In re Baby
| Decision Date | 18 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. M2012–01040–SC–R11–JV.,M2012–01040–SC–R11–JV. |
| Citation | 447 S.W.3d 807 |
| Parties | In re BABY et al. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Shelley S. Breeding and Allison J. Starnes–Anglea (at trial and on appeal), Knoxville, Tennessee, and Benjamin G. Smith (at trial), Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, J.J.E.
Benjamin Papa and Kimberly K. Huguley, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the appellees, L.G. and A.T.
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., J., filed a concurring opinion.
A man and woman who were unable to have children together entered into a contract with a woman who consented to act as a surrogate. The surrogate's husband was also a party to the contract. The parties contracted for a “traditional surrogacy,” which involves the artificial insemination of the surrogate, who, after giving birth, is meant to relinquish the child to the biological father and the intended mother. Prior to the birth of the child, all parties filed a joint petition asking the juvenile court to declare the paternity of the child, grant custody to the intended parents, and terminate the parental rights of the surrogate. A magistrate for the juvenile court granted the petition. Less than a month later, the surrogate gave birth, and, following the advice of medical personnel, the parties agreed that the surrogate should breastfeed the child for a short period of time in the interest of providing the best possible nutrition. When the child was almost one week old, the surrogate filed a series of motions asking the magistrate to vacate the prior order, set aside the surrogacy contract, and award her custody. The magistrate denied the motions, the juvenile court judge upheld the ruling, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. This Court granted the surrogate's application for permission to appeal to consider issues of public policy, subject matter jurisdiction, paternity, custody, and the termination of parental rights.
After careful consideration of these important questions, we hold that the public policy of this state does not prohibit the enforcement of traditional surrogacy contracts, but does impose certain restrictions. As is relevant here, our public policy requires compliance with the statutory procedures for the termination of parental rights and does not allow parties to terminate the parental rights of a traditional surrogate through judicial ratification of a surrogacy contract prior to the birth of the child. Accordingly, the contractual provisions in this case circumventing the statutory procedures for the termination of parental rights are unenforceable. We further hold that the juvenile court properly exercised jurisdiction over the issues of paternity and custody. We vacate the portion of the juvenile court's order terminating the parental rights of the surrogate, but otherwise affirm the judgments of the juvenile court and the Court of Appeals. Because the surrogate retains parental rights unless and until such rights are terminated in a future proceeding, we remand the case to the juvenile court to address the issues of visitation and child support.
In early 2010, L.G.2 (the “Intended Father”) and A.T. (the “Intended Mother”) (collectively, the “Intended Parents”),3 both of whom are citizens of Italy, engaged the services of a surrogacy agency in the United States after discovering that they were biologically incapable of having a child together. At that time, the Intended Parents had been in a relationship for some time but had not married because they were waiting for the Catholic Church to approve the annulment of the Intended Mother's previous marriage. The surrogacy agency arranged for the Intended Parents to contact J.J.E. (the “Surrogate”) and her husband, J.M.M., both Tennessee residents.
The parties decided to go through with a surrogacy arrangement and negotiated the terms. Each couple was represented by legal counsel during the negotiations. In July of 2010, the Intended Parents, the Surrogate, and the Surrogate's husband entered into a contract that provided for the Surrogate to be artificially inseminated by the sperm of the Intended Father, and, in the event of a successful pregnancy, to relinquish the child to the custody of the Intended Parents at the time of birth. The contract included the following terms:
(Emphasis added.)
The contract required the Intended Parents to pay the Surrogate for her pain and suffering, a portion of her legal fees, all medical expenses associated with the pregnancy not covered by insurance, and various other expenses, such as lost wages, transportation costs, housing costs, and maternity clothes. The contract...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Blackwell v. Sky High Sports Nashville Operations, LLC
... ... D. " [T]he public policy of Tennessee is to be found in its constitution, statutes, judicial decisions and applicable rules of common law. " In re Baby , 447 S.W.3d 807, 823 (Tenn. 2014) (quoting Cary v. Cary , 937 S.W.2d 777, 781 (Tenn. 1996) ). "Primarily, it is for the legislature to determine the public policy of the state, and if there is a statute that addresses the subject in question, the policy reflected therein must prevail." Hyde v ... ...
-
West v. Schofield
... ... See In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807, 823 (Tenn.2014) (referring to legislative history in order to determine Tennessee's public policy concerning traditional surrogacy contracts); see also 460 S.W.3d 123 Bunarith Tep v. Southcoast Hosp. Grp., Inc., No. 1311887LTS, 2014 WL 6873137, at *5 (D.Mass. Dec. 4, 2014) ... ...
-
Elmy v. W. Express, Inc.
... ... Tenn. May 18, 2010)). 2 In Response, Plaintiff argues Tennessee law permits him to seek declaratory relief to find the contracts at issue are void for unconscionability. (Doc. No. 202 at 6-7). In support, Plaintiff argues that the Tennessee Declaratory Relief Act and In re Baby , 447 S.W.3d 807, 832-33 (Tenn. 2014) (holding that contract defenses can be raised in an independent declaratory judgment action) permit defenses to contract enforceability to be raised affirmatively. Plaintiff notes that In re Baby Page 7 did not specifically address unconscionability, but ... ...
-
Middendorf v. Middendorf
... ... the settlement, and (4) Husband did not file his Rule 60.02(5) motion within a reasonable time when he waited 17 months after the Final Decree was entered before requesting that it be set aside[.] In our consideration of this issue, we are guided by the standard of review set forth in In re Baby : Our review of a ruling on a motion brought pursuant to ... Rule 60.02, however, is limited. This Court may reverse only if the trial court has abused its discretion. Discover Bank v ... Morgan , 363 S.W.3d 479, 487 (Tenn. 2012); Henry v ... Goins , 104 S.W.3d 475, 482 (Tenn. 2003). A trial ... ...
-
Assisted reproductive technologies
...that the child’s biological father may one day assert his rights and 123. 833 N.W.2d 634, 646 (Wis. 2013). 124. See e.g. , In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807, 840 (Tenn. 2014) (“[T]he contractual provisions circumventing the statutory procedures for the termination of parental rights are unenforcea......
-
§ 5.4 Surrogacy Laws in the United States
...does not contemplate surrogacy using gamete donation, and adoption laws may apply to such scenarios. See id. § 48(A).[277] . In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807 (2014).[278] . Tex. Fam. Code § 160.754.[279] . Id. §§ 160.754(a)(2)-(3).[280] . Id. § 160.754(4)(c).[281] . Id. § 160.754(d).[282] . Id. §......
-
Section 30.8 Surrogacy, Custody, and “Intended Parents”
...parent’ . . . does not include a surrogate birth mother who is not the genetic parent.” Id. at 541. The intended parents in In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807 (Tenn. 2014), entered into a contract with a woman who consented to act as a traditional surrogate, meaning she was the genetic parent of th......