a Release of Judgment Lien was filed in Cherokee County, Texas. The release included recitals that the parties had settled the 1988 judgment and that the State of Texas released and discharged the lien created by the judgment.
In a letter to Jordan dated May 22, 1991, the Friend of the Court for the 16th Judicial Circuit Court of Michigan acknowledged that she had received the release of lien. However, she informed Jordan that the Texas order had not established the full amount of the Michigan arrearage. The letter further informed Jordan that he still owed $5,536.89, which was the difference between the amount established in Texas and the amount owed in Michigan.
On January 22, 2002, the State of Michigan registered an authenticated and certified copy of an arrearage order entered by the 16th Judicial Circuit Court of Macomb County, Michigan on August 14, 2001 (the "2001 order"). The order included a finding that Jordan owed $8,847.24 in unpaid child support and $374.75 in unpaid service fees. Further, Michigan included a certified copy of the 1974 divorce decree, which was a default judgment of divorce. Jordan contested registration of the 2001 order, stating that the alleged child support owed was for the period prior to 1984, that a support order was entered and payments made pursuant to the 1983 Texas order, and that a Release of Judgment Lien had been filed. Jordan also contended that the 2001 order was barred by limitations in both Texas and Michigan.
After a hearing on October 2, the trial court sustained Jordan's contest to registration of the order. At the Attorney General's request, the trial court signed findings of fact and conclusions of law on October 21. The Attorney General then filed a motion to modify, correct, or reform the judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial. After a hearing, the trial court granted a new trial, which was held on June 5, 2003.2
Jordan's current wife Judy was the sole witness at the June 5 hearing. She testified that, after marrying Jordan in 1982, she kept the couple's records and made the child support payments. She admitted that there was a child support arrearage in 1983, but stated that, to the best of her recollection, Jordan owed no back child support after 1988. According to Judy, the Attorney General's Office informed her that the arrearage was paid in full. A few months later, however, she and Jordan received a letter from Michigan notifying Jordan that he still owed an arrearage. Judy testified that she called the Attorney General's Office six times regarding this letter. She also stated that the Attorney General's Office responded that the arrearage was paid. Moreover, Judy testified that she called Macomb County, Michigan two or three times regarding the arrearage. She also testified that, based upon her knowledge of the matter, she and Jordan had paid all of the back child support due under the Michigan divorce decree. However, Judy provided no documentation to support her testimony.
Jordan's attorney stated in closing argument that Michigan did not obtain service on Jordan before obtaining the 2001 order. However, no documentation or other proof was offered in evidence to support this statement. Jordan's attorney also abandoned Jordan's limitations defense and stated that his purpose in the hearing had been twofold: (1) to determine whether back child support was owed and (2) to determine whether the 2001 order was correct.
In announcing its ruling, the trial court stated that, under the facts presented, the United States Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require recognition of the 2001 order. Thus, the trial court ordered that the 2001 order not be registered as a judgment in Texas. Further, the trial court adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law previously signed on October 21, 2002. On June 11, the trial court signed an order incorporating its ruling denying registration of the 2001 order. However, the trial court, upon a request from the Attorney General, filed findings of fact and conclusions of law that differed from those it had previously adopted. After the Attorney General filed another motion to modify, correct, or reform, or, alternatively, for a new trial, the trial court held a hearing, denied the motion, and entered an order incorporating its ruling. This appeal followed.
Under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), a support order or income-withholding order issued by a tribunal of another state may be registered in this state for enforcement.3 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 159.601 (Vernon 2002). A support order or income-withholding order issued in another state is registered when the order is filed in the registering tribunal of this state. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 159.603(a) (Vernon 2002). The nonregistering party seeking to contest the validity or enforcement of a registered order may, under section 159.607, seek to vacate the registration, assert any defense to an allegation of noncompliance with the registered order, or contest the remedies being sought or the amount of any alleged arrearages. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 159.606(a) (Vernon 2002).
A party contesting the validity or enforcement of a registered order or seeking to vacate the registration has the burden of proving one or more of the following defenses: (1) the issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the contesting party; (2) the order was obtained by fraud; (3) the order has been vacated, suspended, or modified by a later order; (4) the issuing tribunal has stayed the order pending appeal; (5) there is a defense under the law of this state to the remedy sought; (6) full or partial payment has been made; or (7) the statute of limitation under section 159.604 precludes enforcement of some or all of the arrearages. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 159.607(a) (Vernon 2002).
If the contesting party does not establish a defense under section 159.607(a), the registering tribunal shall issue an order confirming the order. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 159.607(c). The law of the issuing state governs the nature, extent, amount, and duration of current payments and other obligations of support and the payment of arrearages under the order. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 159.604(a) (Vernon 2002).
In its first issue, the Attorney General contends there is no evidence to support the trial court's finding ( of fact number 23) that Jordan was not served with notice of the suit that resulted in the 2001 order. Therefore, it concludes, the trial court could not deny full faith and credit to the 2001 order on the ground that the Michigan court lacked personal jurisdiction of Jordan.
A trial court's findings of fact are binding on an appellate court unless they are so contrary to the great preponderance of the evidence as to show a clear abuse of discretion. In re Ferguson, 927 S.W.2d 766, 769 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, no writ). In the absence of such a clear abuse of discretion, an appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Id. In argument, Jordan's attorney claimed that Jordan was not served with notice of the 2001 Michigan action. However, no evidence regarding lack of notice was admitted at the hearing nor is there any such evidence in the record. Because there is no evidence to support the trial court's finding that Jordan was not served with notice of the Michigan suit, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in making the finding. Therefore, the finding is not binding upon us.
A party contesting the validity or enforcement of a registered order or seeking to vacate the registration has the burden of proving that the issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the contesting party. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 159.607(a). Because there was no evidence at the hearing or in the record to support Jordan's contention that he had not been served with notice of the 2001 Michigan action, he failed to prove that the Michigan court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. See id. Accordingly, we sustain the Attorney General's first issue.
In its second issue, the Attorney General contends that the ...
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