In re Boyd

• Decision Date: 28 December 2022
• Docket Number: 53637-4-II
• Parties: In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of: ANDREW JAMES BOYD, Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of: ANDREW JAMES BOYD, Petitioner.

No. 53637-4-II

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2

December 28, 2022

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

PRICE, J.

In this personal restraint petition, Andrew J. Boyd seeks relief from personal restraint imposed following his 2015 guilty plea to first degree murder. Boyd, who was 18 years old when he committed his crimes, argues that the trial court erred when it failed to consider his youth before imposing his 320-month sentence. He further argues that this issue is not time barred because of a significant, material, retroactive change in the law. We disagree and dismiss this petition as time barred.

RCW 10.73.090(1) requires that a petition be filed within one year of the date that the petitioner's judgment and sentence becomes final. Boyd's judgment and sentence became final when he pleaded guilty in 2015. RCW 10.73.090(3)(a). Boyd did not file this petition until 2019, well over one year later. Thus, this petition is time barred unless Boyd establishes that one of the six time-bar exceptions set out RCW 10.73.100 applies to his petition.^[1] RCW 10.73.100. Under RCW 10.73.100(6), the time bar does not apply if:

1

There has been a significant change in the law, whether substantive or procedural, which is material to the conviction, sentence, or other order entered in a criminal or civil proceeding instituted by the state or local government and either the legislature has expressly provided that the change in the law is to be applied retroactively, or a court in interpreting a change in the law that lacks express legislative intent regarding retroactive application, determines that sufficient reasons exist to require retroactive application of the changed legal standard.

Boyd argues that his petition is not time barred under RCW 10.73.100(6) because State v. O'Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 358 P.3d 359 (2015), and State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017), are significant, material, retroactive changes in the law that require the trial court to meaningfully consider youth during sentencing. He further argues that, although these two cases involve juveniles and not young adult offenders like him, their holdings have been extended to young adults by In re Personal Restraint of Ali, 196 Wn.2d 220, 474 P.3d 507 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 1754 (2021), In re Personal Restraint of Domingo-Cornelio, 196 Wn.2d 255, 474 P.3d 524 (2020), cert. denied, 141...