In re Bell's Estate

• Decision Date: 14 October 1912
• Citation: 127 P. 100,70 Wash. 498
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: In re BELL'S ESTATE. v. HOTEL SORRENTO et al. BELL et al.

127 P. 100

70 Wash. 498

In re BELL'S ESTATE.

BELL et al. v. HOTEL SORRENTO et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

October 14, 1912

Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; A. W. Frater Judge.

In the matter of the estate of William Con Bell, deceased. From orders classifying claims against the estate of the deceased and ordering the same paid as allowances to the widow as expenses of her last illness during the process of administration of the estate, W. C. Bell, Jr., by W. P Harvey, guardian, and others, appeal. Affirmed.

Byers & Byers, of Seattle, for appellants.

Ben L Moore and G. A. C. Rochester, both of Seattle, for respondents.

ELLIS J.

In this appeal certain creditors of W. C. Bell, deceased, and the guardian of the estate of his minor son, seek a review of two orders of the superior court for King county, the first made on February 4, 1911, and the second on December 9, 1911, by which certain other claims against the estate of W. C. Bell, deceased, were classified and ordered paid as allowances to the widow and as expenses of her last illness during the process of administration of the estate. The facts are not disputed. The deceased and his wife, Elizabeth Young Bell, were residents of the state of Kentucky. In April, 1910, while they were temporarily in the city of Seattle, W. C. Bell was killed outright in a street car accident, and his wife received injuries from which she died in the fall of 1911, after having been taken back to her home in Kentucky. It is admitted that in the fall of 1910 the respondent G. A. C. Rochester was appointed by the superior court of King county administrator of the estate of W. C. Bell. The claims attacked as improperly classified as allowances to the widow were all for services rendered to her after her husband's death. They are as follows: After the accident, the widow was cared for at the Hotel Sorrento and Seattle General Hospital, at each of which places she remained for a considerable length of time. The claim of the Hotel Sorrento on this account was allowed for $746.75, and that of the hospital for $270.75. The respondent Arthur Young, a brother of the widow, made two trips from Kentucky to Seattle to care for his sister and her affairs and the affairs of the deceased, and his claim for railroad fare, loss of time, and hotel bills was allowed in the sum of $1,177.42. The claims of the respondents Dr. Davidson and Dr. Shannon were for professional services rendered to the widow during her last illness, and were allowed in the sums of $400 and $1,746.50, respectively. The claim of Louisa Laemrich was for services as a nurse amounting to $16, and that of Frederick & Nelson for necessaries furnished in the sum of $11.69. The administrator testified that all of these claims were for necessaries and for necessary services and attention rendered and furnished during and on account of the last illness of the widow. No evidence was offered to the contrary.

The statute (Rem. & Bal. Code, § 1466) provides that if the property of the estate, exempt by law from execution, be not sufficient for the support of the widow and minor child or children, the court shall make such reasonable allowance out of the estate as may be necessary for the maintenance of the family according to their circumstances during progress of settlement of the estate. By section 1467 this allowance is given preference over all other charges, except funeral charges and expenses of administration. Section 1571 makes it the duty of the administrator, as soon as he has in hand sufficient funds, to pay the funeral charges, expenses of last illness, and the allowances made to the family. Under these sections, as construed by this court in Re Murphy's Estate, 30 Wash. 9, 70 P. 109, we think the court was justified in classifying and ordering these claims paid as allowances to the widow. In that case it was held that money expended by the surviving spouse for household and family expenses and for physicians' charges on account of the last illness and death of minor children was properly allowed as a part of the family allowance. The statute makes no distinction as to the character of such allowance as between the widow and the minor children. The humane considerations which are the evident basis of the statute are as potent in the one case as in the other. Though the claims were large in amount, there is no evidence that they were exorbitant. The gravity of the widow's injuries, the long duration of her illness, her great distance from home, and the manifest necessities of her case are sufficient to account for a large and necessary expense.

The appellants contend that the court was without jurisdiction to enter the orders, except upon the same notice as that provided in Rem. & Bal. Code, § 1562, for final settlement of administrator's accounts. The admitted facts show that upon the presentation of these claims, the...