In Re Alexander, in Re

• Decision Date: 05 June 1907
• Citation: 53 Fla. 647,44 So. 175
• Parties: In re ALEXANDER.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

44 So. 175

53 Fla. 647

In re ALEXANDER.

Florida Supreme Court

June 5, 1907

In Banc. Application of H. A. Alexander for admission to the bar. Motion granted.

Shackleford C.J., and Whitfield, J., dissenting.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

The phrase 'from and after the passage of this act,' occurring in the beginning of an act, will not be held to put the act into immediate effect, in the absence of the usual effective clauses generally observed in this state, and when a comprehensive view of the entire act makes it reasonably clear that the Legislature did not intend an immediate change in the existing law.

OPINION

COCKRELL, J.

H. A Alexander, Esq., a member in good standing of the bar of the Supreme Court of the state of Georgia, on the 4th day of June, 1907, applied for admission to the bar of this court.

There is diversity of opinion among the members of this court as to the effect, if any, now to be given to the act just passed by the Legislature and approved by the Governor on May 27, 1907 entitled 'An act to prescribe and regulate the procedure for the admission of attorneys to practice law in the courts of Florida.'

The first section of the act reads:

'Section 1. That from and after the passage of this act no one shall be authorized or permitted to practice law, as an attorney, counsellor or proctor or advocate in any of the courts of this state unless he shall have first obtained a commission or license to so practice from the Supreme Court of the state after a thorough examination by said court of the applicant for admission as to his qualifications.'

The act does not contain the usual formula that it should take effect on its passage or passage and approval, and the question presents itself whether, taking the act as a whole, the phrase 'from and after the passage of this act' sufficiently complies with the constitutional exception that acts shall take effect 60 days from the final adjournment of the session, 'unless otherwise specially provided in such law.' Const. art. 3, § 18. The session of the Legislature was declared finally adjourned on May 31st.

We find the adjudged cases about equally divided in construing the phrase 'from and after the passage of the act' under language identical with our own; but there is practical unanimity in the holdings, under Constitutions providing that an 'emergency' must exist and be declared, that a specific declaration must be made, else the exception cannot obtain. We are, moreover, confronted by the practical construction placed upon similar language in appropriation acts by the administrative departments of the state government...