In re Adoption of B.L.F.
| Decision Date | 20 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 20CA11 |
| Parties | IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF: B.L.F. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
APPEARANCES:
Ryan Shepler, Logan, Ohio, for Intervenor-Appellant.
{¶1} Appellant, the child's paternal grandmother, appeals the trial court's judgment that granted a petition to adopt the minor child. Appellant raises three assignments of error. Appellant first asserts that the trial court erred as a matter of law by allowing the adoption to proceed when the Petitioner, the child's stepfather, did not use an agency or an attorney to arrange the adoption. Appellant next claims that the trial court erred by accepting the biological father's consent to the adoption when the father's consent was based upon terminating his child support obligation. Appellant further contends that the trial court erred by concluding that adoption is in the child's best interest.1
{¶2} Upon review, we do not find any merit to Appellant's assignments of error. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant's three assignments of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.
{¶3} J.B. ("Father") and J.F. ("Mother") are the child's biological parents but were never married. In October 2016, approximately four years after the child's birth, J.F. married M.F. ("Stepfather").
{¶4} Father exercised parenting time with the child until the child was around six years of age. At that time, Father stopped visiting the child.
{¶5} On February 19, 2020, Stepfather filed a petition to adopt the child. Father consented to the adoption.
{¶6} Appellant, the child's paternal grandmother, later filed a motion to intervene.
{¶7} On September 22, 2020, the trial court granted Appellant's motion to intervene and held an adoption hearing. The trial court asked Father whether anyone had forced him to consent. Father stated, "No." The court asked Father whether his decision to consent was of his "own freewill," and Father stated, "Yes." Father also indicated that he understood that his decision to consent to the adoption would affect Appellant's relationship with the child. The court asked Father if he wished "to contest the adoption in anyway," and Father stated that he did not.
{¶8} Stepfather testified that he wished to adopt the child. Stepfather stated that the child does not remember Father, because it has been two or three years since the child saw Father. Father then interjected and confirmed that he has not seen the child in about two years. Father explained that the child
{¶9} Father then testified that he believes granting the adoption is in the child's best interest. Father explained that the child Father continued to testify that he has a strained relationship with Appellant and that he does not believe continued contact between Appellant and the child would benefit the child.
{¶10} Appellant testified that until Father stopped visiting the child, Appellant shared a "wonderful" relationship with the child. Appellant stated that before Father moved out of her house two or three years ago, Father had been exercising parenting time with the child at Appellant's house every other week and that she helped care for the child. Appellant further explained that she does not believe that the adoption is in the child's best interest because it would end the relationship that the child has with Appellant and her extended family. Appellant stated that the child enjoys visiting her and the extended family.
{¶11} On October 13, 2020, the trial court granted Stepfather's petition to adopt the child. The court first found that Father had consented to the adoption. The trial court noted: The court also found that Father voluntarily consented to the adoption.
{¶12} The court next considered the best-interest factors. With respect to the least detrimental alternative available, the court observed that Father and Stepfather testified that granting the adoption would not negatively affect the child. The court also noted that both Father and Stepfather stated that the child's visits with Appellant are detrimental to the child. The court recognized that Appellant testified to the contrary and commented that Appellant "seemed to concentrate on how the adoption would affect her and her family and not the impact on the child." The court determined that this best-interest factor weighed in favor of granting the adoption.
{¶13} The court found the next two best-interest factors—the age and health and the wishes of the child—to be neutral. The court noted that the child is old enough to express his wishes, but none of the parties requested the court to conduct an in-camera interview.
{¶14} The court determined that the fourth best-interest factor—the duration of separation of the child from a parent—"strongly favors" granting the adoption. The court observed that the child has been separated from Father for several years.
{¶15} The court concluded that the fifth best-interest factor—whether adoption will allow the child to enter into a more stable and permanent family relationship—also favored granting the adoption. The court noted that granting the adoption will not change the child's current placement, but it will legally establish the relationship that "has existed for years."
{¶16} The court found that the sixth best-interest factor—the likelihood of a safe reunification with a parent within a reasonable period of time—also weighed in favor of granting the adoption. The court commented that "[t]here is virtually no chance of reunification with the father."
{¶17} The court determined that the seventh best-interest factor—the importance of providing permanency, stability, and continuity of relationships for the child—to be neutral. The court found that granting the adoption will give the child permanency and stability but may discontinue the relationship with Father's relatives. The court noted that Mother stated that "under certain circumstances she would allow contact of the child with other paternal relatives." However, the court concluded that Mother "has zero credibility on this issue." The court nevertheless did not believe that this factor weighed against granting the adoption.
{¶18} The court found that the eighth best-interest factor—the child's interactions and interrelationships—also favored granting the adoption. The court noted that the child has a good relationship with Stepfather and his half-siblings, but "has no relationship with his father whatsoever."
{¶19} The court concluded that the ninth best-interest factor—the child's adjustment to the child's current home, school, and community—also favored granting the adoption. The court found that the child is well adjusted to the child's home, school, and community and that not granting the adoption would maintain the child in Mother's custody. The court indicated, however, that it
{¶20} The court did not find either of the remaining two best-interest factors relevant to the case.
{¶21} The court noted Appellant's concerns with the adoption yet it determined that granting the adoption is in the child's best interest.
{¶22} The court thus entered a final decree of adoption. This appeal followed.
{¶23} Appellant raises three assignments of error.
{¶24} In her first assignment of error, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred as a matter of law by granting the adoption petition when the adoption petitioner, Stepfather, did not use an attorney to effectuate the adoption. Appellant argues that R.C. 3107.011(A) plainly requires a party seeking to adopt a child to use an attorney to arrange the adoption.
{¶25} We first observe that Appellant did not object to the lack of an attorney during the trial court proceedings at a time when the court could have corrected any error. As a general rule, appellate courts " ' will not consider any error which could have been brought to the trial court's attention, and hence avoided or otherwise corrected.' " Cline v. Rogers Farm Ents., LLC, 2017-Ohio-1379, 87 N.E.3d 637, ¶ 47 (4th Dist.), quoting Schade v. Carnegie Body Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 207, 210, 436 N.E.2d 1001 (1982). "Thus, a party forfeits, and may not raise on appeal, any error that arises during trial court proceedings if that party fails to bring the error to the court's attention, by objection or otherwise, at a time when the trial court could avoid or correct the error." Id., citing Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997), and Stores Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland Bd. of Bldg....
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