In re Banks, 83-8.

• Citation: 461 A.2d 1038
• Decision Date: 31 May 1983
• Docket Number: No. 83-8.,83-8.
• Parties: In re Quentin W. BANKS, Respondent, A Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Columbia District

461 A.2d 1038

In re Quentin W. BANKS, Respondent, A Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

No. 83-8.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted April 28, 1983.

Decided May 31, 1983.

Before NEWMAN, Chief Judge, and FERREN and BELSON, Associate Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The matter is before us for our consideration of the Report and Recommendation of the Board on Professional Responsibility. Respondent has not contested the Board's recommendation.

The record reveals five separate acts of neglect of professional obligations on the part of respondent, a member of the bar. The Hearing Committee concluded that respondent's conduct violated 6 DR § 101(AX3), which requires that "A lawyer shall not . . . [n]eglect a legal matter entrusted to him." It recommended the sanction of informal censure. The Board on Professional Responsibility agreed with the Hearing Committee's findings of neglect. However, in light of two prior informal disciplinary proceedings against respondent in other cases, the Board recommends a more severe sanction: public censure. We agree with the Board's recommendation.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED by the court that Respondent Quentin W. Banks, be, and he hereby is, publically censured for the reasons set forth in the appended Report and Recommendation of the Board on Professional Responsibility.

So ordered.

APPENDIX

BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

Bar Docket No. 244-81

IN THE MATTER OF QUENTIN W. BANKS, ESQUIRE, RESPONDENT

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Board on Professional Responsibility on the report of Hearing Committee Number Four. Since this case was heard on stipulated facts, we set forth the stipulation in its entirety:

1. Quentin W. Banks is an attorney admitted to practice in the District of Columbia.

2. Respondent filed a complaint to contest the will of Effie M. Bailey, deceased, in the Probate Division of the District of Columbia Superior Court on July 11, 1980, on behalf of Grace Gray, Donald Bailey, Elwood Anderson, Howard Anderson, and Gordon Anderson.

3. Paragraph 11 of said complaint alleged that the testatrix, Effie M. Bailey, was incompetent at the time she purportedly signed her last will and testament, dated February 21, 1980.

4. The complaint also alleged fraudulent inducement, undue influence, and coercion of the testatrix.

5. On October 8, 1980, Defendants propounded Interrogatories to all plaintiffs. Respondent filed no answer to these Interrogatories on behalf of the plaintiffs and did not move for an extension of time in which to file answers.

6. On March 18, 1981, Defendants moved to compel Answers to Interrogatories under SCR 37. Respondent filed no opposition to Defendants' motion and on April 16, 1981 the Court entered an Order directing Plaintiffs to file and serve Answers to Interrogatories on or before May 4, 1981.

7. On May 4, 1981, a set of Answers entitled "Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories of Defendants" was filed with the Court. These answers bore only the signature, verification and oath of one plaintiff, Donald A. Bailey.

8. On May 22, 1981 Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution which alleged that only one plaintiff had responded to discovery and that those answers were grossly inadequate and unresponsive. Defendants' Motion was served by mail on respondent on May 21, 1981.

9. Respondent filed no Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss, and on June 25, 1981, the Court dismissed the complaint for want of prosecution.

10. On July 22, 1981, respondent moved the Court to vacate and reconsider its order of June 25, 1981. A hearing on this motion was held on September 28, 1981.

11. At the time of the September 28, 1981, hearing on Plaintiff's Motion, respondent had not filed Answers to Defendants' Interrogatories.

12. Bar Exhibit 10, the Court's Order of November 20, 1981, which issued as the result of the September 28, 1981, hearing is unchallenged.

On these stipulated facts, the Hearing Committee concluded that respondent's conduct violated DR 6-101(A)(3), which requires "A lawyer shall not . . . neglect a legal matter entrusted to him." We agree.

On the undisputed facts of this case, we discern at least five separate acts of neglect. First, respondent had served upon him interrogatories on October 8, 1980. For more than five months thereafter, respondent failed to file answers to the interrogatories and failed to request any extension of time on behalf of his clients. Second, when, on March 18, 1981, his opponent filed a motion to compel, respondent failed to respond to the motion on behalf of his clients. Third, when the court ordered that answers be filed, respondent filed answers on behalf of one plaintiff which were subsequently characterized by the court as being "ridiculously inadequate." Fourth, when a motion to dismiss the case for want of prosecution was filed on May 22, 1981, respondent failed to file any opposition on behalf of his clients. Fifth, when that motion was granted and the case was dismissed, respondent waited almost a month before he filed a motion to reinstate his clients' case. We view these acts as repeated acts of neglect that show a pattern of neglect on the part of respondent. We have no doubt that such conduct violates DR 6-101(A)(3) proscribing neglect.

In his defense, respondent raised four matters before the Hearing Committee. First, respondent points out that his clients have not complained against him but that the complaint in this case was initiated by Bar Counsel. The Hearing Committee in its report to this Board correctly points out that Rule XI, Section 6(1)(b) of the Rules of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals Governing the Bar of the District of Columbia provides that Bar Counsel must pursue all matters involving alleged attorney misconduct regardless of whether the matter is called to his attention by complaint "or otherwise." We have repeatedly interpreted this rule to mean that the source of the complaint is irrelevant in our proceedings.

The only proper inquiry for the disciplinary system is whether the disciplinary rules have been violated. In this case, they were. Second, in a variation on the same theme, respondent points out that no harm has resulted to his clients since the only count on which they had any hope of prevailing — incompetency of the testatrix — was reinstated by the court. The report of the Hearing Committee, at pages 4 and 5, seems to suggest that the Hearing Committee did indeed find that there was prejudice to the clients upon which a finding of neglect might be based.

So that there is no doubt on this matter, we pause to point out that prejudice is not an element of neglect as that violation is defined in DR 6-101(A)(3), and our previous cases have so held. In the Matter of Whitlock, 441 A.2d 989, 991 (D.C.C.A.1982).¹

Whether a respondent has violated DR 6-101(A)(3) does not turn on prejudice to the client because in many neglect cases whether the client is prejudiced is largely a matter of fortuity. This case illustrates the point perfectly; but for the grace of the probate judge, respondent's clients might have lost their cause of action entirely. No lawyer can, or should be allowed to, take such chances with his clients' interests and then later plead fortuitous good luck in his defense. When viewed from the perspective of the disciplinary system's responsibility to protect the public from unworthy attorneys, to maintain the integrity of the profession, and to deter shoddy practice, it is clear that whether the client happens to be prejudiced or not should not determine the outcome of disciplinary cases involving neglect.

So we say once again that prejudice to the client is not an element of a charge of neglect, although the existence vet non of prejudice to the client may be relevant on the issue of sanction.

Third, respondent argues that he was lulled into a false sense of security because he was having settlement discussions with representatives of the other side. He particularly blames the fact that one of the defendants, an attorney who was the nominated executor of the contested estate, was discussing settlement with him at the same time that another attorney representing the executor was acting aggressively to defeat his clients' suit. The short answer is that, no matter what was transpiring between respondent and the nominated executor, respondent was served twice — once in March 1981 with a motion to compel and again in May 1981 with a motion to dismiss — with papers that threatened the very viability of his clients' cause of action. His inactivity in the face of repeated obvious threats to his clients' interests is neglect and cannot be condoned.

Fourth, respondent answers the petition by saying that he had great difficulty in dealing with his clients, several of whom lived out of the jurisdiction. If respondent was having difficulty in contacting his clients or in securing their cooperation, he had a clear responsibility either to negotiate a stipulation extending the time for...