In re Anderson's Estate

Citation286 P. 17,142 Okla. 197,1929 OK 434
Decision Date15 October 1929
Docket Number19361.
PartiesIn re ANDERSON'S ESTATE. v. LINN. MORRISON
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma

Rehearing Denied Feb. 18, 1930.

Order Denying Rehearing Vacated Feb. 25, 1930.

Further Rehearing Denied March 25, 1930.

Syllabus by the Court.

"The burden of proof in the trial of a contest of the probate of a will is first upon the proponents of the will to make a prima fac-ie showing entitling the will to probate. The burden then shifts to the contestants to establish the issues presented by their contest." In re Will of Son-se-gra, 78 Okl. 213, 189 P. 865.

"A presumption of sanity goes with every one, and the burden of proving unsoundness of mind in a will contest rests upon the contestant." In re Blackfeather's Estate, 54 Okl. 1, 153 P. 839.

"The time of the making and execution of the will is the point of time from which the mental capacity of testator must be determined." In re Estate of Wah-kon-tah-he-um-pah, 108 Okl. 1, 232 P. 46.

Where a person devises his property to one who is acting during that time as his attorney, either in relation to the subject-matter of making the will, or generally, such devise of itself raises a presumption of undue influence. However this is by no means a conclusive presumption, but is one that may be overcome by evidence such as will lead the court to conclude that no undue influence was exerted.

A will contest is a case of purely equitable cognizance, and on appeal this court will examine the whole record and weigh the evidence; but the findings and judgment of the district court will not be disturbed unless such findings and judgment are clearly against the weight of the testimony.

The general principles of testamentary capacity apply in cases where the testator is addicted to the use of drugs. In such case a person may have the capacity which the law requires for making a will if, in spite of the use of drugs, he has sufficient mind and memory to understand the nature and extent of his property, the proper objects of his bounty, and the nature of the testamentary act. The fact that he was frequently or habitually under the influence of drugs does not render his will invalid if he had the requisite understanding at the time he made it.

For definition of what is meant by undue influence in relation to the execution of wills, see paragraph 3 of syllabus of In re Swartz's Will, 79 Okl. 191, 192 P. 203, 16 A. L R. 450, quoted in this opinion.

Record examined, and held that the findings and judgment of the trial court are not against the clear weight of the evidence.

Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 1.

Appeal from District Court, Tulsa County; R. D. Hudson, Judge.

Petition by Conn Linn for probate of the will of Walter Anderson deceased, contested by Sallie Morrison and others. Judgment for proponent admitting the will to probate, and contestant named brings error.

Affirmed.

Fred M Carter, of Bartlesville, and Linn & Spradling and Thos. G. Skinner, all of Tulsa, for defendant in error.

REID C.

Walter Anderson was a three-quarter blood enrolled Creek Indian, and about 30 years of age when he died on January 18, 1927. He had made three wills; the principal beneficiaries named in them and their dates being: Sally Morrison, February 2, 1921; Conn Linn, January 31, 1924; J. L. Moore, August 5, 1926.

On January 24, 1927, Conn Linn filed his petition in the county court of Tulsa county asking that the will of January 31, 1924, be probated as the last will of the deceased. Thereafter Andrew Anderson, a brother of the decedent, one Dave Bruner Anderson, Sallie Morrison, an aunt, and J. L. Moore filed contests against the probate of the Linn will. And in due course, J. L. Moore and Sallie Morrison each filed their petitions in that court to have probated the wills of Walter Anderson in which they were named the chief beneficiaries. The causes were consolidated and heard by a special judge agreed on, upon the petition to probate the respective wills and the contests of the adverse parties. On January 8, 1927, a judgment was rendered holding that the will propounded by Conn Linn, executed January 31, 1924, was the last will of the deceased, and admitted the same to probate and denied probate of the wills offered by Moore and Sallie Morrison.

Each of the parties adversely affected by the judgment prosecuted an appeal to the district court, except the contestant Dave Bruner Anderson.

Upon a trial of the consolidated proceeding in the district court, findings were made on the issues, and judgment was entered admitting the Linn will to probate, and denying probate of the wills propounded by Moore and Sallie Morrison, respectively, and in all things approved the judgment of the county court.

From the foregoing judgment Sallie Morrison alone appealed. And the only question here presented is whether or not the will of January 31, 1924, naming Linn as the principal beneficiary, is a valid will and entitled to probate.

As showing her right to contest the will made to Linn, Sallie Morrison alleged that she was a beneficiary under a will made by the deceased on February 2, 1921, and had filed petition for probate thereof. And for attack upon the Linn will she alleged: "Contestant says that the will presented for probate by Conn Linn, made by Walter Anderson on January 31, 1924, was obtained by Conn Linn by undue influence, suggestion, and persuasion on the part of the said Conn Linn; that Conn Linn at the time of the making of said will was, and for a long time prior thereto had been the attorney of Walter Anderson, and had acquired great influence over Walter Anderson by reason of such relationship; that Walter Anderson, at the time said will was made, was and for some time theretofore, he had been addicted to the use of narcotic drugs, that the use of said drugs had become so habitual and so frequent that the mind of Walter Anderson had been weakened, and his mental condition so impaired that he was unable to make and execute a valid will at that time; that at said time he was very easily influenced, had no idea of the value of property and would do anything to obtain narcotics when the craving for such narcotic was upon him, and when under the influence of such narcotic he would part with his property or take action regarding it without reason, and without regard to its value, upon the mere suggestion that such action be taken, and this contestant avers that the said Conn Linn well knew the condition of Walter Anderson at that time, and procured the execution of said will of January 31, 1924, with knowledge that Walter Anderson at that time was without mental capacity to make a will."

It is evident that the contestant sought to defeat the will on the grounds that the testator was not of sound mind as required by section 11221, C. O. S. 1921, and also on the further ground that the will was procured by undue influence, mentioned as one of the grounds on which a will may be denied probate in section 11223, C. O. S. 1921; the other allegations of the pleading going as inducements to the two main facts charged.

In the contestant's brief she groups her several assignments of error into two questions; the first being stated as follows: "Was the burden cast upon Sallie Morrison in this case to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Linn will was invalid either by reason of undue influence on the part of Linn, or by reason of the mental incapacity of Walter Anderson?"

The general rule answering the foregoing question has been stated by this court in the case of In re Will of Son-se-gra, 78 Okl. 213, 189 P. 865, 866, in the following language: "The burden of proof in the trial of a contest of the probate of a will is first upon the proponents of the will to make a prima facie showing entitling the will to probate. The burden then shifts to the contestants to establish the issues presented by their contest. Section 6210, R. L. 1910; Cartwright v. Holcomb, 21 Okl. 548, 97 P. 385; In re Blackfeather's Estate, supra; In re MacCrellish's Estate, 167 Cal. 711, 141 P. 257, L. R. A. 1915A, 443; Estate of Latour, 140 Cal. 414, 73 P. 1070, 74 P. 441; Jones on Evidence, § 189; In re Van Alstine's Estate, 26 Utah, 193, 72 P. 942."

And, applying the foregoing general rule to the question where the burden of proof rested on the particular issue as to whether the testator had sufficient mental capacity to make the will, we find that this court, in the case of In re Blackfeather's Estate, 54 Okl. 1, 153 P. 839, 842, has said: "A presumption of sanity goes with everyone, and the burden of proving unsoundness of mind in a will contest rests on the contestant."

This holding was approved in the case of McClure, Ex. v. Kerchner, 107 Okl. 28, 229 P. 589, and in the case of In re Estate of Wah-kon-tah-he-um-pah, 108 Okl. 1, 232 P. 46, 48, where it was also said: "The time of the making an execution of the will is the point of time from which the mental capacity of testator must be determined. See 40 Cyc. 998, and authorities cited."

The evidence in this case shows that, for some time prior thereto, and at the time the will in question was executed the proponent was the attorney of the testator and regarded by him as his close friend. We find the evidence sufficient to show a confidential relation. It therefore became the duty of the proponent to show that the will was not obtained by undue influence. However, notwithstanding the burden so placed on the proponent if by all the evidence in the case the burden was overcome, then the will was entitled to probate, if not invalid, for some other reason. Bromley's Estate, 113 Mich. 53, 71 N.W. 523. For certainly there is no rule of law which prevents a party from receiving bequests under, or...

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