In re Bozarth
Decision Date | 15 December 1936 |
Docket Number | 26484. |
Citation | 63 P.2d 726,178 Okla. 427,1936 OK 811 |
Parties | In re BOZARTH. |
Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. It rests exclusively with the Supreme Court of this state Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 15 L.Ed 565.
2. A fair, private, and professional character is essential to membership in the bar, and such prerequisite qualifications must follow the personality of one who continues to be a member of the bar and their loss by wrongful personal and professional conduct furnishes adequate reason for taking away the privilege of such membership in the bar and pardon will not elude it.
3. It rests exclusively with this court to pass upon the ultimate fitness of those who may enjoy the privilege of continuing the practice of the profession of law and the issuance of an executive pardon cannot encroach upon the court's inherent power over attorneys at law in reference to their removal as members of the bar.
4. Record examined: Respondent disbarred: Respondent's name stricken off the rolls of attorneys.
Proceeding to review an order of the Board of Governors of the State Bar, recommending disbarment of Mark L. Bozarth.
Respondent disbarred.
W. C Alley, of Okmulgee, and George Jennings and L. O. Lytle, both of Sapulpa, for petitioner.
Frank G. Anderson and V. P. Crowe, both of Oklahoma City, for State Bar.
This is a disbarment proceeding.
Petitioner on December 15, 1933, was convicted in the district court of Oklahoma county of a felony on the charge of obtaining property under false pretenses and was sentenced to pay a fine of $500. An appeal was thereafter perfected to the Criminal Court of Appeals and that court, on October 12 1934, affirmed the judgment rendered by the district court. Bozarth v. State, 56 Okl.Cr. 424, 41 P.2d 924. Thereafter, on November 24, 1934, there was filed by the Board of Commissioners of the State Bar an accusation against petitioner for disbarment by reason of said conviction. Petitioner responded and subsequently filed an amended response setting forth the fact that the Honorable E. W. Marland, Governor of the State of Oklahoma, on March 11, 1935, issued and granted to petitioner a full and free pardon of the offenses charged in said accusation.
Petitioner, at the hearing, introduced testimony of a number of outstanding members of the State Bar, each of whom testified in substance that petitioner's morality and general fitness as a practitioner of the law was good. It was stipulated in said hearing that a number of other witnesses, whose names were set forth, if called and sworn, would testify that petitioner possessed a good general reputation, good moral character, and a general fitness as a practitioner of the law. The Board of Governors recommended to this court that petitioner be disbarred and that his name be stricken off the rolls of the members of the bar of this state.
We do not discuss the felony charge. We confine the opinion to the controlling question of whether the pardon issued by the Governor is a full and complete defense to this proceeding. Counsel for petitioner contends that such a pardon blots out of existence the guilt of petitioner in the eyes of the law as an offender so that he may be considered as innocent as if the offense had never been committed; and that the issuance of such a pardon automatically strips this court of the power and authority to revoke petitioner's license as an attorney at law.
Sir William Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the laws of England, vol. 3, c. 3, p. 23, says:
In the case of In re Burr, 9 Wheat, 529, 531, 6 L.Ed. 152, the Supreme Court of the United States considered the regularity of the proceedings of the circuit court for the District of Columbia in suspending Mr. Burr from practice for one year.
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in speaking for the court in reference to whether the circuit court had exceeded its powers in suspending Mr. Burr because he was put to answer charges not made on oath, said:
"The power is one which ought to be exercised with great caution, but which is, we think, incidental to all courts, and is necessary for the preservation of decorum, and for the respectability of the profession."
In the case of Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L.Ed. 565, Mr. Justice Taney, in speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, said:
In the case of Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 37 S.Ct. 377, 378, 61 L.Ed. 585, Ann.Cas.1917D, 569, the Supreme Court of the United States considered a petition to disbar a member of the bar of that court upon the ground of his previous disbarment by a state court for personal and professional conduct. Mr. Chief Justice White, in discussing the question of the prerequisites to admission to the bar of that court, said:
The admission of an attorney to the practice of law is a judicial function and it is of necessity within the inherent power of the court for the reason of selfprotection and respectability of the profession. It is a time-honored privilege to become an officer of the court as an attorney and counselor and the same power which grants the privilege also withdraws the same when the attorney has been found to be unworthy.
It may be conceded that the legislative...
To continue reading
Request your trial