In re Boyd
| Docket Number | S22Y0940 |
| Decision Date | 07 November 2023 |
| Parties | IN THE MATTER OF TAMORRA A. BOYD. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
This disciplinary matter is back before the Court following a remand for a hearing on the issue of whether respondent Tamorra A. Boyd (State Bar. No. 201382), who was admitted to the Georgia Bar in December 2014, was in default as to the Bar's previously filed formal complaint, which charged her with violations of Rules 1.4, 1.5 (b), 7.1, and 8.4 (a) (4) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct ("GRPC") found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). See In the Matter of Boyd, 315 Ga. 390 (882 S.E.2d 339) (2022) ("Boyd I") (). On remand, special master LaVonda Rochelle De Witt held a hearing and once again found Boyd to be in default, after which Boyd, through new counsel, timely requested a hearing for consideration of matters in aggravation and mitigation of discipline. Before that hearing could be set, however, Boyd filed a petition for voluntary discipline, and the State Bar responded, agreeing that a public reprimand is the appropriate discipline given new information that Boyd provided in that petition. The special master then issued a new final report and recommendation, agreeing that a public reprimand was the appropriate discipline and recommending that the Court accept Boyd's petition. We agree.
After this Court's remand in Boyd I, the special master scheduled a hearing on the issue of whether Boyd had defaulted on the formal complaint and/or had shown a proper case to open the default. A hearing was set for March 14 2023, and, although neither Boyd nor her then-counsel were present at the hearing, the Bar presented its case on default and argued that opening the default would cause prejudice to the Bar's mission and purpose by making it appear that the Bar was trying to protect its members at the expense of the public and by delaying justice. Following the hearing, the special master issued a thorough and well-reasoned order again granting the State Bar's motion for default and denying Boyd's motion to set aside the default, which the special master found had been willfully abandoned in any event. The special master gave the parties time to file a proposed report and recommendation or to request an evidentiary hearing on any remaining issues including aggravation and mitigation. Through new counsel, Boyd requested an evidentiary hearing, but, before that hearing could be set, Boyd negotiated with the Bar to resolve the issue via a petition for voluntary discipline, which she filed in July 2023.
In the petition, Boyd acknowledged that the special master not only found her to be in default, twice, but also previously determined that a six-month suspension was the appropriate discipline based on her application of the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("ABA Standards"). Nevertheless, Boyd requested that the special master reconsider that prior recommendation based on a reevaluation of her conduct in light of new information which Boyd provided in the petition and consideration of the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors. Boyd contended that a public reprimand or a suspension shorter than six months would be more appropriate in this case. The Bar responded, offering its assent to Boyd's petition and declining to contest the accuracy or relevance of the additional averments and documents offered by Boyd in the petition, including that she did not act knowingly or intentionally to mislead or harm anyone; that she had mental health issues and other personal and emotional problems that may have clouded her judgment; that she has since obtained the proper diagnosis and treatment for those issues; that she has refocused her career in a way that is conducive to dealing with those issues; that she paid full restitution; that she expressed remorse; and that she provided evidence of her good character and reputation as a lawyer. Ultimately, the Bar agreed that Boyd violated GRPC Rules 1.4, 1.5 (b), and 7.1 and stated that, in light of the additional information provided by Boyd, it had elected not to proceed with the prosecution of any Rule 8.4 (a) (4) violation at this time.
In her new report and recommendation, the special master acknowledged both Boyd's concession that she is in default and the Bar's assent to Boyd's petition requesting a public reprimand. The special master noted that, due to Boyd's default, the following facts were deemed admitted pursuant to Bar Rule 4-212 (a): Olympia Law Group ("OLG") is a California law firm that purports to assist homeowners in distress with seeking solutions to their mortgage situations. According to its website, OLG offered its services nationwide "through its Of Counsel attorneys," and it marketed and advertised its mortgage services in Georgia. Boyd signed a contract with OLG, pursuant to which she was identified as "Of Counsel" for OLG matters in Georgia and was listed on the "Our Attorneys" webpage of OLG's website. In the contract, Boyd agreed "to represent [OLG] in [Georgia] with respect to [OLG's] Law Practice located within [Georgia]" and to provide services as an attorney to OLG's clients, including contacting those clients and providing legal representation as to any OLG client, case, or matter assigned to her.
In 2018, a Georgia couple contacted OLG for help negotiating a mortgage loan modification to stop foreclosure of the wife's home. On April 11, 2018, the couple signed a contract permitting OLG to withdraw $750 per month from their bank account in return for OLG's help with their mortgage modification. By July 11, 2018, OLG had withdrawn a total of $3,000 from the couple's bank account. On July 26, 2018, the couple's mortgage servicing company, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. ("SPS"), contacted the wife directly, and learned of the couple's retention of OLG. SPS informed the wife that, although it had not had any contact with OLG or Boyd, SPS had approved her on July 20, 2018, for a loan modification based on the application the couple made prior to retaining OLG. The wife immediately checked the "client portal" on OLG's website, which showed that the representation had been "opened," but did not show the submission of any information to SPS on her behalf, and she emailed OLG, directing that it stop all loan modification proceedings on her behalf, cease all withdrawals from her bank account, and return the fees it had already withdrawn.
Boyd contacted the wife for the first time on July 28, 2018, and advised her not to cancel the contract with OLG. The wife again requested a refund in light of the fact that neither Boyd nor OLG had performed any of the services promised. That same day, the wife checked the client portal again and noticed that it now showed that OLG had submitted the couple's documents to SPS on July 27, 2018, even though she had terminated OLG's services on July 26. The wife immediately wrote to OLG, again demanding reimbursement. In September 2018, after some back and forth between the wife and OLG about the refund, it became clear that no refund would be coming, and the wife filed a grievance against Boyd.
During the Bar's investigation of this matter, Boyd advised the Bar that the couple were clients of OLG; that she was "Of Counsel" for OLG for Georgia cases but did not directly work on the couple's case or consult with the couple as she was not required to by her "Of Counsel" agreement with OLG; that she only reviewed the couple's submitted information and approved them as clients for OLG; that she was paid $75 for doing so; and that she never collected funds from the couple and had no authority to return funds to them. Boyd provided a copy of the retainer agreement signed by the couple and herself, as a representative of OLG, pursuant to which she agreed to oversee and supervise any OLG employees that may assist her with the representation. Nevertheless, Boyd saw her role as an "employee" of OLG in its representation of the couple and she suggested that it was OLG who bore the responsibility for setting fees and communicating with the couple. Eventually, however, Boyd provided to the State Bar a certified check in the amount of $3,000 made payable to the wife.
Noting that Boyd provided additional facts to provide context to her case and that the Bar did not contest the accuracy or relevance of those facts, the special master accepted the following as fact. During law school, Boyd sought mental health treatment and was misdiagnosed with a particular mental health condition by a psychiatrist. She obtained treatment appropriate for that diagnosis and disclosed her condition, and the fact that she was receiving treatment for it, in her application for admission to the practice of law in Georgia. After graduating from law school, Boyd started a solo practice but had difficulties managing her practice.
In 2016, Boyd sought additional mental health care and began seeing a Georgia Licensed Professional Counselor. In 2019, a year after Boyd's conduct that is the subject of this disciplinary matter, Boyd's counselor determined that Boyd had been misdiagnosed and helped to properly diagnose Boyd with a different mental health disorder. Immediately after receiving the new diagnosis, Boyd went to her primary care physician and received prescriptions to help manage her newly-diagnosed condition. Since then, Boyd has filled the prescriptions regularly and has implemented a regime of strategies to permit her to meet her deadlines and...
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