In re American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 12 September 1913
• Citation: 215 Mass. 480,102 N.E. 693
• Parties: In re AMERICAN MUT. LIABILITY INS. Co.; In re GOULD; In re B. F. STURTEVANT CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

215 Mass. 480

102 N.E. 693

In re AMERICAN MUT. LIABILITY INS. Co.; In re GOULD; In re B. F. STURTEVANT CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Sept. 12, 1913.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Edward P. Pierce, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act; William S. Gould, employé, B. F. Sturtevant, employer, and the American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, insurer. From a decree of the Superior Court, the American Mutual Liability Insurance Company excepts. Exceptions dismissed.

Sawyer, Hardy & Stone, of Boston (Edward C. Stone, of Boston, of counsel), for insurer.

Geo. P. Drury, of Boston, for employé.

RUGG, C. J.

This is a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act, St. 1911, c. 751, and St. 1912, cc. 571 and 666.

[1] 1. At the threshold lies a question of practice. The insurer, being a party in interest, presented its petition to the superior court, together with certified copies of the decision of the Industrial Accident Board. The petition alleges the interest of the employé, employer and insurer, the date of the decision and the insurer's desire to have determined questions of law set out in the decision. Part 3, § 11, as amended by St. 1912, c. 571, § 14, provides that ‘any party in interest may present certified copies of an order or decision of the board, * * * and all papers in connection therewith, to the superior court * * * whereupon said court shall render a decree in accordance therewith and notify the parties. Such decree shall have the same effect and all proceedings in relation thereto shall thereafter be the same as though rendered in a suit duly heard and determined by said court, except that there shall be no appeal therefrom upon questions of fact.’ While this section does not require anything more than the bare presentation of the copies of the designated proceedings of the Industrial Accident Board, it is not improper that a petition be filed setting forth briefly the nature of the questions to be decided. When the case came on to be heard in the superior court a decree was entered in accordance with the decision of the board. The judge also allowed a bill of exceptions, stating that it was for the purpose of enabling this court to determine the proper manner of bringing before it proceedings of this sort.

[2] The Workmen's Compensation Act has a procedure all of its own. Where the act is adopted by the parties, a relation arises between the employé and the employer, under which in the event of a personal injury to the employé there shall be speedy ascertainment of the new kind of compensation created by the act, coupled with a voluntary relinquishment by both parties of the right to trial by jury as to matters covered by the act. One main purpose of the act is to establish between employé and employer, in place of the common law or statutory remedy for personal injury, based upon tort, a system whereby compensation for all personal injuries or death of the employé received in the course of and arising out of his employment, whether through unavoidable accident or negligence or otherwise (except through his serious and willful misconduct), shall be determined forthwith by a public board, and paid by the insurer. For the accomplishment of these ends a simple method is furnished operating without delay or unnecessary formality. The practice should be direct and flexible in order to adapt the remedy to the needs of the particular case. In one aspect a case under the act resembles an action at law, for it seeks ultimately the payment of money. Payments, however, in most instances are by installments. In another aspect it is akin to the specific performance of a contract, designed to cover the whole range of misfortunes likely to arise in the course of employment in a state with many and diversified industries. Moreover, the compensation is to be paid not directly by the employer, but by the insurer, who is either the ‘Massachusetts Employés' Insurance Association’ created by part 4 of the act or any liability insurance company authorized to do business within the commonwealth. The employé has no immediate relation with the insurer. He is the beneficiary under a contract between the employer and insurer. A beneficiary under any instrument to which he is not a direct party more naturally looks to equity rather than to law for relief. Part 3, § 11, requires a ‘decree’ to be entered, and refers to the proceeding as a ‘suit.’ A decree in our practice is entered commonly in equity alone. Judgment is the word expressive of the end of an action at law. Suit, while a word of comprehensive signification, is applied usually in our practice to proceedings in equity, while action is the word descriptive of proceedings at law. Our statutes in general, although perhaps not with absolute uniformity, refer to proceedings in equity as suits, see R. L. c. 159, and to those at law as actions, see R. L. c. 167. Giving due weight to the equitable phraseology employed in this section, to the beneficient purposes of the act, which can be enforced better through the relief afforded by equity, and to the character of the proceeding itself and the parties thereto, it follows that in the main causes under the act in court should be treated as equitable rather than legal in nature, procedure and final disposition.

[3] The act provides only for an appeal, and makes no reference to exceptions. Although exceptions are permitted in our system of equity, that is a statutory engraftment, not according to general chancery procedure, and appeal is simpler and on all grounds better practice. But where exceptions are taken, there can be no final decree until exceptions are disposed of. The present act, however, requires a decree, which in the ordinary case must be final in its nature, to be entered by the superior court. This precludes the possibility of exceptions. It follows that the suit must be brought here by appeal from the decree of the superior court, and not by exceptions. As exceptions could not be allowed legally, the case is here rightly on appeal.

[4] 2. The facts are that the employé, a citizen and resident of this commonwealth, made a contract here with the employer, a Massachusetts corporation, for rendering to it his personal services, and accepted the benefits of the act. In the course of his employment he received the injury for which this claim arises, in the state of New York. He was principally employed in Massachusetts, but at times incidentally worked in New York and other states. The Industrial Accident Board found that the insurer had been paid by the employer for insuring all injuries received by its employés in the course of their employment, whether within or without the commonwealth. This factor is not of much significance because the obligation of the policy does not refer to anything occurring outside the state, and provides only for performance of the requirements and payment of the compensation designated in the act. If the act enjoins the payment of compensation for injuries received outside the state the insurer has contracted therefor, otherwise it has not.

The question is whether the act governs the rights of parties touching injuries received outside the state. It may be assumed for the purposes of this judgment that it is within the power of the Legislature to give to the act the effect claimed for it by the employé. Mulhall v. Fallon, 176 Mass. 266, 57 N. E. 386,54 L. R. A. 934, 79 Am. St. Rep. 309.

[5] The point to be decided is whether the language used in the act indicates a purpose to make its terms applicable to injuries received outside the state. This must be determined by a critical examination of the words of the statute in the light of its humane purpose. There is nothing which expressly states that the act governs the rights of the parties touching such injuries. This is significant. In the absence of unequivocal language to the contrary, it is not to be presumed that statutes respecting this matter are designed to control conduct or fix the rights of parties beyond the territorial limits of the state. Boston & Maine R. R. v. Trafton, 151 Mass. 229, 23 N. E. 829;Howarth v. Lombard, 175 Mass. 570, 572, 56 N. E. 888,49 L. R. A. 301;Young v. Boston & Maine R. R., 168 Mass. 219, 46 N. E. 624;Stone v. Old Colony St. Ry., 212 Mass. 459-464, 99 N. E. 218;Merrill v. Boston & Lowell, 63 N. H. 259, 260. Part 1 of the act, which is entitled ‘ Modification of Remedies' and which abolishes certain common-law rights of action and defenses for ‘subscribers' and their employés who do not claim such rights in writing, can relate only to injuries received within the commonwealth. The correlative provisions which follow and which are substitutional in their nature for the common law remedies and defenses, naturally would be expected to cover the same field in the absence of clear words indicating a larger scope.

A consideration of the act in detail fails to disclose any plain intent to that end. On the contrary, several provisions indicate solely intrastate operation. Part 2, § 19, provides that the employé who has received an injury shall submit himself on request to an examination ‘by a physician or surgeon authorized to practice medicine under the laws of the commonwealth.’ It hardly can be inferred from this language that the Legislature intended that physicians or surgeons from Massachusetts should journey to the place of injury, or that those authorized to practice under the laws of other states should make the examination. Part 3 of the act, which relates to procedure, and which as has been pointed out creates a wholly new method of procedure, deals only with boards and courts within this commonwealth. No provision is made for enforcing rights as to injuries occurring outside the state. Part 3, § 7, requires that the hearings of the committee on arbitration ‘be held in the city or town where an injury occurred.’...