In re Adoption of Ta'Niya C.

• Decision Date: 22 November 2010
• Docket Number: No. 133, Sept. Term, 2009.,133, Sept. Term, 2009.
• Citation: 417 Md. 90,8 A.3d 745
• Parties: In re ADOPTION/Guardianship OF TA'NIYA C.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

8 A.3d 745

417 Md. 90

In re ADOPTION/Guardianship OF TA'NIYA C.

No. 133, Sept. Term, 2009.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 22, 2010.

Joan Little, Chief Attorney (Kelly E. James, Legal Aid Bureau, Inc., Baltimore, MD), on brief, for petitioner.

Brian L. Zavin, Asst. Public Defender (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for respondent.

Argued before HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS, BARBERA and JOHN C. ELDRIDGE (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

ADKINS, J.

We return again to the problematic question of how a court should resolve a case in which the rights of an individual to raise her child without state interference may ultimately conflictwith the best interests of that child. A juvenile court is authorized by statute to terminate the legal relationship between a parent and child upon certain conditions, and after certain findings are made. Maryland Code, (1984, 2006 Repl.Vol., 2009 Supp.), § 5-323 of the Family Law Article ("FL"). Although the paramount consideration identified in the statute, as set forth in subsection (b), is the "best interests of the child," constitutional and common-law rights of parents require consideration of countervailing factors that can make the " best interest" analysis somewhat circuitous.

Judge Wilner, writing for this Court in In re Adoption/Guardianship of Rashawn H. and Tyrese H., 402 Md. 477, 937 A.2d 177 (2007), undertook a comprehensive review of Termination of Parental Rights ("TPR") cases, as well as those involving claims by third parties to custody of children in an effort to reconcile some seeming inconsistencies in our decisions. Id. at 494, 937 A.2d at 189. He concluded that "our case law has been clear and consistent, that, even in contested adoption and TPR cases ... the best interest of the child remains the ultimate governing standard." Id. at 496, 937 A.2d at 189. This opinion is invaluable for achieving an understanding of the law in this area.

Yet, it is undeniable that in our prior decisions we have struggled in defining how parental unfitness, exceptional circumstances and the child's best interest analyses relate to one another. Compare Shurupoff v. Vockroth, 372 Md. 639, 662, 814 A.2d 543, 557 (2003) (stating that the child's best interest is the "ultimate, determinative factor" in custody disputes) with McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 418, 869 A.2d 751, 808 (2005) (stating that "the constitutional right [of the parent] is the ultimate determinative factor."). To ensure that juvenile courts have clear and consistent guidance as they decide whether termination of parental rights is justified in a given case, we reexamine the law in this area and confirm once again that the child's best interest is the prevailing standard in these determinations.

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

At the heart of this TPR case is a seven-year-old girl, Ta'Niya.¹ In October 2004, when Ta'Niya was eighteen months old, she and her older sister, Jamiara, came to the attention of the Baltimore City Department of Social Services ("DSS") whenit received reports that the house where the children were living was dirty, and that Ta'Niya had ringworm. By the time DSS intervened, Jamiara had gone to live with a maternal relative. Four years later, a court ordered that Jamiara be returned to the care of Ms. L., the girls' biological mother, subject to an Order of Protective Supervision. Ta'Niya, however, was adjudicated a Child in Need of Assistance ("CINA") ² because Ms. L. did not have stable and appropriate housing, Ta'Niya was diagnosed with high levels of lead and was behind in her immunizations, and Ta'Niya's father was not in a position to care for her, he himself needing housing and mental health assistance. As no other relatives were willing to care for Ta'Niya, DSS placed her in foster care.

From October 2004 to January 2009, Ta'Niya was placed in three different homes. When she was first placed in foster care, she experienced behavioral problems, including pulling her hair out, extensive crying, and hitting. These behaviors gradually subsided and later disappeared after Ta'Niya went to live in the foster home of Alicia and Luther W. At the time of the TPR hearing, Ta'Niya appeared to be a "very happy" child, who was doing well in school, loved to read, and had "an incredible relationship" with her foster parents, whom shecalled "mommy" and "daddy." Mr. and Mrs. W. continued to be Ta'Niya's foster parents at the time of the TPR hearing and expressed a wish to adopt her.

During the four years that Ta'Niya was in the foster care system, Ms. L. had limited contact with her. From October 2004 to January 2007, Ms. L. requested only two visits with Ta'Niya. Ms. L. testified that she frequently visited Ta'Niya from September 2005 to November 2006, when Ta'Niya lived with a relative, but did not notify DSS of those visits. From November 2006 through January 2008, Ms. L. visited Ta'Niya three times. In fact, Ms. L. did not begin to visit Ta'Niya on a regular basis until after DSS filed its TPR petition in January 2008.

Ms. L.'s reunification attempts with Ta'Niya through DSS have also been scarce. Over the time period from October 2004 to January 2008, Ms. L. signed four family service agreements, the terms of which were substantially the same: Ms. L. was to complete parenting classes, obtain stable housing, maintain employment, and submit to a substance abuse test. To assist Ms. L. in fulfilling these requirements, DSS's case workers provided Ms. L. with referrals for housing, job readiness programs, and employment.³ Yet despite these efforts, Ms. L. showed no progress with regard to the terms of the service agreements, other than completing parenting classes by December 2004.⁴

In January 2007, Ms. L. informed DSS that she had been approved to receive foodstamps and disability insurance. She also moved in with her mother at that time, and in September 2007, they began renting a house together. One month later,Ms. L. started working for a cleaning company but was laid off in September 2008. After that, Ms. L. worked for a temp agency and made additional money on the side cutting hair.

As time progressed without a showing that Ms. L. was ready for reunification with Ta'Niya,⁵ DSS filed a Petition for Guardianship of Ta'Niya, seeking termination of Ms. L.'s parental rights. In May 2008, Ms. L. completed a second 10-week parenting class and, in August 2008, she completed a drug screen and did not appear to need treatment or counseling. The week before trial, Ms. L. was rehired by the cleaning company for which she had worked in 2007, but her living arrangements were again uncertain.

The TPR hearing lasted three days, and at the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court denied DSS's petition, ruling that DSS failed to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that Ms. L. was unfit or that there were exceptional circumstances that would justify termination of Ms. L.'s parental rights. In reaching its conclusion, the court "very quickly" examined the statutory considerations enumerated in FL Section 5-323.⁶

The court began its oral opinion by stating that Rashawn "changed the law" by "chang[ing] it now from how it looks tothe child to what should happen regarding the parents." In finding that no exceptional circumstances existed, the court seemed to focus solely on Ms. L.'s actions and inactions. Namely, the court acknowledged that "it wasn't a great performance by the mother, [but] she did much of what she was asked for. Not timely, not well-documented, but what she didn't do I don't think rises to the level of extraordinary circumstances that would justify termination." Later, the court reiterated that "failure for lack of timely performance [does] not amount to exceptional circumstances[.]" Yet, at the same time, the court commented that Ms. L. is not "a person who can take care of a child[,]" and that she may never "be ready" to have Ta'Niya back.

The court was also puzzled by DSS's insistence on termination of parental rights when Ta'Niya's half-sibling, Jamiara, had already been returned to Ms. L.'s care. The court reasoned that if, in Jamiara's case, Ms. L. was fit and there were no exceptional circumstances that would have prevented her from reuniting with Jamiara, "then [it] is the same with respect to Ja'Mira [sic] as it is with respect to Ta'Niya[.]" At the end of its oral opinion, the juvenile court acknowledged thatleaving her foster parents would be detrimental to Ta'Niya's well-being but maintained that " Rashawn H. would almost ask us to ignore that."

Ta'Niya filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals ("CSA"),⁷ arguing that the juvenile court erred as a matter of law when deciding not to terminate Ms. L.'s parental rights by mistakenly believing that Rashawn "changed the standard in termination of parental rights cases from best interest of the child to best interest of the parent," and "precluded it from viewing the totality of circumstances of the case because Mother had custody of [Ta'Niya's] half-sibling under an order of protective supervision." Ta'Niya also argued that the juvenile court "abused its discretion in denying the termination of parental rights when the trial court found that [Ta'Niya]should not be returned to Mother, that there were no services that would assist Mother in having [Ta'Niya] returned, and that Mother might never be ready to have [Ta'Niya] returned to her."

In an unreported opinion, the CSA affirmed the juvenile court's decision. In re Adoption/Guardianship of Ta'Niya C., No. 2863, slip. op. at 7-13 (August 28, 2009). The CSA held that "notwithstanding [the juvenile court judge's] colorful description of the holding in Rashawn, he remained focused on the appropriate legal standard and considered the relevant statutory factors." Id. at 13. The court also held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion as "a fair reading of the court's ruling discloses that the circuit court judge's...