In re Application of Pugh

Decision Date19 April 1926
Docket NumberCivil 2334
Citation245 P. 273,30 Ariz. 129
PartiesIn the Matter of the Application of SPENCER B. PUGH for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. v. JERRY SULLIVAN, Sheriff of Maricopa County, State of Arizona, Appellee SPENCER B. PUGH, Appellant,
CourtArizona Supreme Court

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Maricopa. Dudley W. Windes, Judge.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded, with direction that an order be entered discharging the appellant from custody.

Mr. D L. Cunningham, Mr. T. A. Carson and Mr. V. L. Hash, for Appellant.

Mr John W. Murphy, Attorney General, and Mr. Earl Anderson and Mr. Frank J. Duffy, Assistant Attorneys General, for Appellee.

Ross J. McAlister, C. J., and Lockwood, J., concur.

OPINION

Ross, J.

The appellant, Spencer B. Pugh, a practicing attorney, was found guilty of contempt of court, in the superior court of Maricopa county, and sentenced to pay a fine, and, in default of payment, to be imprisoned. He applied for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming his imprisonment was illegal. In his return to the writ, the sheriff exhibited, as his authority for confining appellant, the following judgment and commitment, properly certified by the clerk of the court:

"In the Superior Court of Maricopa County, State of Arizona.

"In the Matter of the Application of JACINTA LAVIN AJA (No. 19670) and PABLO ALONSO GONZALES (No. 19671) for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

"Judgment and Commitment.

"On this the 26th day of June, 1924, one Spencer B. Pugh, being present in open court, was adjudged in contempt of court for the abuse of the process of the writ of habeas corpus, and the court having found that Spencer B. Pugh is guilty of contempt of court:

"It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed and the judgment and sentence of the court is that you, Spencer B. Pugh, pay a fine of one hundred dollars ($ 100.00), and in default of the payment of said sum of money, that you, Spencer B. Pugh, be imprisoned in the county jail of Maricopa county, state of Arizona, for one hundred days, or until the said fine is satisfied in the proportion of one day's imprisonment for every one dollar of said fine remaining unpaid. And the defendant is remanded to the custody of the sheriff of Maricopa county, state of Arizona, to be by him delivered into the custody of the proper officers of the said county jail.

"And it is further ordered, that a certified copy of this judgment shall be a sufficient warrant for the said sheriff to take, keep, and safely deliver the said Spencer B. Pugh into the custody of the proper officers of said county jail, and a sufficient warrant for the officers of the said county jail to keep and imprison the said Spencer B. Pugh in accordance herewith.

"[Signed] FRED C. STRUCKMEYER, Judge."

The court, after a hearing upon the petition and return, refused to discharge the prisoner, and he appeals.

One assignment of error is as follows:

"That the said judgment and commitment was void because it did not specify any facts whatsoever constituting the contempt therein specified, to wit, abuse of process."

There are other assignments, but, since the point in this one is unquestionably good, we will not state the others or consider them.

It appears that the contempt of which appellant was found guilty grew out of a habeas corpus proceeding wherein appellant was representing the petitioners, and involved his good faith or conduct in that matter. If he was guilty of contempt, it was of the kind designated as direct contempt. In such cases it is not necessary to prefer formal charges against the contemnor; the law being that:

"It is the almost universal rule that, where the contempt is direct, in the immediate presence of the court, summary punishment may be inflicted, without affidavit, notice, rule to show cause, or other process." 13 C. J. 63, § 87.

And none was preferred in this case.

We think however, that it is quite as universally the rule that if the proceeding is summary, without any written charge, that the record must somewhere show the facts upon which the conviction is based, in order that it...

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7 cases
  • Weiss v. Superior Court of Pima County
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • July 31, 1970
    ...P.2d 875 (1948); Ex parte Gambrell, 160 Kan. 620, 164 P.2d 122 (1945), rehearing denied 161 Kan. 4, 165 P.2d 760 (1946); In re Pugh, 30 Ariz. 129, 245 P. 273 (1926). The reason for this 'particularity' requirement as to the basis of the contempt is to permit informed appellate review. Taube......
  • Silverton v. Commonwealth
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • May 25, 1943
    ...held that a sentence for criminal contempt must be accompanied by a detailed statement of its grounds. Illustrative of these are In re Pugh, 30 Ariz. 129, Wilde v. Court of San Diego County, 53 Cal.App. (2d) 168, 179, People v. Sherwin, 354 Ill. 371, Crites v. State, 74 Neb. 687, and Hoffma......
  • Ong Hing v. Thurston
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • July 8, 1966
    ...contempt is an act committed in the presence of the court or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, In re Pugh, 30 Ariz. 129, 245 P. 273; and constructive or indirect contempt is an act committed outside the presence of the court, In re Quan, 39 Ariz. 13, 3 P.2d 522. ......
  • Weiss v. Superior Court of Pima County
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • January 28, 1971
    ...to set forth on its face the facts upon which the convictions for criminal contempt are grounded. Petitioner relies upon In re Pugh, 30 Ariz. 129, 245 P. 273 (1926) and Golden v. Superior Court of Cochise County, 8 Ariz.App. 25, 442 P.2d 562 (1968) to support his position. This court in Pug......
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