In re Ball

• Decision Date: 20 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2014–493,2014–493
• Parties: IN the MATTER OF Glenda J. BALL and Frank A. Ball
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

168 N.H. 133
123 A.3d 719

IN the MATTER OF Glenda J. BALL and Frank A. Ball

No. 2014–493

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued: May 13, 2015
Opinion Issued: August 20, 2015

Glenda J. Ball, self-represented party, by brief and orally.

Gawryl MacAllister & O'Connor, of Nashua (Jared O'Connor on the brief and orally), for the respondent.

CONBOY, J.

168 N.H. 135

The respondent, Frank A. Ball, appeals an order of the 9th Circuit Court—Nashua Family Division (Ryan, J.) denying his motion to terminate his obligation to support the parties' eldest child because she had turned 18 and had graduated from high school. We reverse and remand.

I. Background

The pertinent facts are as follows. The respondent and the petitioner, Glenda J. Ball, were married in 1994 and separated in 2004. They have three children: a daughter born in 1995, a son born in 1997, and another son born in 1999.

123 A.3d 721

In July 2005, the parties entered into a separation agreement in Massachusetts requiring the respondent to pay the petitioner $519 in weekly child support until the "emancipation" of the parties' children. The agreement's definition of "emancipation," consistent with Massachusetts law, required child support to continue after a child had attained the age of 18 or had graduated from high school provided that certain conditions were met. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 208, § 28 (West 2007) (amended 2011). Under the agreement, the respondent was obligated to pay support for a child until the child reached age 23 if the child was "attending a post-secondary

168 N.H. 136

accredited educational training school or a two-year or four-year accredited college program as a full-time student" and was "domiciled in the home of a parent and ... principally dependent upon said parent for maintenance due to enrollment in the educational program." See id. The parties agreed that their agreement would "be construed and governed" by Massachusetts law and that it would be incorporated and merged with their divorce decree. As they requested, the parties' Massachusetts divorce decree incorporated their separation agreement.

According to the respondent and not disputed by the petitioner, the parties and their children relocated from Massachusetts to New Hampshire in 2008. In the fall of 2008, the parties' Massachusetts divorce decree was registered in New Hampshire. See RSA 546–B:47 (2007) (repealed and reenacted 2015). At that time, the parties requested the New Hampshire court to approve a partial stipulation purporting to modify their Massachusetts decree. In their 2008 partial stipulation, the parties agreed that the definition of "emancipation" contained in their Massachusetts decree was thereby "stricken" and that New Hampshire law would apply. The parties also agreed that the respondent's child support obligation would "be payable in accordance with New Hampshire law ... until the parties' youngest child reaches the age of 18 or graduates from high school whichever is later." See RSA 461–A:14, IV (Supp. 2014). The court approved the stipulation and ordered the respondent to pay $516 in weekly child support. In December 2008, it increased the weekly child support amount to $559.

In 2013, the respondent filed a petition to modify his child support obligations, alleging that, because the parties' daughter was 18 and had graduated from high school, his obligation to support her should be terminated. The petitioner objected, asserting that the Massachusetts decree required the respondent to continue supporting the parties' daughter because she was "pursuing post-secondary education in an accredited college program as a full time student," was "domiciled in [the petitioner's] home," and was "principally dependent upon [the petitioner] for her maintenance due to her enrollment in college." See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 208, § 28. Although the petitioner acknowledged that the parties had entered into the 2008 partial stipulation, which had been approved by the New Hampshire court, she argued that the court had "lacked jurisdiction and authority to modify the Massachusetts Order regarding the duration that [the respondent] had to pay child support." Relying upon the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), see RSA ch. 546–B (2007) (repealed and reenacted 2015), the trial court agreed with the petitioner and denied the respondent's motion to modify. The respondent unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, and this appeal followed.

168 N.H. 137

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Resolving the issues in this appeal requires us to interpret UIFSA. Although

123 A.3d 722

the respondent argues that UIFSA does not apply to this case, we disagree. UIFSA applies because Massachusetts issued a child support order in 2005, and UIFSA governs the jurisdiction of New Hampshire courts to enforce or modify that order. See RSA 546–B:39 – :46 (enforcing order), :47–:52 (modifying order). Our review of the trial court's interpretation of UIFSA is de novo. See In the Matter of Yaman & Yaman, 167 N.H. 82, 86, 105 A.3d 600 (2014).

"UIFSA is a model act adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at the behest of Congress...." In the Matter of Scott & Pierce, 160 N.H. 354, 358, 999 A.2d 229 (2010) (quotation omitted). UIFSA has been enacted in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Id. at 359, 999 A.2d 229. New Hampshire first enacted UIFSA in 1997, effective January 1, 1998. See Laws 1997, 263:32. Since then, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has amended UIFSA twice, once in 2001, and again in 2008. Scott & Pierce, 160 N.H. at 359, 999 A.2d 229. In 2015, New Hampshire repealed the 1996 version of UIFSA and enacted the 2008 version, which included the 2001 amendments thereto. See Laws 2015, ch. 75. The 2015 amendments to New Hampshire's version of UIFSA will become effective on January 1, 2016. See id.

To interpret UIFSA, we rely upon our ordinary rules of statutory construction. Scott & Pierce, 160 N.H. at 359, 999 A.2d 229. Under those rules, we are the final arbiter of the legislature's intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. Id. We first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result. Id.

We also rely upon the official comments to UIFSA. Id. When interpreting a uniform law, such as UIFSA, "the intention of the drafters of a uniform act becomes the legislative intent upon enactment." Hennepin County v. Hill, 777 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Minn.Ct.App.2010) (quotation and brackets omitted). In addition, we have considered later amendments to UIFSA when "they provide insight into the intended meaning of New Hampshire's existing statute." Scott & Pierce, 160 N.H. at 361, 999 A.2d 229. Further, we consider the interpretation of UIFSA by other jurisdictions. See Hill, 777 N.W.2d at 256–57. The opinions from courts in other jurisdictions are relevant "because uniform laws should be interpreted to effect their general purpose to make uniform the laws of those states that enact them."

168 N.H. 138

Id. at 257 (quotation omitted); see RSA 546–B:56 (providing that RSA chapter 546–B "shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among states enacting it").

B. UIFSA in General

UIFSA applies when more than one state is involved in child support proceedings. Scott & Pierce, 160 N.H. at 359, 999 A.2d 229. It consists of nine articles that supply procedural and jurisdictional rules for three types of child support proceedings: (1) proceedings to establish a child support order in the first instance when there is no prior child support order; (2) proceedings to enforce another state's existing child support order; and (3) proceedings to modify an existing child support order issued by another state. See id. at 360, 999 A.2d 229 ; see also RSA 546–B:31 – :38 (Articles 4 and 5—establishing order), :39–:46 (Article 6—enforcing

123 A.3d 723

order), :47–:52 (Article 6—modifying order). In this case, we are concerned with Article 6 of UIFSA, which applies to modification of child support orders issued by another jurisdiction. See RSA 546–B:47 – :52.

The purpose of UIFSA is to avoid conflicting child support orders issued by courts in different states. See Wills v. Wills, 16 Neb.App. 559, 745 N.W.2d 924, 926–27 (2008). UIFSA relies upon the concept of "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" to ensure that only one child support order will be in effect at any given time. See LeTellier v. LeTellier, 40 S.W.3d 490, 493 (Tenn.2001). A state that issues a support order has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over...