In re Alfred H.H.

• Citation: 233 Ill.2d 345,910 N.E.2d 74
• Decision Date: 21 May 2009
• Docket Number: No. 106616.,106616.
• Parties: In re ALFRED H.H. (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Alfred H.H., Appellant.).
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

910 N.E.2d 74

233 Ill.2d 345

In re ALFRED H.H. (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Alfred H.H., Appellant.).

No. 106616.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 21, 2009.

Veronique Baker, Laurel Spahn, Patricia Werner and Cynthia Tracy, Illinois Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, Hines, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, Richard A. Huszagh, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

INTRODUCTION

Respondent, Alfred H.H., was involuntarily committed to McFarland Mental Health Center on May 11, 2007. On May 22, 2007, respondent filed in the circuit court of Sangamon County a timely notice of appeal from his commitment order. Less than a month after his appeal was filed, on June 19, 2007, respondent was discharged from McFarland. Almost one year after the commitment order was entered, the appellate court dismissed respondent's appeal as moot. 379 Ill.App.3d 1026, 320 Ill.Dec. 260, 887 N.E.2d 40. Respondent filed a petition for leave to appeal the mootness determination with this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (210 Ill.2d R. 315). We granted respondent's petition and now affirm, on other grounds, the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

Respondent, Alfred H.H., is a 60-year-old man with a history of mental illness. Prior to the present case, respondent had been a recipient of mental health treatment on numerous occasions. Some of these treatments were as a result of involuntary commitments. See In re Alfred H., 358 Ill.App.3d 784, 295 Ill.Dec. 514, 832 N.E.2d 964 (2005).¹

In addition to respondent's history of mental health issues, respondent also has a criminal record. In the mid-1960s, respondent was indicted for and pled guilty to murder. Respondent received a sentence of 20 to 50 years' imprisonment as a result of this plea.

The facts relevant to the present commitment are not in dispute. The State alleges that on or about May 7, 2007, respondent visited a local bank seeking a loan. After respondent left the bank, bank employees contacted the Decatur police department based on statements that respondent allegedly made while at the bank. It was reported that respondent told bank employees that he knew the president of AT & T and that AT & T was bugging his phone. He also stated that "the ADM explosion was caused by 650 gallons of propane." Respondent then allegedly queried, "I've got 1000 gallons in my back yard, what do you think that would do?"

Officer Owens of the Decatur police department was dispatched to the bank, spoke with the bank employees, and thereafter went to respondent's home to speak with him. When Owens arrived, respondent testified, he was sitting in the kitchen with his mother, with whom he lives, having a snack. Respondent agreed to speak with Owens and allegedly stated that he was employed by the Department of Defense and was in radio communication with them. Respondent also confirmed to Owens that he possessed a large quantity of propane.

Based on this interview, in conjunction with the statements that were allegedly made at the bank, Owens executed a petition for involuntary admission and took respondent to St. Mary's Hospital for an evaluation.

Dr. Zhang, a psychiatrist who had previously treated respondent on five or six occasions, stated that he examined respondent for purposes of certifying the petition to have him involuntarily committed. Zhang testified that respondent was very agitated and hostile during the interview. Zhang testified that respondent was easily provoked, yelled and screamed, and displayed a disorganized thought process. Zhang further testified that respondent yelled things like "police are all liars" and "I killed." Respondent's behavior during the exam was such that a nurse came into the session having "called Code" because of the noise. At this point, respondent was given forced medication.

On May 11, 2007, a commitment hearing was held on the grounds of McFarland Mental Health Center. Dr. Zhang was the only witness for the State. His testimony was consistent with the foregoing facts. He also stated that it was his expert opinion that respondent was likely to inflict serious harm on himself or another in the near future and that the least restrictive means of treatment was a period of commitment.

Respondent also testified at the hearing. He stated that he had told Owens that he had 550 gallons of propane in his backyard. Respondent said that he knew this because his mother asks him to check the levels regularly and every time he checks the levels he writes the reading on a wall calendar at his home. Respondent also testified that he was an employee of the Department of Defense but that this "would be rather difficult to prove because the Pentagon's going up in smoke."

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court judge found that respondent "is a person subject to involuntary admission" and that commitment was "the least restrictive alternative available." Thereafter, the judge entered an order committing respondent for a period not to exceed 90 days and informed respondent of his right to appeal. The order, entered on May 11, 2007, expired, by its own terms, on August 9, 2007.

On May 22, 2007, respondent filed a notice of appeal with the trial court. Respondent's sole argument before the appellate court was "whether there was clear and convincing evidence" to warrant "respondent's involuntary admission."

On June 19, 2007, less than a month after filing his notice of appeal, respondent was released from McFarland Mental Health Center. On March 11 of the following year, the appellate court ruled that respondent's appeal was moot and should, therefore, be dismissed.

Respondent filed a petition for leave to appeal the appellate court's determination that his appeal was moot. This court granted respondent's petition pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (210 Ill.2d R. 315). The sole question before this court is whether the appellate court erred in finding respondent's appeal to be moot.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Though the underlying issue in this appeal is a question of the sufficiency of the evidence, this claim is not before the court. Instead, the question faced by this court is the correctness of the appellate court's determination that respondent's appeal should be dismissed as moot. This is entirely a question of law. Therefore, our review of this question is de novo. Blount v. Stroud, 232 Ill.2d 302, 308-09, 328 Ill. Dec. 239, 904 N.E.2d 1 (2009).

ANALYSIS

Before we begin our analysis, we note that there is no dispute that the underlying case is moot. The commitment order was limited in duration to 90 days and that period has long since passed. In this case, as in In re Barbara H., respondent "could be held involuntarily and forced to take psychotropic medication against [his] will only if a new set of petitions were filed and new hearings were conducted." In re Barbara H., 183 Ill.2d 482, 490, 234 Ill. Dec. 215, 702 N.E.2d 555 (1998). The parties agree on this point. As in Barbara H., whether the commitment order entered against respondent is valid or not, it "can no longer serve as the basis for adverse action against [respondent]." Barbara H., 183 Ill.2d at 490, 234 Ill.Dec. 215, 702 N.E.2d 555.

As a general rule, courts in Illinois do not decide moot questions, render advisory opinions, or consider issues where the result will not be affected regardless of how those issues are decided. See In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill.2d 393, 401, 269 Ill.Dec. 440, 781 N.E.2d 237 (2002); Barth v. Reagan, 139 Ill.2d 399, 419, 151 Ill.Dec. 534, 564 N.E.2d 1196 (1990). However, the issue presented before this court is not the validity of the underlying judgment or whether the case is moot. Instead, the question is whether there is an exception to the mootness doctrine that would allow the appellate court to consider respondent's claim that the evidence presented at his hearing was insufficient to warrant his commitment.

Respondent, as the appellant, raises five bases to find that the appellate court erred in finding no exception to mootness. First, respondent argues that the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code requires review of his involuntary commitment despite mootness. Second, respondent asserts that the "public interest exception" to the mootness doctrine applies. Respondent's third argument is that the exception for cases that are "capable of repetition yet avoiding review" applies in mental health cases. The fourth argument asserted by respondent is that the "collateral consequences" associated with mental health proceedings compel review. Finally, respondent asserts that general "policy considerations" warrant review of involuntary mental health orders.

I. The Mental Health Code

Respondent's first argument is that section 3-816 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) guarantees respondent the right to appeal his involuntary commitment. See 405 ILCS 5/3-816(b) (West 2006). Section 3-816 provides:

"(b) An appeal from a final order may be taken in the same manner as in other civil cases. Upon entry of a final order, the court shall notify the recipient orally and in writing of his or her right to appeal and, if he or she is indigent, of his or her right to a free transcript and counsel. The cost of the transcript shall be paid pursuant to subsection (c) of Section 3-818 and subsection (c) of Section 4-615 of this Code. If the recipient wishes to appeal and is unable to obtain counsel, counsel shall be appointed pursuant to Section 3-805." 405 ILCS 5/3-816(b) (West 2006).

Respondent argues that given the limited duration of the orders entered in mental health cases, these cases will technically be moot before an appeal can be heard. Thus, respondent argues that in order to effectuate the right to appeal provided in section 3-816,...