In re Arland's Estate

• Decision Date: 18 November 1924
• Docket Number: 18424.
• Citation: 230 P. 157,131 Wash. 297
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: In re ARLAND'S ESTATE. v. ARLAND et al. ARLAND et al.

230 P. 157

131 Wash. 297

In re ARLAND'S ESTATE.

ARLAND et al. v. ARLAND et al.

No. 18424.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 18, 1924

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Whitman County; Blake, Judge.

Suit by Josephine E. Arland and others against George H. Arland executor of the estate of Charles H. Arland, deceased, and another. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Voorhees & Canfield, of Spokane, for appellants.

Neill &amp Sanger, of Pullman, for respondents.

BRIDGES J.

This is a very interesting suit in equity. In December, 1911, Charles H. Arland and his wife, Mary E. Arland, entered into a written agreement concerning all their property which belonged to the community. By its terms each agreed to, and did, execute to the other a warranty deed, covering all of the property; the contract providing that such deed should have the effect of vesting in the survivor the entire title. These deeds were to be, and were, put in escrow to be held until the death of one of the parties, and then the proper deed was to be delivered to the survivor. It was further agreed that the survivor should immediately upon the death of the other party make a will, giving whatever he or she had at his or her death to the children of the contracting parties. Mrs. Arland died within a year after the execution of this contract, and Mr. Arland at once obtained from the escrow holder the deed running from his deceased wife to himself. About four years thereafter he married again. He died about six years after his second marriage leaving his wife, Josephine, surviving him. At the time of his death he was 79 or 80 years of age. There were no children resulting from the second marriage. He did not make the will contemplated by the contract between himself and his first wife, but did make one giving to his second wife a one-third interest in his estate; the remainder being given to his children (all by the first wife). The second wife had no knowledge of the contract or its terms until after the death of Mr. Arland. From the time of the death of his first wife until his second marriage and thereafter he and his wife lived on the property in question. They did not add to the estate that was in existence at the time of the death of his first wife; but, on the contrary, a small portion of it was expended for their living. The foregoing facts are set out in a stipulation which provides that the question to be determined 'is as to the right of the petitioner, Josephine E. Arland, to the portion of the estate of Charles H. Arland, deceased, bequeathed to her under his last will and testament. * * *' The trial court upheld Mr. Arland's will, and the children have appealed.

This case rests entirely upon equitable principles. The court is free to do that which its conscience dictates. Contracts of the character of the one involved here will be enforced if equity so demands, but although there may be equities supporting it, it will not be enforced if by so doing the rights of others will be invaded. The court may not, in its anxiety to relieve one party, inflict a wrong upon another who is entirely innocent. In other words, a contract to devise property is valid and enforceable unless superior equities have intervened. Equity will not enforce a contract where the result will be harsh and oppressive. These principles are supported by the following cases: Johnson v. Hubbell, 10 N. J. Eq. 332, 66 Am. Dec. 773; Alexander on Wills, § 97; Rundell v. McDonald, 41 Cal.App. 175, 182 P. 450; Owns v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444, 45 P. 710, 33 L. R. A. 369. In a general way we have recognized this rule in Bernard v. Benson, 58 Wash. 191, 108 P. 439, 137 Am. St. Rep. 1051, where we said:

'We think the true rule, and the one which best harmonizes with the broad principles of equity, is that specific performance will be denied when rights of innocent third parties have intervened so that the enforcement of the contract would be harsh, oppressive, or unjust to them.'

While there are many equities in favor of the appellants, we think they are overcome by the greater equities of the respondent. She married Mr. Arland in entire ignorance of the contract between him and his deceased wife. She lived with him for six years and cared for him during his old age. In so doing she must have relieved the appellants of many duties which otherwise would have been imposed upon them. In a sense her equities are based on an actual consideration, while theirs are based on the right of heirship. She obtains only one-third of the estate. The appellants obtain all that portion which formerly belonged to their mother and some in addition thereto. If the contract did not exist, no one would think of denying that an equitable division had been made. Under our statute, section 1399, Rem. Comp. Stat., if Mr. Arland had made the will provided for in the contract, it would have been avoided by his marriage to the respondent. His widow is his heir as well as the children, for the statute provides that in the event one die intestate leaving a wife and children one-third of his estate shall go to his wife. Section 1341, Rem. Comp. Stat. If the respondent had been an innocent purchaser for value of all the property in question, and not the widow, courts of equity would not, for a moment, think of enforcing the contract against her. While in the ordinary sense she is not a purchaser, in an equitable sense she is in as favorable a position as if she were such. It is quite true that as between the appellants and their father or as between him and his deceased wife the contract would unquestionably be enforced, but that situation would not take into consideration the equities of the respondent.

There are but few cases closely touching this question. The one most nearly in point is Owens v. McNally, supra. There the facts were: McNally lived in California, was unmarried, was more than 50 years of age, and had an estate of considerable value. He had a niece about 18 years of age who lived in Michigan. He promised her that if she would...