In re Baker

Decision Date28 January 1942
Citation39 N.E.2d 762,310 Mass. 724
PartiesHENRY D. BAKER, petitioner.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

January 5, 1942.

Present: FIELD, C.

J., QUA, DOLAN & RONAN, JJ.

Extradition and Rendition. Habeas Corpus. Evidence, Presumptions and burden of proof. Practice, Civil, Habeas corpus proceedings Exceptions: whether error harmful. The requirement of Section 14 of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 276, as appearing in

St. 1937, c.

304, Section 1 that a demand for interstate rendition of a person charged with a crime in another State shall allege "that the person demanded was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime," was complied with, although there was no express statement in the demand that the accused was so present, if it plainly appeared therefrom that he was charged with a crime in the demanding State which he could not have committed without being there. Sworn testimony is not required by Section 662 of U.S.C. Title 18 or by

Section 14 of G. L (Ter. Ed.) c. 276, as appearing in St. 1937, c. 304, Section 1, to make effective a requisition by the Governor of another

State for the rendition of one stated therein to have been indicted for a crime committed there and to have filed into this Commonwealth, if the requisition is accompanied by a duly authenticated copy of the indictment.

At the hearing in habeas corpus proceedings seeking release from custody under a rendition warrant issued by the Governor of the Commonwealth upon requisition of the Governor of another State setting forth in proper form an indictment for a crime in that State and that the accused was here a fugitive from justice there, certain testimony on the issue whether he was a fugitive did not require the trial judge to make a finding of fact contrary to that upon which the Governor of this

Commonwealth must have relied in issuing the warrant.

The burden is on the respondent, in habeas corpus proceedings seeking the release of one under arrest on a warrant issued by the Governor in interstate rendition, to prove the fact, denied by the petitioner, that he is the person named in the warrant.

Rulings by a judge hearing habeas corpus proceedings seeking release from arrest upon a warrant for interstate rendition, in substance that the petitioner could not be held unless it was shown that he was the person named in the warrant, showed that the judge placed the burden of proof of such identity on the respondent, and his dismissal of the petition, on the evidence shown by the record, showed that he justifiably found that the respondent had sustained that burden; and there was no reversible error in his denial of an ambiguous request which the judge apparently interpreted as seeking to place the burden of proof of the entire case on the respondent.

One seeking release by habeas corpus from custody under an interstate rendition warrant is not entitled to raise the issue of his guilt of the crime charged to him.

PETITION, filed in the Superior Court on April 28, 1941, for a writ of habeas corpus.

The petition was heard by Fosdick, J. The petitioner's requests for rulings, and their disposition, were as follows:

The judge granted a request numbered 5, that a "written statement under oath, made in positive form, if made under circumstances, or as to matters, which indicates that it was made upon information and belief, will be so considered"; a request numbered 9, that the "accused in custody must be the identical person charged with crime in New Hampshire, and named in the requisition and Governor's warrant of rendition"; and a request numbered 16, that to "warrant extradition of the petitioner to New Hampshire, the papers must name or describe him so that he may be identified as a fugitive from justice."

The judge denied requests numbered 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8, to the effect that (1) "The Governor of this Commonwealth was without authority to issue his warrant for the arrest and rendition of your petitioner because the demand of the Governor of New Hampshire does not allege that your petitioner was present in the State of New Hampshire at the time of the commission of the alleged crime"; (2) because the demand "and its accompanying papers does not substantially charge your petitioner with the commission of any crime in the State of New Hampshire"; (3) because the demand "was not accompanied by sworn evidence that your petitioner is a fugitive from justice of that State as required by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 276, Section 11, as amended by St. 1937, c. 304"; [1] (7) "because the alleged affidavit of Ralph W. Caswell that your petitioner is a fugitive from justice is actually based on information and belief and is not the sworn evidence required by" said Section 11; and (8) "because the alleged affidavit of Ralph W. Caswell that your petitioner was in New Hampshire at the time of the commission of the alleged crime and that he filed from the said State of New Hampshire is actually based on information and belief and is not the sworn evidence required by" said Section 11; and (6) that a "written statement under oath, made simply upon information and belief, does not possess the qualities of an affidavit."

The judge also denied requests for rulings (10) that the "burden of proof in this proceeding where the alleged fugitive has denied identity is upon the respondent"; and (4) that the evidence did not warrant a finding that the "petitioner was in the State of New Hampshire at the time of the commission of any crime alleged in the papers of demand by the Governor of New Hampshire"; and also requests for rulings (11) that the petitioner was "not a fugitive from the justice of the State of New Hampshire"; (12) that on all the evidence the court was "warranted in finding that the petitioner is not the person demanded by the Governor of the State of New Hampshire," (13) "in finding that the petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not a fugitive from the justice of New Hampshire," (14) "in finding that the petitioner did not commit a crime in the State of New Hampshire on October 16, 1936, as alleged," and (15) "in finding that the Governor of this Commonwealth did not have before him competent evidence to the effect that your petitioner is a fugitive from the justice of New Hampshire."

J. S. Hurley, for the petitioner. T. Leboeuf, Assistant Attorney General, for the respondent.

RONAN, J. The petitioner, by this petition for habeas corpus, seeks his release from the custody of an officer of the State police who has arrested him upon a rendition warrant, issued by the Governor of the Commonwealth in compliance with the requisition of the Governor of New Hampshire, which stated that Baker had been indicted for the crime of robbery in that State and had fled into this Commonwealth. This requisition was accompanied by a duly authenticated copy of the indictment for this offence returned against Baker. There was also attached to the requisition an affidavit of one Caswell stating that Baker was in the city where the alleged robbery occurred at the time of its commission and that he thereafter fled to this Commonwealth, and a copy of an application for extradition of Baker, made to the Governor of New Hampshire by the county solicitor of the county where the alleged robbery was committed, which stated that he was of the opinion that the evidence was sufficient to secure a conviction of the fugitive. The petition was denied after a hearing in the Superior Court. The petitioner excepted to the order denying his petition and to the denial of his requests for rulings.

We assume in favor of the petitioner that the case may be properly brought here by exceptions. Harris, petitioner, 309 Mass. 180 .

The Constitution of the United States, art. 4, Section 2, provides that "A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he filed, be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime" and the method and manner in which this constitutional requirement shall be enforced and executed are regulated by an Act of Congress, U.S. Rev. Sts. Section 5278; U.S.C. Title 18, Section 662, which imposes upon the executive authority of the State in which the fugitive has taken refuge the duty of causing him to be apprehended and delivered to the agent of the demanding State whenever the executive authority of the latter State makes such demand and produces a properly certified copy of an indictment charging the fugitive with the commission of a crime. Our statute, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 276, Section 14, as appearing in St. 1937, c. 304, Section 1, provides that the demand for interstate rendition of a person charged with crime in another State shall be in writing and shall allege "that the person demanded was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime," or that the person demanded did an act either in this Commonwealth or in a third State which resulted in the commission of the alleged crime in the demanding State. It is true that the demand of the Governor of New Hampshire does not expressly state that Baker was in that State at the time of the crime, but it plainly appears from the demand that Baker was charged with a crime, the nature of which required his presence at the time and place where the offence occurred, and that thereafter he fled to this Commonwealth. That such a demand is sufficient has been recently decided in Harris, petitioner, 309 Mass. 180 . The indictment charged the commission of a robbery which the demand itself shows was a crime in that State, and the indictment was...

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