In re Bell's Estate
| Decision Date | 06 April 1911 |
| Citation | 130 N.W. 798,150 Iowa 725 |
| Parties | In re Estate of J. T. BELL, Deceased. Application by the State, Appellant, to subject property of said estate to a collateral inheritance tax, v. D. L. THOMAS, Administrator, J. H. BELL, MARGARET DRIPS and JANE BRADLEY |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Audubon District Court.--HON.E. B. WOODRUFF, Judge.
IN a proceeding in probate for the settlement of the estate of J T. Bell, deceased, the treasurer of state made application to have a collateral inheritance tax assessed against the estate on account of two hundred and forty acres of land passing by inheritance to collateral heirs. This application was denied as to a three-fourths interest in the land claimed by defendants to have been conveyed to them by decedent prior to his death, and the state appeals.
Affirmed.
George Cosson, Attorney-General, N. J. Lee, Special Counsel, and H J. Mantz, County Attorney, for the state.
H. F Andrews, for appellees.
The decedent died unmarried and without children, leaving as his heirs a brother and two sisters, who are made codefendants with his administrator. On March 31, 1908, about two months prior to his death, the deceased owned two hundred and forty acres of land, and executed a warranty deed purporting to convey to his brother and sisters the undivided three-fourths interest in said land, adding the following clause: "It is my intention in executing this deed to convey to each of the grantees named an undivided one-fourth interest in said real estate, and that I retain an undivided one-fourth therein, and upon the condition that all of said real estate shall be sold and the proceeds divided equally among the grantor and said three grantees named herein, all rent and possession of said property reserved until March 1, 1909." This deed was drawn by and acknowledged before one Graham, a justice of the peace, and was then left in the possession of Graham, with direction that it be recorded, and that Graham proceed to effect a sale of the land. Graham proceeded to make efforts toward effecting a sale, but no sale had been made at the time of decedent's death, and the instrument was not filed for record until after that time. When it was recorded, however, it was by Graham handed to either the defendant J. H. Bell or to the husband of the defendant Jane Bradley. J. H. Bell had knowledge of the conveyance at the time it was executed, and expressed his appreciation of his brother's kindness in making provision for him and his sisters, and Jane Bradley was told of the conveyance prior to decedent's death, but defendant Margaret Drips had no knowledge of the fact until after decedent died. One of the grounds urged in the application for the assessment of the inheritance tax was that the deed was made for the express purpose of avoiding such tax, but there is no evidence to support this contention, and we will give it no further consideration. The grounds now relied upon by the appellant are, first, that there was no such execution, delivery, and acceptance of the deed as that it became effectual to pass any title to the grantees; and, second, that, even if effectual to pass an interest in the property, the grant was made to take effect in possession and enjoyment after the grantor's death, and, therefore, the interest granted was subject to an inheritance tax.
I. The deed does not purport to postpone the passing of the interest described to the grantees until after the grantor's death, nor does it contain any conditions or limitations having reference to the time of his death. So far as can be determined from the language used, his intention was to vest in them a present interest, enjoyment of which should commence on the termination of the existing leasehold estate; but the contention of the appellant is that the instrument was not delivered to and accepted by the grantees in such sense that any interest passed prior to the grantor's death.
Where a conveyance has been executed and is ready for delivery, the question whether the acts of the grantor relied upon to constitute a delivery are sufficient is to be determined by ascertaining the grantor's intention. Kneeland v. Cowperthwaite, 138 Iowa 193, 115 N.W. 1026; Stewart v. Wills, 137 Iowa 16, 114 N.W. 548; 2 Jones, Real Property, section 1220.
And a well recognized method of effectual delivery is to place the instrument in the hands of a third person to be held by him for the grantee. If this is done without reservation of any right to assert further authority over the instrument on the part of the grantor, such third person is presumed to take and hold the instrument as the agent of the grantee, if the conveyance is in its nature beneficial and imposes no burdensome conditions or obligations on such grantee. Actual knowledge on the part of the grantee is immaterial. Matheson v. Matheson, 139 Iowa 511, 117 N.W. 755; Criswell v. Criswell, 138 Iowa 607, 116 N.W. 713; Foreman v. Archer, 130 Iowa 49, 106 N.W. 372; Albrecht v. Albrecht, 121 Iowa 521, 96 N.W. 1087; Trask v. Trask, 90 Iowa 318, 57 N.W. 841; Hinson v. Bailey, 73 Iowa 544, 35 N.W. 626.
Whatever may be said in general as to the necessity of acceptance by the grantee in order that title may pass to him, it is well settled that such acceptance will be presumed where the conveyance is in the nature of a gift, and imposes no burdensome conditions or obligations; and the title passes at once upon delivery to the third person to be held for such grantee. Parker v. Parker, 56 Iowa 111, 8 N.W. 806; Craven v. Winter, 38 Iowa 471; Robinson v Gould, 26 Iowa 89; 2 Jones, Real Property, section 1282; 2 Tiffany, Real Property...
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