In re Adriana T.

• Decision Date: 29 November 2012
• Docket Number: No. 0433,Sept. Term, 2012.,0433
• Citation: 56 A.3d 814,208 Md.App. 545
• Parties: In re ADRIANA T.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

208 Md.App. 545

56 A.3d 814

In re ADRIANA T.

No. 0433, Sept. Term, 2012.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 29, 2012.

Nenutzka C. Villamar (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.

Lindsay E. Brecher (Maryland Legal Aid Bureau, on the brief), Riverdale, MD, for Appellee.

Panel: MEREDITH, HOTTEN, JAMES R. EYLER, (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

HOTTEN, J.

This appeal arises from a decision from the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, sitting as a juvenile court, which ordered the termination of the parental rights of appellant—mother, Monet T. (“Mother”) for minor child, Adriana T. (“Adriana”). Mother apparently exhibited delusional behavior while in labor, and the Prince George's County Department of Social Services (“Department”) authorized limited custody, and placed Adriana in foster care. The Department filed a Child in Need of Assistance (“CINA”) petition, alleging that Mother was unable to care for the child. The court ordered that Adriana be placed in the Department's temporary custody for continued foster care placement. Following a hearing, the court determined that Adriana was a CINA and permitted placement with a relative. The Department filed a Petition for Guardianship with the Right to Consent to Adoption, to which Mother filed an objection. Adriana's father, Detuan J. (“Father”), consented to the termination of his parental rights. Following a hearing on the petition, the court entered judgment terminating parental rights. Mother noted an appeal, and presents two questions for our consideration:

1. Did the court err in permitting a social worker to testify by telephone when [appellee]-child had not complied with Md. Rule 2–513?

2. Did the court err in admitting irrelevant evidence?

For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mother, now thirty-seven years of age, has suffered from Delusional Disorder Persecutory Type since she was seventeen.¹ On December 20, 2001, Mother suffered from a psychiatricepisode and believed that her mother, Mary T. (“Grandmother”) was complicit in a conspiracy against her. An argument ensued between Mother and Grandmother. Mother left Grandmother's residence, but returned with a handgun. Mother fired two shots at Grandmother, striking her in the chest and abdomen, but Grandmother survived. Mother was arrested and charged with several criminal offenses.² On June 16, 2003, Mother was found not criminally responsible and was committed to Perkins Hospital until her conditional release on March 26, 2007.³

On November 25, 2009, Mother, who was pregnant, was admitted to the Prince George's Hospital Center because of a preeclampsia diagnosis,⁴ which posed a serious health risk to Mother and the unborn child. Mother disregarded the physician's warning and left the hospital. On November 30, 2009, Mother returned to the hospital, but during labor, she again attempted to leave. However, she gave birth to Adriana, and was subsequently involuntarily committed to the hospital's mental health unit until December 8, 2009.

The hospital sent a report to the Department, explaining that Mother was a risk to herself and to others, and recommended that she not be left alone with the baby. The Department's child protective services investigator interviewed Mother to determine if she was capable of caring for Adriana. Due to Mother's mental state and the inability to identify other relatives in the interim, the investigator issued a report of limited custody.⁵

On December 7, 2009, Adriana was discharged from the hospital and placed in foster care. On December 8, 2009, the Department filed a CINA petition for Adriana.⁶ On December 14, 2009, following a hearing which reflected Mother's absence and Father's concurrence with foster care, the juvenile court ordered that Adriana be placed in the temporary care and custody of the Department. The court granted Mother and Father visitation rights, but ordered that visitation be supervised by the Department.⁷

During a hearing on March 10, 2010, Mother contended that Adriana was not a CINA, and that based on her history of compliance with therapy and medication, she posed no danger to the child. Although the court found that Mother's physicians indicated her return to therapy and compliance with her medication regimen, there were no mental health evaluations or laboratory results to confirm this. The court “[was] not willing to take a chance on Mother,” and determined that Adriana was a CINA and could be placed with a relative.⁸

In May 2010, after the approval of the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (ICPC) process,⁹ the Department placed Adriana with Grandmother, in North Carolina, where she currently resides. During this time, Ms. Joyce Trott (“Ms. Trott”), the North Carolina social worker, visited Grandmother's residence once a month, monitored Adriana's care, and provided reports to the Department. On October 29, 2010, the Department filed a Petition for Guardianship with Right to Consent to Adoption. Father consented to the petition, but on December 16, 2010, Mother noted her objection. On April 8, 2011, the court determined that the matter was a contested guardianship, and ordered a hearing on the merits.

On June 23, 2011, Adriana filed a motion to take Ms. Trott's testimony by telephone.¹⁰ On June 29, 2011, Mother filed a response, arguing that (1) the motion was not filed in a timely fashion and it lacked the required contents,¹¹ which deprived her of the opportunity to depose, oppose, and contact the witness; (2) the court could not determine the witness' demeanor and credibility; and (3) substantial prejudice would result because she would not have the opportunity for face-to-face cross-examination. On July 6, 2011, the court granted Adriana's motion. Additionally, over Mother's objections, the court permitted Grandmother to testify regarding her medical recovery from the gunshot wounds that Mother inflicted. On April 2, 2012, the court ordered that Mother's parental rights be terminated under § 5–323(d) of the Family Law Article.¹² Thereafter, Mother noted a timely appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In In re Adoption/Guardianship of Ta'Niya C., 417 Md. 90, 100, 8 A.3d 745 (2010), the Court of Appeals outlined the standard in reviewing a juvenile court's decision to terminate parental rights:

Namely, [w]hen the appellate court scrutinizes factual findings, the clearly erroneous standard of [Rule 8–131(c) ] applies.¹³ [Second,] [i]f it appears that the [court] erred as to matters of law, further proceedings in the trial court will ordinarily be required unless the error is determined to be harmless. Finally, when the appellate court views the ultimate conclusion of the [court] founded upon sound legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, the [court's] decision should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion.

Id. (quoting In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 586, 819 A.2d 1030 (2003)) (citations omitted).

The trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence. SeeMd. Rule 5–104(a). “Whether to admit lay opinion testimony is vested in the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Bey v. State, 140 Md.App. 607, 623, 781 A.2d 952 (2001) (citation omitted). Specifically, the trial courts have wide discretion in permitting witnesses to testify by telephone. Audio tape: Hearing on the Notice of Proposed Rules Changes: held by the Court of Appeals on the 163rd Report (March 8, 2010). During the Court of Appeals' hearing on Md. Rule 2–513, the Honorable Sally D. Adkins stated, “Obviously, this is going to be a discretionary decision by the trial courts.”

The trial court abuses its discretion “ ‘where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court,’ ” or when the court does not refer to any guiding principles or rules. In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 583, 819 A.2d 1030 (quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295, 312–13, 701 A.2d 110 (1997)). “Questions within the discretion of the trial court are ‘much better decided by the trial judges than by appellate courts, and the decisions of such judges should only be disturbed where it is apparent that some serious error or abuse of discretion or autocratic action has occurred.’ ” In re Caya B., 153 Md.App. 63, 74, 834 A.2d 997 (2003) (quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. at 312, 701 A.2d 110) (internal quotation omitted).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Did the Trial Court Err in Permitting the North Carolina Social Worker to Testify By Telephone?

Md. Rule 2–513 became effective on July 1, 2010. This rule permits telephone testimony in civil cases under certain conditions. See Reporter's Note to Proposed Rule 2–513, Md. Reg., Vol. 37, Issue 3, Friday, January 29, 2010.

Our task is to determine whether the court erred in permitting Ms. Trott's testimony by telephone. Md. Rule 2–513(b)(2) reads, in relevant part:

When testimony taken by telephone allowed; applicability. A court may allow the testimony of a witness to be taken by telephone (1) upon stipulation by the parties or (2) subject to sections (e) and (f) of this Rule, [ infra ] on motion of a party to the action and for good cause shown.

During trial, Mother avowed that Adriana failed to satisfy the “good cause” exception. Good cause permits the court to have “some discretion in enforcing the notice requirement, and allows a court, in certain circumstances, to avoid an unjust conclusion.” Prince George's County v. Longtin, 419 Md. 450, 467, 19 A.3d 859 (2011). Md. Rule 2–513(e) states:

Good cause. A court may find that there is good cause to allow the testimony of a witness to be taken by telephone if:

(1) the witness is otherwise unavailable to appear because of age, infirmity, or illness;

(2) personal appearance of the witness cannot be secured by subpoena or other reasonable means;

(3) a...