In re Application for Annexation of Common School Districts Nos. 18 and 21

• Decision Date: 17 October 1932
• Docket Number: 5909
• Citation: 15 P.2d 732,52 Idaho 363
• Parties: In the Matter of the Application for Annexation of COMMON SCHOOL DISTRICTS NOS. 18 and 21 to INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, MINIDOKA COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

15 P.2d 732

52 Idaho 363

In the Matter of the Application for Annexation of COMMON SCHOOL DISTRICTS NOS. 18 and 21 to INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, MINIDOKA COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO

No. 5909

Supreme Court of Idaho

October 17, 1932

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-ANNEXATION OF UNORGANIZED TERRITORY-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. Party protesting annexation of unorganized territory within lapsed school district to organized district and alleging unorganized territory was "uninhabited" could not urge that annexation petition and evidence did not show that less than five electors resided within lapsed district (Laws 1929, chap. 101, sec. 9, as added by Laws 1931, chap. 121; Laws 1921, chap. 215, as amended).

2. On appeal from judgment affirming school district annexation trial court's memorandum decision respecting board's abuse of discretion, as distinguished from findings, held ineffective.

3. Legislature has plenary power over formation, operation etc., of school districts, and may delegate such power (Laws 1921, chap. 215, as amended).

4. That railroad's right of way, extending through unorganized lapsed common school district, could not of itself be used for school purposes, held not valid objection to annexation to organized district (Laws 1929, chap. 101, sec. 9, as added by Laws 1931, chap. 121; Laws 1921, chap. 215, as amended).

5. County commissioners having exercised power of annexing unorganized territory within lapsed school district to organized district when all statutory conditions were present, there could be no abuse of discretion, though additional taxable territory was thus taken into district rather than leaving it in unorganized district (Laws 1929 chap. 101, sec. 9, as added by Laws 1931, chap. 121; Laws 1921, chap. 215, as amended).

APPEAL from the District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District for Minidoka County. Hon. Adam B. Barclay, Judge.

Application for annexation of Common School Districts to Independent School District. From a judgment of the District Court affirming an order granting the application, the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company appeals. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed; costs to respondent. Petition for rehearing denied.

George H. Smith, H. B. Thompson and Chas. A. Root, for Appellant.

It is unreasonable and an abuse of power to extend the boundaries of a school district into the desert between fifteen and twenty miles from the school, into an area in which no children reside, solely to subject property of a railroad to the bonded indebtedness of the school district and annual tax levies. (In re Wolf, 8 Kulp (Pa.), 181; Oakland School Dist. v. Board of Education, 100 Kan. 59, 163 P. 800; Heaton v. Jackson, 34 Ohio App. 424, 171 N.E. 364; School Dist. No. 14 v. School Dist. No. 27, 195 Mo.App. 504, 193 S.W. 634.)

The unreasonable extension of boundaries of a taxing unit constitutes a deprivation of property without due process of law. (Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 5 S.Ct. 357, 28 L.Ed. 923; Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 19 S.Ct. 187, 43 L.Ed. 443, 447, 449.)

H. V. Creason, for Respondent.

A school district or the residents therein have no vested rights in the original boundaries laid out for such district, whether lapsed or otherwise, and it is the policy of the legislature to provide for the formation of school districts or their alteration and change as in its opinion is necessary for the formation of the public good, and the residents of such school districts may not claim to be aggrieved thereby.

The function of the board of county commissioners in the instant case is legislative and discretionary, and its decision therein is final and unassailable on appeal, except where a clear case on abuse of discretion is shown. (12 C. J. 808, and cases cited; 34 C. J. 1180, and cases cited; 1931 Sess. Laws, chap. 21, sec. 15; 56 C. J. 197 et seq.; Broyles v. Mahon, 72 Cal.App. 484, 237 P. 763; Antelope Valley Union High School Dist. v. McClellan, 55 Cal.App. 244, 203 P. 147; Gorrell v. Bevans, 66 Colo. 67, 179 P. 337; People v. Camargo Community Consol. School Dist. No. 158, 313 Ill. 321, 145 N.E. 154; Pass School Dist. v. Hollywood City School Dist., 156 Cal. 416, 20 Ann. Cas. 87, 105 P. 122, 26 L. R. A., N. S., 485; State v. Hall, 73 Ore. 231, 144 P. 475; School Dist. No. 48 v. School Dist. No. 115, 60 Ore. 38, 118 P. 169.)

GIVENS, J. Lee, C. J., and Budge and Leeper, JJ., concur.

OPINION

GIVENS, J.

Common School District No. 18 in Minidoka county lapsed under the provisions of chap. 215, Sess. Laws 1921, p. 427, and acts amendatory thereof, and became thereby and by reason of chap. 101, Sess. Laws 1929, part of the unorganized school district of Minidoka county.

Through the territory formerly in district No. 18 extends several miles of the main line east and west of the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company.

Thereafter, under the provisions of chap. 121, Sess. Laws 1931, p. 208, the territory formerly in district No. 18 was annexed to Independent School District No. 1 at Rupert, Idaho, adjoining and being contiguous thereto.

The Oregon Short Line Railroad Company resisted such annexation, and appeals from the order of the district court affirming the action of the board of county commissioners on three principal grounds, first, that the petition and evidence did not show that there were less than five qualified electors in such lapsed district.

Sec. 9, chap. 121, supra, specifies only three conditions precedent, or what might be termed jurisdictional requirements, for annexation: first, that the school district has lapsed. This is not questioned. Second, that there be no outstanding indebtedness. This, also is not questioned. Third, that less than five qualified electors reside in the district.

Appellant in its protest alleged that: "All of which territory (within the lapsed district) is dry, unirrigated, barren, unproductive and uninhabited. . . ." If the territory is uninhabited, and appellant itself so stated, it perforce contains less than five qualified electors; thus appellant is in no position to urge that the petition and showing in this particular was not sufficient.

Appellant's main point specified in several assignments is that either the county commissioners did not have the power to make the annexation or abused their discretion in so doing.

Since the statute itself gives the county commissioners power, where the three conditions above noted obtain, to make the annexation, where they exist as they did herein, there can be no abuse of discretion.

"'In a nut-shell, this whole controversy arises over a question of judgment. The petitioners before the board, the appellants here, are not in agreement with the members of the board. That disagreement of itself is not for the courts. The law has plainly vested the board of directors of school districts such as this with discretionary powers in such matters, and the directors having examined into and passed upon the matter in the exercise of their discretion, the courts have no right or power to review the conclusions reached by them as a board in the absence of a showing of abuse, of discretion on their part, which is not the case here.'" (In re Chelan Electric Co., 152 Wash. 412, 65 A. L. R. 1520, 278 P. 171, 172.)

While in his memorandum decision the trial court construing School Dist. No. 12 v. School Dist. No. 33, 25 Idaho 554, 139 P. 136, indicated there was more abuse of discretion therein than here, in his findings he held there was no abuse herein. The memorandum is of no force or effect (Stewart Min. Co. v. Ontario Min. Co., 23 Idaho 724, 132 P. 787; Smith v. Faris-Kesl Con. Co., 27 Idaho 407, 150 P. 25; Corker v. Cowen, 30 Idaho 213, 164 P. 85; Young v. Washington Water Power Co., 39 Idaho 539, 548, 228 P. 323; Forsman v. Holbrook, 47 Idaho 241, 274 P. 111); thus appellant's argument in this particular is of no avail.

The legislature has plenary power over the formation, operation etc., of school districts, and may delegate this power. ( Fenton v. Board of County Commrs., 20 Idaho 392, 119 P. 41; Norton v. Lakeside Special School Dist., 97 Ark. 71, 133 S.W. 184; Corpier v. Thomason, 155 Ark. 509, 244 S.W. 738; Special School Dist. v. Pyatt Special School Dist., 172 Ark. 602, 289 S.W. 778; People v. Camargo Community Consol. School Dist., 313 Ill. 321, 145 N.E. 154; Attorney General of Michigan v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 26 S.Ct. 27, 50 L.Ed. 167; School Dist. No. 94 v. King, 20 N.D. 614, 127 N.W. 515; El Dorado Ind. School Dist. v. Tisdale, (Tex. Com. App.) 3 S.W.2d 420; School Dist. No. 48 v. School Dist. No. 115, 60 Ore. 38, 118 P. 169; Pass School Dist. v. Hollywood City School Dist., 156 Cal. 416 20 Ann. Cas. 87, 105 P. 122, 26 L. R. A., N. S., 484; People v. San Bernardino High School Dist., 62 Cal.App. 67, 216 P. 959; Broyles v....