In re Boynton, Docket No. 310889.

• Decision Date: 15 October 2013
• Docket Number: Docket No. 310889.
• Citation: 302 Mich.App. 632,840 N.W.2d 762
• Parties: In re BOYNTON.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

302 Mich.App. 632

840 N.W.2d 762

In re BOYNTON.

Docket No. 310889.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Oct. 2, 2013, at Detroit.

Decided Oct. 15, 2013, at 9:10 a.m.

Child Advocacy Team (by Terina M. Carte) for Malachi Boynton.

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, B. Eric Restuccia, Deputy Solicitor General, and Anica Letica, Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General.

Before: BECKERING, P.J., and O'CONNELL and SHAPIRO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, Malachi Eric Boynton, a juvenile, appeals by leave granted the trial court's May 30, 2012, order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and permitting his extradition to the state of Georgia in accordance with a governor's warrant. An issue of first impression in this case is whether the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (UCEA), as adopted in Michigan (MCL 780.1 et seq.), applies to juveniles charged with delinquent behavior in another state. Because we conclude that it does and that petitioner's other claims of error lack merit, we affirm.

I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a Michigan resident. In the summer of 2010, he spent time in Georgia with this godfather. Petitioner was 12 years old at the time. Toward the end of his stay, Georgia authorities began investigating allegations that petitioner sexually assaulted a four-year-old child. Petitioner returned home to Michigan. An arrest warrant was issued in Fulton County, Georgia. Georgia's Governor then issued a requisition demand to Michigan's Governor seeking petitioner's extradition to Georgia to face accusations of aggravated child molestation, Ga Code Ann 16–6–4,¹ associated with his alleged anal penetration of the four-year-old child. Because of petitioner's status as a juvenile, the state of Georgia sought to pursue charges against him in the juvenile court as a delinquent felon.

In November 2010, petitioner was detained in Michigan for delinquent behavior associated with an episode of domestic violence. Petitioner admitted that he had pushed his mother, and the Genesee Circuit Court, Family Division, asserted jurisdiction over him on February 1, 2011. The court placed petitioner on formal probation with the option of rescinding his plea and being placed on consent calendar probation if he successfully completed the terms of his probation.

In May 2011, after learning of the charges pending in Georgia, petitioner's probation officer sought to effectuate the extradition request. Efforts were made to follow through on this request, but it was not until the following spring, after petitioner violated the terms of his probation by not attending school regularly, that he was served with the extradition paperwork and that the court undertook to execute the extradition request.²

Counsel was appointed to represent petitioner in the extradition proceedings. Petitioner's counsel filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the extradition request. The trial court denied the petition. This Court denied petitioner's application for leave to appeal.³ The Michigan Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, remanded the matter to this Court for consideration as on leave granted.⁴ The Supreme Court also granted the Michigan Attorney General's motion to intervene in the case.

II. ANALYSIS

Petitioner raises four arguments to challenge the extradition proceedings: (1) the UCEA does not apply to juveniles charged with delinquent behavior; (2) even if the UCEA does apply to him, he is not a “fugitive from justice” under the act; (3) the documents used to obtain the governor's warrant contain inaccurate and untruthful pertinent information and, thus, are not in order on their face and must not be honored; and (4) enforcing the governor's warrant and extraditing him to Georgia would be cruel and unusual punishment because he is a minor.⁵

“Challenges to extradition proceedings must be made in the asylum state.” People v. Duck, 147 Mich.App. 534, 540, 383 N.W.2d 245 (1985). “The scope of review in passing upon a writ of habeas corpus by the courts of the custody state is generally limited to questions of identity, fugitivity, and regularity of the extradition procedure.” Williams v. North Carolina, 33 Mich.App. 119, 123 n. 4, 189 N.W.2d 858 (1971), citing Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432, 35 S.Ct. 137, 59 L.Ed. 302 (1914). However, the interpretation of a statute presents a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. People v. Kimble, 470 Mich. 305, 308–309, 684 N.W.2d 669 (2004). Furthermore, to the extent petitioner raises questions of constitutional law on appeal, we generally review such issues de novo. People v. Brown, 294 Mich.App. 377, 389, 811 N.W.2d 531 (2011).

A. APPLICABILITY OF THE UCEA TO JUVENILES CHARGED WITH DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR

Petitioner raises an issue of first impression in Michigan, contending that the UCEA does not and, as manifested by its chosen language, was not intended to apply to juveniles charged with delinquent behavior. We disagree.

At the outset, it is noted that Michigan, in addition to “[a]lmost all states,” has adopted the UCEA. Anno: Extradition of juveniles, 73 A.L.R.3d 700, 706, § 3. In Michigan, the relevant statutory provisions include the following:

Subject to the provisions of this act, the provisions of the constitution of the United States controlling, and any and all acts of congress enacted in pursuance thereof, it is the duty of the governor of this state to have arrested and delivered up to the executive authority of any other state of the United States any person charged in that state with treason, felony, or other crime, who has fled from justice and is found in this state. [MCL 780.2 (emphasis added).]

As noted in MCL 780.28, “The provisions of this act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purposes to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.” The state of Georgia has also adopted the UCEA. See Ga Code Ann 17–13–20.

Discussions of the UCEA have recognized as a starting point the Extradition Clause of the United States Constitution, specifically, U.S. Const, art IV, § 2, cl 2, which states:

A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime. [Emphasis added.]

Congress implemented this constitutional provision in 18 USC 3182, which states:

Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State, District, or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, the executive authority of the State, District, or Territory to which such person has fled shall cause him to be arrested and secured, and notify the executive authority making such demand, or the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and shall cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no such agent appears within thirty days from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged. [Emphasis added.]

The United States Supreme Court in Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 288–289, 99 S.Ct. 530, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (citations omitted), explained the relationship of these various provisions:

Whatever the scope of discretion vested in the governor of an asylum state, the courts of an asylum state are bound by Art IV, § 2, by § 3182, and, where adopted, by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. A governor's grant of extradition is prima facie evidence that the constitutional and statutory requirements have been met.

Analysis of the relevant constitutional and statutory language is consistent with the rules of statutory interpretation. In re Investigation of Death of White, 256 Mich.App. 39, 45–46, 662 N.W.2d 69 (2003). “If the language of a statute is clear, no further analysis is necessary or allowed to expand what the Legislature clearly intended to cover.” People v. Monaco, 474 Mich. 48, 54, 710 N.W.2d 46 (2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

In this instance, the relevant language indicates the applicability of the statutes to a “person” or “persons” without distinction premised on age. “It is a settled rule of statutory construction that, unless otherwise defined in a statute, statutory words or phrases are given their plain and ordinary meanings.” Id. at 55, 710 N.W.2d 46 (quotation marks and citation omitted), citing MCL 8.3a. The plain and ordinary meaning of “ person” is “a human being; a man, woman, or child.” Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2005); see also Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed) (defining “person” as “[a] human being”). The act does not define the term “ person” and does not contain other provisions limiting its scope to adults. As a consequence, in adherence to the rules of statutory interpretation, we conclude that the Legislature intended to use the broad and encompassing term “ person” through its election to not limit the applicability of the provision by using qualifying language such as “adult.” Under general principles of statutory interpretation, the applicability of the UCEA is not confined to adults and the UCEA permits the extradition of juveniles.

Although there is limited caselaw regarding the applicability of the UCEA to juveniles, what exists is consistent with the above interpretation premised on the statutory language. As an example, the annotation at 73 A.L.R.3d 700 provides an overview of caselaw pertaining to the extradition of juveniles. In general, it is...