In re Ashley S.

Decision Date14 December 2000
Citation762 A.2d 941,2000 ME 212
PartiesIn re ASHLEY S.
CourtMaine Supreme Court

Verne E. Paradie Jr., Gosselin, Dubord & Rabasco, P.A., Lewiston, for appellant.

Andrew Ketterer, Attorney General, Carmen L. Coulombe, Asst. Attorney General, LaTonya Hayes, Asst. Attorney General, Nancy Henry, Asst. Attorney General, Matthew Pollack, Asst. Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee.

J. Lawrence Irwin, Lewiston, Guardian ad Litem.

David Veilleux, Lewiston, for mother.

Panel: WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and CALKINS, JJ.

SAUFLEY, J.

[¶ 1] The father of Ashley S. appeals from the judgment of the District Court (Lewiston, Gorman, J.) finding Ashley to be in circumstances of jeopardy and awarding custody of Ashley to the Department of Human Services. 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 4035, 4036 (1992 & Supp.2000). The father does not challenge the court's jeopardy finding but contends that the court erred when it found that "aggravated circumstances" existed pursuant to 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 4002(1-B)(A)(1), 4036(1)(G-2) (Supp.2000) and that reunification efforts would be inconsistent with Ashley's permanency plan, 22 M.R.S.A. § 4041(2)(A-1) (Supp.2000). We affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] On December 13, 1999, the Department of Human Services filed a petition for child protection order concerning two-year-old Ashley, alleging that Ashley was in circumstances of jeopardy based on her parents' severe neglect, domestic violence, and mental health problems. The Department also sought a preliminary protection order allowing Ashley's immediate removal from her parents' home. The court granted the preliminary protection order, and the Department removed Ashley from her parents' care on the same date.

[¶ 3] The father waived his right to hearing on the preliminary protection order, and two months later, the court held hearings over the course of three days on the Department's petition for a protection order and its request for an order allowing the Department not to undertake reunification efforts. At trial, the father disputed only the Department's request to be relieved of its reunification obligations. The District Court found that Ashley was in circumstances of jeopardy, awarded custody of Ashley to the Department, and relieved the Department of its obligation to provide reunification services to the father.

[¶ 4] The facts relevant to the father's appeal can be summarized as follows.1 On December 13, 1999, at approximately 1:13 in the afternoon, the Lewiston Police Department received a phone call from Ashley's mother indicating that her two-month-old son, Eric Jr., had died in his sleep. Upon arriving at the apartment, the two responding detectives found the baby's corpse and Ashley in a shockingly unsanitary and dangerous apartment.

[¶ 5] According to the investigating detectives, the apartment was in complete disarray, with dog excrement on the floor and garbage and trash piled everywhere. Although it was winter, the temperature inside the apartment was unusually warm, later reported to be above eighty degrees; and the odor of feces, urine, body odor, animals, and decaying food was overwhelming. Cockroaches were observed in the vicinity of Ashley's room and little bugs were flying around the trash and crawling on the walls. In the bathroom, there were gnats, and the tub was filled with trash bags full of clothing and other items. Dirty dishes and rotting foods filled the kitchen area. In sum, the two investigating detectives, who had almost twenty years of experience between them, described the apartment as one of the worst they had seen in their law enforcement careers.

[¶ 6] The DHS caseworker who was called to the scene observed that the children's conditions reflected the shocking condition of the apartment and that Ashley looked and smelled as if she had not been bathed in days, if not weeks, and was dressed in clothes that were covered with feces.

I held her, and I immediately felt that her clothing was wet, so much that it had soaked through the arm that I was holding her by .... [W]hen we went to the police department, and upon takin[g] the clothes off of her, it was discovered that [the pants had] feces completely coating the inside, front and back .... It was very overwhelming .... [S]he had feces inside and outside of her stocking, shoes. It was all over—it was all over her body. In her hair.

According to Ashley's guardian ad litem, Ashley had to be "taken for medical treatment several times to try to determine why she was emitting a noticeable body odor even weeks after her removal from the [father's] home." Photographs and a video tape recording confirmed the testimony of the officers and the DHS case-worker.

[¶ 7] Ashley's baby brother, Eric Jr., had been dead for approximately eight to twelve hours when the officers arrived. The previous evening, Eric Jr. had been put to bed, still in his car seat, in a bassinet inside the parents' bedroom. He was dressed in sweatpants and sweatshirt, and completely covered with a blanket. According to the father, it was routine for the parents to place the blanket over the baby's face to keep his pacifier from falling out.

[¶ 8] Although it was typical for Eric Jr. to wake up one or more times during the night, he did not wake up that night. The next morning, when the mother left the apartment with Ashley's five-year-old step-sister, Katie, to run some errands, she did not feed or change the baby. From 7:30 A.M. until the mother's return just after 1:00 P.M., the father took no action to tend to Eric Jr. or Ashley's needs. Therefore, from approximately 11:00 P.M. until the next afternoon at 1:15 P.M., the two-month-old infant received no food, no care, and no attention whatsoever from his father. During those hours, Eric Jr. laid fully covered beneath a blanket in a sweltering apartment, right beside his father's bed, and died.2 During the same period of time, Ashley was penned in a small room, covered in her own feces, unattended, and prevented from contact with her parents by a fence in the doorway of her room.

[¶ 9] An evaluation of the father, completed after the baby's death, disclosed that the father "seems to feel no responsibility for his son's death, and did not seem to think it out of line to allow a small child like his youngest daughter to languish for hours in her room behind a locked gate." Ultimately, the court found that the father's "failure to even notice that [his] child was dead is clear and convincing evidence of deprivation of supervision."

[¶ 10] In a detailed and thoughtful opinion, the court concluded that the father had subjected Ashley to "chronic abuse or any other treatment that is heinous or abhorrent to society" and that reunification efforts would be inconsistent with her permanency plan. In light of the evidence that the father had the financial resources and the skills necessary to provide a clean and safe environment for his children,3 the court concluded that the father willfully and grossly neglected the needs of his children. In so concluding, the court granted the Department's request not to commence reunification efforts. The father filed a timely appeal of the court's order.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 11] The father contends that the court erred when it concluded that his treatment of Ashley met the statutory definition of "aggravated circumstances," as defined in 22 M.R.S.A. § 4002(1-B)(A)(1), and that providing reunification services would be inconsistent with Ashley's permanency plan. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4041(2)(A-1).4 Specifically, the father argues that the court erred in interpreting the term "treatment that is heinous or abhorrent to society" as applied to the facts before it. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4002(1-B)(A)(1). We review de novo the court's interpretation of the statute for errors of law, and review the court's application of the statutory language to the facts at issue for abuse of discretion. See In re Heather C., 2000 ME 99, ¶ 26, 751 A.2d 448, 455

; In re Christmas C., 1998 ME 258, ¶ 3, 721 A.2d 629, 630.

[¶ 12] Ordinarily, when children are removed from their parents' custody, the Department is required to develop a rehabilitation and reunification plan designed to safely reunite the parents and children. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4041(1) (Supp.2000). Because families that enter the child protective system often suffer from a lack of resources, we have recognized the Department's role in this process as "important" in rehabilitating families for reunification. See In re Daniel C., 480 A.2d 766, 769 (Me.1984)

. Without the Department's efforts in this regard, families may not receive the help they need to correct the circumstances that brought their children into the State's custody in the first instance. See 22 M.R.S.A. § 4003(3) (Supp. 2000). This aspect of the Department's responsibilities is even more crucial in light of the expedited timeframes recently enacted by the Legislature. 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 4038(1), 4052(2-A)(A) (Supp.2000).

[¶ 13] The Legislature has recognized, however, that under certain circumstances, children cannot be returned home safely within a reasonably calculated time, even if reunification services are provided. See 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 4002(1-B), 4041(2)(A-1); In re Heather C., 2000 ME 99, ¶ 28, 751 A.2d at 456. Specifically, if the court finds the existence of an "aggravating factor," determines that continuation of reunification efforts is inconsistent with the permanency plan for the child, or if two placements of the child with the same parent have failed, the Department may be relieved of its reunification responsibilities. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4041(2)(A-1).

[¶ 14] The Legislature adopted the "aggravating factors" language as part of an Act designed to facilitate "expeditious actions in child protection cases" in compliance with the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub.L. No. 105-89, 111...

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6 cases
  • In re Scott S.
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • July 19, 2001
    ...findings of fact to determine whether they are clearly erroneous, and we review de novo the conclusions of law for clear error. In re Ashley S., 2000 ME 212, ¶ 11, 762 A.2d 941, 945; In re Christina H., 618 A.2d 228, 229 (Me.1992). "Deference is paid to that court's superior perspective for......
  • In re E.A.
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • March 24, 2015
    ...for errors of law, and review the court's application of ... statutory language to the facts at issue for abuse of discretion.” In re Ashley S., 2000 ME 212, ¶ 11, 762 A.2d 941, overruled on other grounds by In re B.C., 2012 ME 140, ¶ 14 n. 2, 58 A.3d 1118.[¶ 11] There was no error here. Fi......
  • IN RE DOROTHY
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    • June 28, 2001
    ...that circumstances of jeopardy existed could have been supported even absent any findings of physical abuse. See, e.g., In re Ashley S., 2000 ME 212, ¶¶ 16-17, 762 A.2d 941, 947-48 (concluding that a showing of severe neglect, absent affirmative abuse or assaultive behavior, is sufficient t......
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    • Maine Supreme Court
    • May 11, 2001
    ...it made a good faith effort to rehabilitate the parent and reunify her with her children. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4041(1)(A) (Supp.2000); In re Ashley S., 2000 ME 212, ¶ 22, 762 A.2d 941; In re Breauna N., 1999 ME 191, ¶ 21, 742 A.2d 911, 916. The court's determination to cease reunification is revie......
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