In re Audrey S.
| Decision Date | 25 August 2005 |
| Parties | In re AUDREY S. & Victoria L. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Linda M. Anderson, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jamie F.
Jacqueline B. Dixon, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Jason L., Kelly L., and Christina B.
Susie P. McGowan, Nunnelly, Tennessee, and Jennifer L. Evans, Springfield, Tennessee, Guardians ad Litem for Audrey S. and Victoria L., respectively.
William B. Cain, J., filed a separate concurring opinion.
This appeal involves the termination of the parental rights of a biological mother who is serving a lengthy prison sentence. Following years of drug abuse, criminal conduct, periodic incarceration, and inconsistent attention to the needs of her two children, the mother pled guilty to charges of especially aggravated kidnaping and aggravated robbery and was sentenced to serve concurrent terms of fifteen and twelve years in prison. Following her incarceration, the fathers of both children filed petitions to terminate her parental rights. The juvenile court consolidated these petitions with the mother's petition for visitation and appointed guardians ad litem for the children. The guardians ad litem later filed a joint petition to terminate the mother's parental rights, and the fathers voluntarily dismissed their termination petitions. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court entered orders terminating the mother's parental rights to both children on three grounds. The mother has appealed. We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support terminating the mother's parental rights on two of the three grounds relied upon by the court and to support the court's conclusion that terminating the mother's parental rights is in the children's best interests.
Jamie F.1 was an eighteen-year-old high school student when she gave birth to her first child, Audrey S., on April 30, 1995. The child's father was Terry S., her eighteen-year-old boyfriend. Shortly after the child's birth, Jamie F. and Audrey S. moved into the home of Terry S.'s mother, Wilma S., where Terry S. was also residing.2 This arrangement was short-lived. Jamie F. soon began stealing Wilma S.'s checks and forging her signature. Jamie F. eventually stole over $3,000 from Wilma S. and deposited the money in her own bank account. Terry S. ended his relationship with Jamie F. after he discovered what Jamie F. had been doing. Jamie F. left Wilma S.'s home, taking Audrey S. with her.
On October 4, 1995, Jamie F. was arrested and charged with two counts of felony forgery. She was released pending trial, and Audrey S. remained in her custody. Jamie F. eventually pled guilty to one count of felony forgery and was placed on probation for three years. She soon violated her probation, and she was arrested and incarcerated. Audrey S. was not yet one year old. While Jamie F. was in jail, she left Audrey S. in the care of the child's great-grandmother. When caring for Audrey S. proved to be too great a burden, Audrey S.'s great-grandmother asked Wilma S. to take custody of the child. Wilma S. agreed and brought the child to live with her.
Wilma S. filed a verified petition in the Davidson County Juvenile Court on March 21, 1996 to have Audrey S. declared a dependent and neglected child. She alleged that Jamie F.: (1) had failed to care for Audrey S. properly; (2) lacked sufficient funds to feed and clothe her daughter; (3) used illegal drugs; (4) had no place to live when she was released from jail other than a camping trailer with her alcoholic uncle; and (5) had stolen from her relatives so often that she was no longer welcome in their homes. Wilma S. also noted that Audrey S. had suffered a skull fracture of unknown origin while in Jamie F.'s custody. Accordingly, Wilma S. requested the juvenile court to award her temporary custody because Audrey S. was a dependent and neglected child.
Wilma S. feared that Jamie F. would attempt to reclaim Audrey S. when she was released from jail. Accordingly, she requested two remedies. She sought a temporary custody order allowing her to retain physical possession of the child pending a final hearing. She also sought a restraining order barring Jamie F. from removing Audrey S. from her custody. The juvenile court entered the restraining order against Jamie F. on the same day the petition was filed. The court also set a preliminary hearing on Wilma S.'s custody request for March 25, 1996.
Terry S. filed a petition to establish parentage of Audrey S. on the date set for the preliminary hearing. He conceded that he was Audrey S.'s biological father and requested exclusive legal custody. On March 28, 1996, the juvenile court entered an order declaring Terry S. to be Audrey S.'s biological father and awarding temporary custody of Audrey S. to Wilma S. The order stated that the court would not set a final adjudicatory or dispositional hearing on Wilma S.'s petition for temporary custody of Audrey S. until Jamie F. requested such a hearing. The juvenile court did not address Terry S.'s request for custody of Audrey S.
Audrey S. turned one year old on April 30, 1996. Ten days later, on May 10, 1996, Jamie F., who had been released from jail sometime during the preceding month, filed a motion to set a final hearing on Wilma S.'s petition for temporary custody. She asserted that she was responsible and drug-free, that she had obtained full-time employment, that she had secured independent means of transportation, and that she would have an apartment fit for her daughter by the time of the final hearing on the petition. Jamie F. also claimed that she was a fit and proper person to have custody of her daughter, and that it was in Audrey S.'s best interests to be with her. The juvenile court scheduled a hearing on Jamie F.'s motion to set for May 29, 1996.
At the May 29, 1996 hearing, the parties informed the juvenile court that they had reached an agreement to have the final hearing on Wilma S.'s petition for temporary custody of Audrey S. on July 15, 1996. They had also agreed that Jamie F. would be allowed to exercise visitation with Audrey S. at the home of her own father every other weekend starting June 1, 1996.3 The juvenile court later entered an order incorporating the parties' agreement.
Sadly, Jamie F. elected not to exercise her right to visitation with Audrey S. at her father's home. Despite her protestations of being "drug-free," Jamie F. was still abusing drugs and alcohol. On June 18, 1996, Jamie F. formally retracted her request for a final hearing on Wilma S.'s petition for temporary custody by filing a mislabeled "Notice of Non-Suit." At the end of June 1996, Jamie F. was involved in a car accident while smoking marijuana, after which she was sent to the hospital and then released. She was later arrested and charged with possession of marijuana theft of property, and possession of drug paraphernalia. She was arrested again three days later, this time on a misdemeanor charge of driving under the influence of alcohol. After she agreed to enter a drug treatment program, the criminal charges arising out of the car accident and her drinking and driving were dropped.
Over the next few months, Jamie F. was in and out of several drug treatment programs. She did not complete any of them. She also chose not to exercise visitation with Audrey S. during this time. In September 1996, Jamie F. moved in with her mother, allegedly so that she would stop using drugs. While living with her mother, she filed a motion seeking modification of the May 1996 agreed order to allow her to exercise visitation with Audrey S. at her mother's home rather than at her father's home. Wilma S. opposed the motion.
The juvenile court dismissed Jamie F.'s motion following a hearing. In its November 11, 1996, order, the juvenile court noted that Jamie F. had failed to complete several drug treatment programs in the preceding months, and that Jamie F.'s mother had her own problems which had led to the removal of her sixteen-year-old son from her home. The juvenile court found no reason to modify the agreed order of visitation entered just a few months earlier. However, out of an abundance of caution, the juvenile court directed Audrey S.'s guardian ad litem to speak with both Jamie F. and Jamie F.'s father to ensure that there was no problem with visitation occurring at Jamie F.'s father's home. The juvenile court instructed Jamie F. to complete a drug treatment program before returning to court again. Audrey S. was one-and-one-half years old when the juvenile court entered this order.
The juvenile court's November 11, 1996 order did not succeed in motivating Jamie F. to turn her life around and become a suitable parent for Audrey S. Instead, for the next twenty-two months, Jamie F. vanished entirely from Audrey S.'s life. The child turned two and then three without ever once seeing or hearing from her mother. Jamie F. made no attempt to visit or even communicate with Audrey S., and there is no evidence in the record that she furnished any financial support for Audrey S. during that time. Fortunately for Audrey S., Wilma S. and Terry S. were willing and able to provide her with a healthy, loving home, and they allowed her to visit regularly with her maternal grandfather and great-grandmother.
In approximately April 1998, Jamie F. met a man named Justin L. while standing in line at a telephone booth. They exchanged telephone...
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