In re Andazola-Rivas

Citation23 I&N Dec. 319
Decision Date03 April 2002
Docket NumberFile A91 431 733.,Interim Decision Number 3467
PartiesIn re Martha ANDAZOLA-Rivas, Respondent
CourtU.S. DOJ Board of Immigration Appeals

In a decision dated March 16, 2000, an Immigration Judge granted the respondent's application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2000), and certified his decision to us for review. In addition, the Immigration and Naturalization Service filed an appeal from the Immigration Judge's grant of relief. Oral argument was heard before a panel of the Board on June 22, 2001. The Service's appeal will be sustained and the respondent will be granted voluntary departure in lieu of removal.

The parties in this case agree that the respondent has both the continuous physical presence and the good moral character required for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Act. The only issue on appeal is whether her removal from the United States would result in "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to her two United States citizen children, which is also required for relief under that section. The Immigration Judge found that the necessary hardship had been shown, but the Service disagrees.

The record reflects that the respondent is a 30-year-old native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection in August 1985. She has two United States citizen children, aged 11 and 6. The respondent has had the same employment for 4 years with a company that provides health insurance for her and her family, as well as a 401K retirement savings plan. The respondent bought her own house, valued at $69,000, in 1998. She owns two vehicles, with a combined value of about $12,000. According to her testimony, she also has savings of about $7,000.

The respondent testified that she has no relatives in Mexico who could help her with the children, should she be forced to return there. She further stated that her mother takes the children to school and looks after them while she works. All of the respondent's siblings live in this country, without valid immigration status, as do her aunts and uncles. The respondent's older child testified to her very close relationship with her grandmother. She did not indicate that she is close to any other relatives in this country.

Although the respondent is not married, when asked at the hearing about the father of her children, she replied, "We're okay, we just live together." She indicated that he has "some form of temporary permit" in this country. Asked if he contributes to the household, the respondent said, "He's working construction so sometimes he does have a job, sometimes he doesn't."

The respondent described the children's health as "fine." She stated that she has had problems with asthma, which is under control, but that this condition would prevent her from working in the fields in Mexico. She also does not believe she could get an office job in Mexico, as she has only a sixth grade education. She is concerned that she would not be able to obtain any employment in Mexico that would be comparable to the job she has here.

The respondent also stated that the schools are better in this country than in Mexico, with better facilities and supplies, and access to computers. She is afraid that her children would not be able to get much education in Mexico, especially when they get older and reach the point where she would have to pay for it.

The respondent testified that the main focus of the family's social life is the church they attend every week. She also stated that she helps out twice a month at her younger child's Head Start program.

Following the removal hearing, the Immigration Judge entered his decision granting the respondent's application for cancellation of removal. The Immigration Judge concluded, after a lengthy discussion, that the "United States citizen children, particularly Tanya [the 11-year-old], would suffer hardship of an emotional, academic and financial nature." This hardship "would be of a daunting level." The Immigration Judge noted that the children would be uprooted from their current "nurturing environment" and from their support system. He also stated that they would face discrimination in Mexico because they are children of a single mother. The Immigration Judge emphasized the fact that Tanya has little knowledge of "academic Spanish" and might therefore be placed in a lower grade in school in Mexico. In addition, he expressed concern that the children may not be able to stay in school, but rather may have to work to help support the family. He noted that the respondent has a steady, full-time job here, with good benefits.

Based on these considerations, the Immigration Judge found that the children "face complete upheaval in their lives and hardship that could conceivably ruin their lives." He concluded that such hardship would be "unconscionable," and he therefore concluded that the respondent had met the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship requirement.

After the Immigration Judge rendered his decision in this case, but before oral argument was held, we issued a precedent decision addressing the meaning of the term "exceptional and extremely unusual" hardship as used in the cancellation of removal statute. In Matter of Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. 56, 65 (BIA 2001), we held that an applicant for cancellation under section 240A(b) of the Act must demonstrate that his or her removal would cause hardship to his or her qualifying relatives that is "substantially different from, or beyond, that which would normally be expected from the deportation of an alien with close family members here."

In Matter of Monreal, supra, the respondent was a 34-year-old man from Mexico who had lived in this country since 1980. He had three United States citizen children. The two older children were 12 and 8 years old, and they lived with the respondent in the United States. His youngest child, an infant, had returned to Mexico with the respondent's undocumented wife shortly before his removal hearing. The respondent's lawful permanent resident parents also lived near him.

We concluded that the respondent in Matter of Monreal, supra, had not shown that his children or his lawful permanent resident parents would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if he was removed from the United States. We recognized that the respondent's children would suffer some hardship if they accompanied their father to Mexico, and that they would likely have fewer opportunities there. However, emphasizing the high bar Congress had imposed in enacting the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" requirement, we concluded that the bar had not been reached.

The respondent asserts that her case is "completely distinguishable from Monreal." She argues that, unlike the respondent in Monreal, she is a single mother who is the sole support of her United States citizen children. She has no family able to help her in Mexico. She claims that single mothers face discrimination in Mexico that will make it even more difficult for her to provide a decent life for her children in that country. The respondent argues that women do not enjoy equal rights in Mexico. They are paid less and generally hold lower level jobs. There is "institutionalized discrimination against women," and a single mother returning to this environment would face a particularly difficult time trying to support her children. She also points out that in Monreal, the respondent's deportation to Mexico was actually going to reunite him with his family, as his wife and one of his children had already moved there.

The respondent further argues that the Board should not approach this case with the assumption that there are many other Mexicans whose situation is similar to hers, and that the hardship she presents therefore does not rise to the level of "exceptional and extremely unusual." The respondent asserts that her case, like all others, must be decided on its particular facts.

The Service, on the other hand, argues that the instant case is "squarely governed" by Matter of Monreal, supra. If anything, the Service claims, this case is weaker than that in Monreal because the respondent's United States citizen children are younger and would therefore have an easier time adapting to life in Mexico. The Service also asserts that this respondent's return to Mexico would be somewhat easier because she is not penniless, but has some assets that would enable her to "set up a better life for her children than many returnees."

The Service contends that the hardship presented by the respondent is similar to that of many Mexican nationals who sought suspension of deportation under the previous...

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