In re Ajr
| Decision Date | 25 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 147522.,Calendar No. 9. |
| Citation | 852 N.W.2d 760,496 Mich. 346 |
| Parties | In re AJR. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Scott Bassett and Cynthia S. Harmon, East Lansing, for petitioner-mother and petitioner-stepfather.
Vivek S. Sankaran and Trish Oleksa Haas for respondent-father.
Yvon D. and Estela M. Roustan in propriis personis.
Rebecca Shiemke, Kent Weichmann, Ann Arbor, and Anne Argiroff, Farmington Hills, for the Family Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan.
This case requires us to interpret the stepparent adoption statute, MCL 710.51(6), which allows the spouse of “the parent having legal custody of the child” to petition to adopt that child as long as the court orders the termination of the other parent's parental rights in a manner consistent with the criteria provided in MCL 710.51(6)(a) and (b). Applying the stepparent adoption statute to the instant case, the circuit court terminated respondent-father's parental rights to the minor child and also allowed petitioner-stepfather—who is married to petitioner-mother—to adopt the minor child. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that because respondent and petitioner-mother shared joint legal custody of the child, petitioner-mother was not “ the parent having legal custody of the child” as required by the stepparent adoption statute. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals because when the role of the phrase “the parent having legal custody” within the statutory scheme is considered, it is clear that the Legislature intended that phrase to refer to the parent with sole legal custody.
We also reject petitioners' argument, made for the first time on appeal before this Court, that petitioner-mother is the sole parent having legal custody of the child because she is the parent with legally sanctioned physical custody of the child. Michigan has long recognized that the concepts of legal custody and physical custody are distinct and allocable between parents. This has been so since before the enactment of MCL 710.51(6). Petitioner-mother has always been free to seek modification of the custody arrangement under MCL 722.27. If on remand petitioner-mother secures sole legal custody of the child, then petitioners may proceed with stepparent adoption under MCL 710.51(6).
Respondent and petitioner-mother were married in 2003. The couple had one child during their marriage, AJR, but divorced in 2009. The divorce judgment awarded custody of AJR as follows:
The parties shall share joint legal custody and [petitioner-mother] shall have the physical custody of the minor child....
The divorce judgment also placed support obligations on respondent and provided that he would be given reasonable visitation with the child.
Petitioner-mother married petitioner-stepfather in June 2010. The couple lived together with AJR as a family. In May 2012, petitioners sought to terminate respondent's parental rights to allow petitioner-stepfather to adopt AJR. Petitioners filed a petition for stepparent adoption consistent with MCL 710.51(6)(a) and (b), alleging that “[t]he noncustodial parent has failed to provide support or comply with a support order and failed to visit or contact the adoptee for a period of 2 years or more.” They also filed a supplemental petition and affidavit to terminate the parental rights of the noncustodial parent, alleging that “[a] support order has been entered and the noncustodial parent has failed to substantially comply with the order for a period of two years or more before the petition for adoption was filed.”
Following a two-day evidentiary hearing, the circuit court issued an opinion and order granting the petition and terminating respondent's parental rights pursuant to MCL 710.51(6). The circuit court found that respondent had substantially failed to provide support for the child for the two years preceding the filing of the petition and that respondent had substantially failed to visit or communicate with the child during the same period.
Respondent appealed by right in the Court of Appeals, which reversed the circuit court's order terminating his parental rights.1 The Court of Appeals concluded that “because [respondent] and the mother had joint legal custody over the child and the statute only acts to terminate the rights of those parents who do not have legal custody, [respondent's] rights were improperly terminated.” 2 The Court of Appeals held that the language “if the parent having legal custody of the child” in the statute must “be construed as requiring the parent initiating termination proceedings to be the only parent having legal custody.” 3 The Court of Appeals concluded that “[t]he rights of a parent who maintains joint legal custody are not properly terminated under MCL 710.51(6).” 4 The Court of Appeals observed that the articles “the” and “a” have different meanings and that the Legislature uses the term “the,” rather than “a” or “an,” to refer to something particular.5 The Court of Appeals also reasoned that, when possible, every word and phrase in a statutory provision must be given effect and that a court “should not ignore the omission of a term from one section of a statute when that term is used in another section of the statute.” 6 The Court of Appeals applied this principle, stating:
Notably, the preceding subsection in the statute, MCL 710.51(5), uses the phrase “ a parent having legal custody” to refer to whom that particular subsection applies. Contrastingly, MCL 710.51(6) refers to “ the parent having legal custody.” We presume that the Legislature intended to use the more general phrase “ a parent” to refer to either of the child's parents in MCL 710.51(5) and that the omission of a general article in MCL 710.51(6) was intentional.7
It being undisputed that the divorce judgment provided that respondent and petitioner-mother would maintain joint legal custody of AJR, the Court of Appeals concluded that MCL 710.51(6), which requires that the petitioning parent be “ the parent having legal custody,” was inapplicable in the instant case.8
This Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether MCL 710.51(6) necessarily refers to “ the ” sole parent with legal custody and whether the term “legal custody” in the statute is synonymous with the concept of joint custody in § 6a(7)(b) of the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.26a(7)(b), under which the parents “share decision-making authority as to the important decisions affecting the welfare of the child,” and also to explore the remedies, if any, available to the petitioners in this case if the Court of Appeals had not erred in interpreting MCL 710.51(6).9
Whether the application of the stepparent adoption provision is limited to situations in which one parent has sole legal custody of the child is a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.10
As always, the objective of statutory interpretation “is to give effect to the Legislature's intent,” and “[t]o ascertain that intent, this Court begins with the statute's language.” 11 “When that language is unambiguous, no further judicial construction is required or permitted, because the Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it plainly expressed.” 12 Moreover, “[w]hen interpreting a statute, courts must ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute,” which “requires courts to consider the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase as well as its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.” 13
MCL 710.51(6) provides for the termination of parental rights in the context of stepparent adoption:
(6) If the parents of a child are divorced, or if the parents are unmarried but the father has acknowledged paternity or is a putative father who meets the conditions in [MCL 710.39], and if the parent having legal custody of the child subsequently marries and that parent's spouse petitions to adopt the child, the court upon notice and hearing may issue an order terminating the rights of the other parent if both of the following occur:
(a) The other parent, having the ability to support, or assist in supporting, the child, has failed or neglected to provide regular and substantial support for the child or if a support order has been entered, has failed to substantially comply with the order, for a period of 2 years or more before the filing of the petition.
(b) The other parent, having the ability to visit, contact, or communicate with the child, has regularly and substantially failed or neglected to do so for a period of 2 years or more before the filing of the petition.
Accordingly, a court may only terminate parental rights under the stepparent adoption statute after concluding that both Subdivision (a) and (b) are satisfied, and also that the conditions provided in the preceding paragraph are satisfied.14 The phrase “the parent having legal custody of the child” in the preceding paragraph of the stepparent adoption statute is the focus of this case.
Petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals erred by interpreting the phrase “the parent having legal custody of the child” as necessarily referring to the sole parent with legal custody. We disagree because when the role of the phrase “the parent having legal custody” within the statutory scheme is considered, it is clear that the Legislature intended that phrase to refer to the parent with sole legal custody.
When interpreting the phrase “the parent having legal custody,” we may consider the role of this phrase within the statutory scheme.15 Under the Michigan Adoption Code, two provisions are particularly relevant when considering the process by which a stepparent may adopt a child: MCL 710.51 and MCL 710.43. There are two possible avenues pursuant to MCL 710.51 for a petitioning stepparent to adopt a child: adoption by parental consent under MCL...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Deng, Docket No. 328826.
...533, 536, 711 N.W.2d 426 (2006).The goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the Legislature's intent. In re AJR, 496 Mich. 346, 352, 852 N.W.2d 760 (2014). To ascertain the Legislature's intent, we begin with the language of the statute, giving words their plain and ordinary m......
-
Varran v. Granneman
...broadly means “ ‘[t]he care, control, and maintenance of a child awarded by a court to a responsible adult.’ ” In re AJR, 496 Mich. 346, 358, 852 N.W.2d 760 (2014) (citation omitted; alteration in original). In Michigan, two forms of custody are recognized—“physical” custody and “legal” cus......
-
Khalid v. Sessions, 16-3480-ag
...In addition, state courts do sometimes deem residing with a parent a component of "physical custody." See, e.g. , In re AJR , 496 Mich. 346, 852 N.W.2d 760, 765 (2014) (noting that "physical custody pertains to where the child shall physically reside" in interpreting Michigan's child custod......
-
In re AGD
...whether this Court is free to announce a new construction of MCL 710.51 in light of our Supreme Court’s decision in In re AJR , 496 Mich. 346, 852 N.W.2d 760 (2014), and the doctrine of vertical stare decisis. MCL 710.51, as amended by 2016 PA 143, provides:(6) If the parents of a child are......