Varran v. Granneman
Decision Date | 13 October 2015 |
Docket Number | Docket Nos. 321866,322437. |
Citation | 880 N.W.2d 242,312 Mich.App. 591 |
Parties | VARRAN v. GRANNEMAN (ON REMAND). |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Legal Services of South Central Michigan (by Tracy E. Van den Bergh, Ann L. Routt, Ann Arbor and Jessica K. Hirsh), for Peter Granneman.
Daniel R. Victor, PLLC (by Daniel R. Victor, Bloomfield Hills), for Debora and James Granneman.
Anne L. Argiroff, Judith A. Curtis, Kevin S. Gentry, Liisa R. Speaker, and Trish Oleksa Haas, for the Michigan Coalition of Family Law Appellate Attorneys.
Before: RONAYNE KRAUSE, P.J., and MURPHY and SERVITTO, JJ.
These matters are before us on remand from our Supreme Court for further consideration of our June 20, 2014 order dismissing Peter Granneman's claim of appeal in Docket No. 321866 for lack of jurisdiction and our July 16, 2014 order dismissing his claim of appeal in Docket No. 322437 for the same reason. The Supreme Court directed us to “issue an opinion specifically addressing the issue of whether an order regarding grandparenting time may affect custody within the meaning of MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii), or otherwise be appealable by right under MCR 7.203(A).” Varran v. Granneman, 497 Mich. 928, 856 N.W.2d 555 (2014) ; Varran v. Granneman, 497 Mich. 929, 856 N.W.2d 555 (2014).
Plaintiff, Emily Varran (Mother), who is deceased, and defendant, Peter Granneman (Father), are the parents of a minor child (referred to as “A” hereafter), born in 2002, when the parents were both minors. The parents never married. Mother initially had custody of A, but when A was 8 months old he went to live with Father, who resided with his parents, intervening petitioners (Grandparents). This arrangement continued until 2005 when A was 2 ½ years old. At that time, Grandparents asked Father to leave their home because of hostility and conflicts. A continued to reside with Grandparents, and Father initially visited A once a week at Grandparents' home. Within a few months, Father had A with him on Saturday nights at his apartment.
Mother passed away in 2007. In 2007, Father began having A stay with him on Friday and Saturday nights. In the summer of 2012, A began living with Father during the week and visiting with Grandparents every weekend. In the spring of 2013, Father reduced A's visits with Grandparents to every other weekend. In May 2013, Father advised Grandparents that they would no longer have overnight visits with A and that any contact between them and A would be under Father's supervision.
Grandparents, as intervening petitioners, filed a motion for grandparenting time with A in June 2013.
In a July 2013 order, the trial court awarded Grandparents temporary visitation with A every other weekend from Saturday at 10:00 a.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m. and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued a written opinion on April 25, 2014, wherein it determined that A would suffer a substantial risk of future harm to his mental and emotional health if grandparenting time were not granted. The trial court additionally applied the best-interest factors set forth in MCL 722.27b(6) and found that it was in A's best interest to allow grandparenting time. The trial court thereafter, on May 30, 2014, entered an order providing Grandparents with visitation with A every other Saturday from 10:00 a.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m. Father claimed an appeal from the trial court's April 25, 2014 opinion granting grandparenting time (Docket No. 321866) and its May 30, 2014 order setting a specific grandparenting-time schedule (Docket No. 322437). As previously indicated, this Court initially dismissed both appeals, but our Supreme Court remanded the appeals, directing us to address “whether an order regarding grandparenting time may affect custody within the meaning of MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii), or otherwise be appealable by right under MCR 7.203(A).” The Supreme Court further directed that if this Court determines that the lower court order is appealable by right, we must take jurisdiction over Father's claims of appeal and address their merits. Varran, 497 Mich. at 928, 856 N.W.2d 555 ; Varran, 497 Mich. at 929, 856 N.W.2d 555. We consolidated the appeals.
The first issue for resolution is, as directed by the Supreme Court, whether an order for grandparenting time affects custody within the meaning of MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii), making it appealable as of right under MCR 7.203(A). Whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal is an issue reviewed de novo. Wardell v. Hincka, 297 Mich.App. 127, 131, 822 N.W.2d 278 (2012). The interpretation and application of a court rule is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Haliw v. Sterling Hts., 471 Mich. 700, 704, 691 N.W.2d 753 (2005).
MCR 7.203(A) provides:
MCR 7.202(6)(a) defines a “final judgment” or “final order” in a civil case as the following:
The rules of statutory interpretation apply to the interpretation of court rules. Reed v. Breton, 279 Mich.App. 239, 242, 756 N.W.2d 89 (2008). The goal of court rule interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the drafter, the Michigan Supreme Court. Fleet Business Credit, LLC v. Krapohl Ford Lincoln Mercury Co., 274 Mich.App. 584, 591, 735 N.W.2d 644 (2007). The Court must give language that is clear and unambiguous its plain meaning and enforce it as written. Id. Each word, unless defined, is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and the Court may consult a dictionary to determine that meaning. TMW Enterprises Inc. v. Dep't. of Treasury, 285 Mich.App. 167, 172, 775 N.W.2d 342 (2009).
On appeal, Father and Grandparents limit their arguments to whether an order regarding grandparenting time is a postjudgment order affecting the custody of a minor under MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii). However, this Court was not tasked by the Supreme Court with only determining whether an order regarding parenting time was a “final judgment” or “final order” under MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii). It was also tasked with determining whether an order regarding grandparenting time would otherwise be appealable by right under MCR 7.203(A). Varran, 497 Mich. at 929, 856 N.W.2d 555 ; Varran, 497 Mich. at 928, 856 N.W.2d 555. Under MCR 7.203(A)(1), this Court has jurisdiction of an appeal of right from a final judgment or order of the trial court, as defined in MCR 7.202(6), while under MCR 7.203(A)(2), this Court has jurisdiction of an appeal of right from a judgment or order for which an appeal of right has been established by law or court rule. There is no law or court rule providing an appeal by right from an order regarding grandparenting time. Therefore, under MCR 7.203(A), there is only an appeal by right from an order regarding grandparenting time if the order is a “final order” or “final judgment” as defined in MCR 7.202(6). MCR 7.203(A)(1).
Two definitions of a “final judgment” or “final order” are potentially applicable to the present case: (1) “the first judgment or order that disposes of all the claims and adjudicates the rights and liabilities of all the parties, including such an order entered after reversal of an earlier final judgment,” MCR 7.202(6)(a)(i), and (2) “a postjudgment order affecting the custody of a minor,” MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii). We will address each in turn.
The grandparenting-time statute provides two ways that an action for grandparenting time can be commenced. MCL 722.27b(3) states:
In this case, Grandparents did not commence their action for grandparenting time by filing a complaint. Instead, a child custody dispute concerning A was initiated by A's mother in the trial court in 2003. Grandparents sought grandparenting time by filing a motion with the trial court in that case. The trial court found that entry of a grandparenting-time order would be in the best interests of A and entered such an order on May 30, 2014. Because the May 30, 2014 order provided a...
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