In re Bayerische Motoren Werke, AG

• Citation: 8 S.W.3d 326
• Decision Date: 27 January 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-0734,99-0734
• Parties: (Tex. 2000) In re Bayerische Motoren Werke, AG, Relator
• Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Page 326

8 S.W.3d 326 (Tex. 2000)

In re Bayerische Motoren Werke, AG, Relator

No. 99-0734

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

January 27, 2000

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus

Motion for Rehearing of Petition for Writ of Mandamus Denied.

Justice Hecht, joined by Justice Owen, dissenting from the denial of the motion for rehearing of the petition for mandamus.

If after a three-week trial the court refuses to render judgment on the verdict and instead orders a new trial on its own initiative, is the party who prevailed with the jury entitled to some meaningful explanation, not just that a new trial is "in the interest of justice and fairness"? When a trial court sets aside a jury verdict on its own and compels the parties to suffer the delay and the enormous expense of a retrial -- tens, perhaps hundreds, of thousands of dollars -- must the court at least say why? Is there any limit to, and any review of, a trial court's power to grant a new trial on its own initiative? The answer to each of these questions, according to our rules of procedure, the constitutional right to a jury trial, this Court's own precedents, and the vast weight of authority from every other American jurisdiction, is yes. By denying the petition for mandamus in this case the Court answers no. I respectfully dissent.

Peggy Marshall lost control of her BMW vehicle and slammed into a light pole, snapping it off at its base. The vehicle caught fire, and Marshall was severely burned while trying to crawl out the driver's side window. She sued the manufacturer of the car, relator Bayerische Motoren Werke, AG, alleging that the car's fuel system was defectively designed. BMW contended that the fuel system was not defective and that the fire was caused when the bolts in the base of the light pole punctured the car's fuel tank. Marshall claimed that the accident occurred because she swerved to avoid another car, but BMW asserted that Marshall's excessive speed and alcohol consumption caused the accident.

Trial commenced August 3, 1998, and concluded 24 days later with a verdict for BMW. The jury failed to find that BMW's negligence or any design defect in the car caused Marshall's injury and found instead that her injury was caused by her own negligence. Marshall moved for a new trial because the verdict was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Her motion requested a new trial "in the interest of justice and fairness". The district court issued an order stating: "The Court, on its own motion, grants the motion and orders a new trial in the interest of justice and fairness." BMW moved to clarify the order, asking the court to state whether it was granting a new trial on Marshall's motion or on its own initiative, and what grounds it had for ordering a new trial. The court partially granted and partially denied BMW's motion to clarify, stating in its order that Marshall's motion for new trial was denied, that a new trial was granted on the court's own motion, and that the court would not give reasons for granting a new trial. BMW petitioned the court of appeals for mandamus relief, which that court denied without opinion.

Unquestionably, Texas trial courts "have always had broad discretion in the granting of new trials" and may exercise that discretion "'in the interest of justice and fairness.'"¹ As early as 1856 this Court wrote: "In ordinary cases the judge has a discretion to grant a new trial whenever, in his opinion, wrong and injustice have been done by the verdict; and it is upon this ground that courts have refused to interfere to revise the granting of new trials."² The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure authorize a trial court to order a new trial, either on motion or on the court's own initiative,³ in several specific instances: "when the damages are manifestly too small or too large",⁴ "because of insufficiency or weight of the evidence",⁵ and for jury misconduct.⁶ But the rules also authorize a trial court to order a new trial for "good cause",⁷ thereby giving the court discretion broad enough to consider reasons not specified in the rules. For example, the court could conclude that error in its trial or pretrial rulings caused the jury to reach erroneous findings, or that the time or manner in which the trial was conducted unfairly prejudiced a party, or that a member of the jury appeared to act in an improper manner -- was inattentive, for example -- short of misconduct.

Broad as the trial court's discretion is, it is not unbounded. "Good cause" does not mean any cause, nor do the interests of justice and fairness include error, whim, and bias. In granting a new trial, as in other rulings, a trial court can abuse its discretion. For one thing, a court cannot order a new trial for a reason that is simply false. Thus, this Court has indicated that a new trial cannot be granted because of an irreconcilable conflict in a jury's findings when in fact no such conflict exists.⁸ Nor can a court grant a new trial conditioned on a party's refusal to accept a remittitur -- in essence, grant a new trial because the verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence or is against the great weight of the evidence -- if the evidence actually does support the verdict.⁹ For another thing, a court cannot order a new trial for an improper reason. It should go without saying that a court cannot order a new trial because it believes the substantive law is wrong and should not be enforced, or because the court is biased for or against plaintiffs or defendants in general, or because it is biased for or against a party or lawyer in the case, or because of invidious discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion, or gender. A judge could not, for example, grant a new trial simply because he or she did not like the prevailing party's lawyer.

In Texas, in civil cases, the granting of a new trial cannot be reviewed on appeal, either from the order granting the new trial or from the final judgment.¹⁰ An appeal from the final judgment would not likely be efficacious, since any error in granting the new trial would ordinarily be harmless following a second trial. The Legislature could provide for an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a new trial, and it did so in 1925.¹¹ But two years later it withdrew the provision, concluding that too many meritless appeals were being taken solely for delay.¹² In 1987 the Legislature provided for an appeal from an order granting a new trial in a criminal case,¹³ but no statute or rule provides for such an appeal in a civil case. BMW does not argue to the contrary.

Nevertheless, an order granting a motion for new trial can be reviewed by mandamus, albeit only in extraordinary cases.¹⁴ Our older cases indicate that mandamus will issue to set aside an order granting a motion for new trial only if the order is void,¹⁵ but more recently we have applied the clear-abuse-of-discretion standard¹⁶ generally applicable in mandamus proceedings.¹⁷ We have not applied this standard in proceedings to review the granting of a motion for new trial, but there is no principled reason why the same standard generally applicable to mandamus would not apply. To determine whether a trial court clearly abused its discretion, an appellate court must know the basis for the trial court's ruling. A motion for new trial must clearly state the grounds urged,¹⁸ and an order granting the motion is based on the grounds stated absent some contrary indication. But if a court grants a new trial on its own initiative, the record may be silent on the reasons, and any meaningful review of the order is effectively precluded.

I know of no reason why a trial court's exercise of discretion in granting a new trial should ever be insulated from all review. Marshall argues that there are many possible reasons for granting a new trial, and that is certainly true, but it is no argument for refusing to state whatever ones are applicable. Marshall also suggests that the "interest of justice" has a broad meaning, and that, too, is true, although the idea is not so broad as to have no meaning at all. Indeed, this Court has undertaken to explain why a remand is or is not in the interests of justice,¹⁹ and the same effort could be made for granting new trials.

Rule 59(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a court that grants a new trial on its own initiative "shall specify the grounds in its order." As one court has explained, this is "so that the reviewing court can exercise a meaningful degree of scrutiny and safeguard parties' right to a jury trial."²⁰ No American jurisdictions but Texas and South Carolina²¹ allow a trial court broad discretion to grant a new trial on its own initiative without stating a reason.²² Three states -- Arkansas,²³ Nevada,²⁴ and New York²⁵ -- do not require the trial court to state its reasons but restrict its discretion. Two states -- Connecticut²⁶ and Virginia²⁷ -- do not permit a trial court to grant a new trial on its own initiative at all.

BMW argues that to deprive it of its jury verdict without explanation infringes on its constitutional right to trial by jury. I do not think it is necessary to reach this argument, given our procedural rules, this Court's decisions, and the consensus of American jurisdictions. But given that a trial court cannot refuse a late request for a jury trial without a good reason, as we held in General Motors Corp. v. Gayle,²⁸ I fail to see how a trial court can refuse to render judgment on a jury verdict without a good reason.

I do not quarrel with the broad discretion Texas law has for well over a century given trial courts to grant new trials to achieve justice. But a reasoned explanation for a court's ruling does not curb either the sound exercise of discretion or the cause of justice; rather, it helps guarantee both. There are many reasons why a trial court may grant a new trial. The expectation that at least one reason should be given is not...