In re Banks
Decision Date | 19 November 1993 |
Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. 9207534 SEG. |
Citation | 161 BR 375 |
Parties | In re Jacqueline BANKS. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
Nicholas Van Wiser, Byrd and Wiser, Biloxi, MS, for plaintiffs.
David L. Lord, Lord and Associates, Biloxi, MS, for defendant.
Before the Court is the Debtor's Motion for Modification of Plan and Mercury Finance Company's objection thereto. Having considered the pleadings, memoranda, testimony of the debtor and arguments presented by counsel, the Court concludes that the motion should be denied.
1. Jacqueline Banks filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of Title 11 of the United States Code, scheduling Mercury Finance Company as a creditor secured by a 1985 Ford Escort Station Wagon.
2. The debtor's Chapter 13 plan was confirmed by this Court on June 1, 1992. The plan provided that Mercury was to receive the value of its collateral, stated in the plan as $1,125.00, plus the contract rate of interest through the debtor's Chapter 13 plan payments. Unsecured creditors were to receive 10% under the plan.
3. After confirmation, the engine in the vehicle began to emit excessive smoke through its exhaust system. Repairs to correct the problem are estimated at $1,500.00. In March of 1993 the debtor filed a motion for modification of her plan proposing that Mercury's collateral be abandoned. The debtor has already financed another vehicle of similar vintage and intends to use the funds generated by the proposed modification to pay the new car notes.1 The debtor seeks to have Mercury sell its collateral, apply the proceeds to the secured portion of its claim, and treat any deficiency in the secured claim as unsecured.
4. Mercury filed an objection to the proposed modification asserting that it violates 11 U.S.C. § 1327 which provides that the confirmed plan shall bind the creditor and the debtor. Mercury wants the proceeds from the sale of the vehicle to be applied to the secured portion of its total claim and not have any deficiency in the secured portion converted to unsecured status.
The matter before the Court is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334.
Section 1329 of Title 11 of the United States Code provides the following:
Section 1327(a) of the Code provides that:
(a) The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and each creditor, whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by the plan, and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan.
The issue presented to the Court is whether the chapter 13 debtor may modify her confirmed plan to surrender collateral that has diminished in value to the secured creditor and to treat any deficiency after liquidation as an unsecured claim. Courts that have dealt with similar issues have reached differing conclusions in their analyses of allowable modifications under § 1329(a).
In In re Jock, 95 B.R. 75 (Bankr. M.D.Tenn.1989), the Court held that the debtor could modify a confirmed plan to surrender a car to a secured claim holder and pay any deficiency as an unsecured claim. That Court stated the following:
95 B.R. at 77. See also, In re Anderson, 153 B.R. 527 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1993) ( ); In re Rimmer, 143 B.R. 871 (Bankr.W.D.Tenn.1992); In re Williams, 108 B.R. 119 (Bankr. N.D.Miss.1989); In re Stone, 91 B.R. 423 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1988).
Other courts have placed limitations on postconfirmation modifications. The Court in In re Algee, 142 B.R. 576 (Bankr.D.C.1992) made the following observations:
Without the doctrine of res judicata as a brake on § 1329, 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a) would be rendered meaningless, with any confirmation issue subject to being revisited at whim. Thus, despite the seemingly unqualified language of 11 U.S.C. § 1329, courts have held that modification is not warranted unless there has been an unanticipated substantial change in circumstances, a test applied on an objective basis. In re Arnold, 869 F.2d 240, 243 (4th Cir.1989).
142 B.R. at 580.2 See, In re Abercrombie, 39 B.R. 178 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1984); In re Kitchen, 64 B.R. 452 (Bankr.D.Mont.1986); In re Johnson, 25 B.R. 178 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1982). See also, In re Howard, 972 F.2d 639 (5th Cir.1992) ( ). See generally, Harry L. Deffebach, Postconfirmation Modification of Chapter 13 Plans: A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing, 9 Bankr.Dev.J. 153 (1992). The Court in Algee further stated the following:
More liberal applications of res judicata principles or abandonment of those principles occurred in In re Frost, 96 B.R. 804 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1989); In re Jock, 95 B.R. 75 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1989); In re Stone, 91 B.R. 423 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1988), and In re Williams, 108 B.R. 119 (Bankr. N.D.Miss.1989). The court finds each of these cases distinguishable or unpersuasive.
Other courts have also refused to allow postconfirmation modifications to surrender collateral and reclassify the creditor's claim from secured to unsecured. See, In re Sharpe, 122 B.R. 708 (E.D.Tenn.1991)3; In re Holt, 136 B.R. 260 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1992).
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice provides a helpful discussion on the issue presented to the Court:
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice 2d § 124:3, pp. 124-25 and 124-26 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
In discussing the rationale behind various cases dealing with these issues, Norton reasoned the following:
To continue reading
Request your trial