In re Anthony M. Spagnoletti, Alleged Unruly Child Case, 97-LW-4649
| Decision Date | 22 August 1997 |
| Docket Number | 96-L-162,97-LW-4649 |
| Parties | IN THE MATTER OF: ANTHONY M. SPAGNOLETTI, ALLEGED UNRULY CHILD CASE |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division Case No. 95 UN 2473
HON DONALD R. FORD, P.J., HON. JUDITH A. CHRISTLEY, J., HON WILLIAM M. O'NEILL, J.
CHARLES E. COULSON, LAKE COUNTY PROSECUTOR, TAYLIR K. LINDEN ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR, 47 North Park Place, P.O. Box 490 Painesville, OH 44077, For Appellee
R. PAUL LaPLANTE, LAKE COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER, JOSEPH P. SZEMAN, ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER, 125 East Erie Street, Painsville, OH 44077, For Appellant
This is an accelerated calendar case submitted to this court on the briefs of the parties.
On June 14, 1995, appellant, Anthony M. Spagnoletti, then aged seventeen, was picked up at 12:32 a.m. by the Mentor Police for violating the Mentor Curfew Ordinance, which states, in relevant part:
"*** between the hours of 12:00 o'clock midnight and 5:00 o'clock A.M. local time no child between the ages of 16 and 18 years shall be upon any streets, roads, sidewalks, parks, beaches, parking lots, public or private playgrounds, public or private school grounds, church grounds or recreation areas unless accompanied by a parent, guardian or some responsible person over the age of 21 years of age, or a member of said child's family over 18 years of age."
On July 21, 1995, appellant was charged with a violation of the curfew ordinance. On February 13, 1996, appellant filed a motion to dismiss alleging that Mentor's Curfew Ordinance was unconstitutional. The trial court overruled appellant's motion on July 10, 1996. On August 29, 1996, appellant changed his plea and he was adjudicated an unruly child by the magistrate. On September 16, 1996, the trial court adopted the magistrate's decision after finding that no objections had been filed. Appellant's disposition was to pay court costs.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal with a single assignment of error. Appellant contends that the Mentor Curfew Ordinance is unconstitutional as it unduly infringes upon a juvenile's constitutionally guaranteed rights, thereby violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the analogous sections of the Ohio Constitution. We agree.
Juvenile curfew ordinances have been challenged in Ohio relatively infrequently but the issue has been addressed by numerous federal courts. There is no clear line of case law, however, that establishes which ordinances are constitutional and which are not. The ordinances themselves range from a strict prohibition against juveniles being out in public during certain hours of the night to more lenient ordinances which allow for exceptions or defenses. These exceptions may include: being accompanied by an adult or guardian; on an errand at the direction of the minor's parent or guardian; traveling to or from a place of employment; in a motor vehicle involved in interstate travel; involved in an emergency; attending an official school, religious, or civic function or other recreational activity; exercising First Amendment rights such as the free exercise of religion, freedom of speech, and the right of assembly; being on the sidewalk abutting the minor's residence or abutting the residence of a neighbor; or being married. Generally, courts have been more likely to strike down the more restrictive ordinances while allowing the more lenient ordinances that provide for many exceptions or defenses.
While it is well established that juveniles possess certain rights under the constitution, In re Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1, 13, it is undisputed that juveniles do not enjoy all of the rights of adults. See, Ginsberg v. New York (1968), 390 U.S. 629 (); Prince v. Massachusetts (1944), 321 U.S. 158 (affirming state's authority to control child's work practices even where such prohibition interfered with child's desire to disseminate religious materials).
A brief analysis of those cases that deal in a precise manner with the distinction between constitutional versus unconstitutional ordinances is in order. In Johnson v. City of Opelousas (1981), 658 F.2d 1065, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a juvenile curfew ordinance that included only two exceptions to the prohibition, when the minor was accompanied by a parent or responsible adult, and when the minor was engaged in an emergency errand.
Initially, the court stated that "'[a] law is void on its face for overbreadth if it "does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of [government] control but, *** sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise" of protected expressive or associational rights. ***'" (Citations omitted,) Id. at 1071. The court continued by noting that an ordinance is not overbroad "unless 'it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts' *** and its deterrent effect on legitimate first amendment activity is both real and substantial. ***" (Citations omitted.) Id. at 1072.
The court then examined the factors set forth in Bellotti v. Baird (1981), 443 U.S. 622, 633-39, concerning when the placement of restrictions on minors, which would be unconstitutional if placed on adults, is justified. Those factors are: "'the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child-rearing.' ***" (Citations omitted.) Id. at 1073. Those concerns were determined to be inapplicable in Opesoulas since: (1) there was no issue of peculiar vulnerability of minors with regard to attendance or travel to or from religious, school, commercial, and other organized activities, or a minor's being on the sidewalk in front of his house; (2) the associational, commercial, and travel activities prohibited under the ordinance were not deemed to involve "critical decisions" on the part of a minor; and (3) the ordinance inhibited, rather than promoted, the parental role in child rearing. Id. at 1073-1074.
The court held that the curfew ordinance in Opelousas was overly broad because it swept within its ambit a number of innocent activities which are constitutionally protected, and the stifling effect on the legitimate activities was overt, real, and substantial. The court further reasoned that the ordinance failed to provide adequate exceptions that would permit a narrowing construction by the court. Id. at 1074.
In Outb v. Strauss (1993), 11 F.3d 488, the Fifth Circuit Court examined the Dallas ordinance that contained a number of exceptions, including the...
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