In re Aries Marine Corp.

• Decision Date: 20 January 2023
• Docket Number: Civil Action 19-10850,19-13138
• Parties: IN THE MATTER OF ARIES MARINE CORPORATION, ET AL. SECTION I
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

IN THE MATTER OF ARIES MARINE CORPORATION, ET AL. SECTION I

Civil Action Nos. 19-10850, 19-13138

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

January 20, 2023

ORDER & REASONS

LANCE M. AFRICK UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is a motion^[1] for summary judgment filed by petitioner-in- limitation Aries Marine Corporation (“Aries”). Claimants Calvin Abshire, Glenn Gibson, Tomas Arce Perez, Lee Bob Rose, Gilberto Gomez Rozas, Gabriel Vilano, and Ronald Williams (collectively, “claimants”) oppose^[2] the motion. For the reasons below, the Court denies the motion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This matter arises from a November 18, 2018 incident involving the RAM XVIII, a 195-gross-ton liftboat^[3] owned and operated by Aries.^[4] At the relevant time, the RAM XVIII was placed in the West Delta 68-U (“WD 68-U”) region on the Outer

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Continental Shelf in the Gulf of Mexico.^[5] The RAM XVIII was chartered to provide services in support of the work to be performed by claimants on a platform located in the WD 68-U area.^[6]

The RAM XVII arrived at the work location on November 16, 2018.^[7] As planned, the starboard leg of the vessel was placed into an existing “can hole.”^[8] To achieve this, the vessel's port leg was placed in the same location where previous liftboats had placed their legs.^[9]

Aries asserts that, once the vessel's legs were placed, the vessel went through a “preload process” intended “to ensure that the leg pads [were] on stable ground and [would] not punch through the seabed.”^[10] According to Aries, during this process the vessel's tanks were filled with water to add weight, the vessel was lifted 5 feet out of the water, and the captain leaned the vessel on one leg at a time for 20 to 30 minutes each.^[11] Aries asserts that this process began at 2 P.M. on November 16th and ended at 3 A.M. on November 17th.^[12]

Claimants disagree with Aries' account of the preload. They assert that the preload was improperly completed because the vessel used its cranes while

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preloading, in violation of Aries' internal policies,^[13] and because the captain did not jack up the hull of the vessel to the height required by Aries' policies.^[14]

Alternatively, claimants argue that during the time the vessel was allegedly preloading, it in fact “jacked[ ] up to approximately 50 feet above the water” to allow workers to board the vessel via a walkway, and therefore the vessel “may not have preloaded at all.”^[15] Aries maintains that the workers were transferred to the vessel using a crane, and that the vessel did perform a preload.^[16]

The parties agree that, regardless of when the vessel was raised, the RAM XVIII and the construction crew worked without incident throughout the day of November 17, 2018.^[17] Then, at approximately 1:30 A.M. on November 18, 2018, the captain noticed the bathroom door in his bunk room moving, and the vessel's tilt alarm rang shortly afterward.^[18] The captain attempted to correct the vessel's listing, but he was unable to do so. All occupants were evacuated, and the vessel ultimately sank.

After this incident, Aries filed a complaint for exoneration or limitation of liability in this Court.^[19] The seven claimants, all of whom were present on the vessel during the incident, then filed answers and claims.^[20] Claimants also filed a separate

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complaint^[21] against Fugro USA Marine, Inc. (“Fugro”), and Fieldwood Energy LLC (“Fieldwood”). That matter was consolidated with the exoneration and limitation action.^[22]

In the instant motion, Aries asks this Court to find that it is entitled to exoneration as a matter of law, and to dismiss all of claimants' claims against it. In the alternative, Aries asks this Court to find that it is entitled to limit its liability to the post-incident value of the RAM XVIII and any pending freight, and to dismiss any claim for punitive damages.

II. STANDARD OF LAW

Summary judgment is proper when, after reviewing the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits, a court determines that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment need not produce evidence negating the existence of a material fact; it need only point out the absence of evidence supporting the other party's case. Id.; see also Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1195-96 (5th Cir. 1986) (“There is no sound reason why conclusory allegations should

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suffice to require a trial when there is no evidence to support them even if the movant lacks contrary evidence.”).

Once the party seeking summary judgment carries that burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The showing of a genuine issue is not satisfied by creating “‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,' by ‘conclusory allegations,' by ‘unsubstantiated assertions,' or by only a ‘scintilla' of evidence.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists when the “evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

“Although the substance or content of the evidence submitted to support or dispute a fact on summary judgment must be admissible . . . the material may be presented in a form that would not, in itself, be admissible at trial.” Lee v. Offshore Logistical & Transp., L.L.C., 859 F.3d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). The party responding to the motion for summary judgment may not rest upon the pleadings but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The nonmoving party's evidence, however, “is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [the nonmoving party's] favor.” Id. at 255.

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If the movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmovant must then articulate specific facts showing a genuine issue and point to supporting, competent evidence that may be presented in a form admissible at trial. See Lynch Props., Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A), (c)(2). These facts must create more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “A non-movant will not avoid summary judgment by presenting speculation, improbable inferences, or unsubstantiated assertions.” Lawrence v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 808 F.3d 670, 673 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation and citation omitted). If the nonmovant fails to meet their burden of showing a genuine issue for trial that could support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant, summary judgment must be granted. See Little, 37 F.3d at 1075-76.

This matter is set for a bench trial. Therefore, so long as “the evidentiary facts are not disputed and there are no issues of witness credibility,” Manson Gulf, L.L.C. v. Modern Am. Recycling Serv., 878 F.3d 130, 134 (5th Cir. 2017), “the district court has the limited discretion to decide that the same evidence, presented to him or her as a trier of fact in a plenary trial, could not possibly lead to a different result.” Jones v. United States, 936 F.3d 318, 321-22 (5th Cir. 2019) (quotation and citation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

“When a court determines whether a shipowner is entitled to exoneration or limitation of liability, it employs a two-step process.” Archer Daniels Midland, Co. v.

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M/T AMERICAN LIBERTY, 545 F.Supp.3d 390, 402 (E.D. La. 2021) (Fallon, J.) (quotations and citations omitted). “First, the party seeking to dissolve limitation must establish that the vessel was negligent or unseaworthy, and those acts caused the accident.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). If the claimants do not make this showing, the vessel owner is entitled to exoneration. If negligence or unseaworthiness is established, then “the burden shifts to the owner of the vessel to prove that negligence or unseaworthiness was not within the owner's privity or knowledge.” Id. (quotation, citation, and alteration omitted). If the owner of the vessel makes that showing, then it is entitled to limit its liability to the value of the vessel and pending freight. In re Omega Protein, Inc., 548 F.3d 361, 371 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing 46 U.S.C. § 30505(a)).

a. Exoneration

The Court first addresses exoneration. Claimants' claims arise under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (“LHWCA”).^[23] That statute “provides longshoremen and other maritime workers with a negligence cause of action against vessel owners.” Anthony v. Deep South Airboats, No. 21-1070, 2021 WL 4460319, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 29, 2021) (Ashe, J.).

In Scindia Steam Navigation Co v. De Los Santos, the Supreme Court held that a vessel owner's duties under § 905(b) are limited to: (1) the “turnover duty,” which requires the vessel owner to turn over a reasonably safe ship, (2) the “active

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control duty,” which requires the vessel owner to protect against hazards under the active control of the vessel, and (3) the “duty to intervene,” which requires that the vessel owner intervene when it “knows...