In re Bright Ideas Co.

• Decision Date: 10 November 2022
• Docket Number: 19-CV-1032
• Citation: 284 A.3d 1037
• Parties: IN RE: The BRIGHT IDEAS COMPANY, INC., Appellant.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

284 A.3d 1037

IN RE: The BRIGHT IDEAS COMPANY, INC., Appellant.

No. 19-CV-1032

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued October 26, 2021

Decided November 10, 2022

John A. Galbreath for appellant.

Mary L. Wilson, Senior Assistant Attorney General at the time, with whom Karl A. Racine, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Loren L. AliKhan, Solicitor General at the time, Caroline S. Van Zile, Principal Deputy Solicitor General at the time, and Carl J. Schifferle, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before Beckwith, Easterly, and Deahl, Associate Judges.

Deahl, Associate Judge:

This appeal, while superficially about a $100 speeding ticket, raises far more important stakes about an institutional litigant's strategic attempts to evade this court's review. After successfully defending a $100 speeding ticket through two layers of agency review and before the Superior Court, the District of Columbia asked this court to summarily affirm and uphold the ticket. When we denied that motion, and instead asked for supplemental briefing and indicated we would hear oral argument in the matter—preliminary indications that the challenge to the ticket may have some merit—the District "voided" the ticket, tried to refund the already-paid fine, and now urges us to dismiss the appeal as moot.

We decline that invitation. Appellant, the Bright Ideas Company, has raised constitutional and regulation-based challenges to how the District enforces its traffic laws. The District's decision to void its ticket at the twenty-fifth hour—in this rare challenge to a speeding ticket that persists all the way to this court—has not rendered those challenges moot. The voluntary cessation doctrine instructs that one party's "voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not moot a case unless ‘subsequent events make it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.’ " Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 n.1, 198 L.Ed.2d 551 (2017) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs. (TOC), Inc. , 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) ). We have no such assurance here, as the District has given us no reason to think it has changed the enforcement practices Bright Ideas now challenges. Rather, the District has made it reasonably clear that it has not altered its challenged enforcement practices at all and that its one-off act of voiding this ticket was done only to avoid a potential precedent-setting loss. This court will not indulge such strategic attempts to evade review, particularly where the District already took a bite at the apple when it unsuccessfully sought summary affirmance.

On the merits, we agree with the Bright Ideas Company that the District misapplied its traffic regulations in upholding the issued citation. When the District cites a driver for violating a posted speed limit, as here, a viable defense is that the posted speed limit sign is not "sufficiently legible to be seen by an ordinarily observant person." 18 D.C.M.R. § 2000.5. The District's contrary view, that whenever the posted limit is illegible, it may always resort to enforcing the so-called default speed limit, see 18 D.C.M.R. § 2200.6, is not a reasonable interpretation of the pertinent traffic regulations. We therefore reverse the agency's order upholding the citation.

I.

This case stems from a ticket issued after an automated traffic camera photographed a car registered to Bright Ideas speeding on the 2900 block of Military Road NW. Bright Ideas is a Maryland company whose sole proprietor was driving the vehicle and would later represent his company as counsel throughout the legal proceedings, including in this appeal. The ticket listed the car's speed as 36 mph, the "Posted Speed" as 25 mph, the infraction as "Speed 11-15" mph over the limit, and the fine as $100. Bright Ideas challenged the ticket before a Department of Motor Vehicles Adjudication Services Hearing Examiner, arguing that there was "no clear signage of the speed limit" on that stretch of road, where the lone speed limit sign was poorly positioned and partially obscured by tree branches. The hearing examiner upheld the ticket, reasoning that "[i]n the District of Columbia, if you do not know what the posted speed limit is, the law requires you to travel at 25 miles per hour." See 18 D.C.M.R. § 2200.6 (2019).

Bright Ideas appealed to the Department of Motor Vehicles’ Traffic Adjudication Appeals Board, which also upheld the ticket. In its decision, the Appeals Board considered two traffic regulations. First, it cited 18 D.C.M.R. § 2200.2 for the proposition that the 25 mph posted speed limit on this stretch of Military Road was set by the Mayor and "determined to be safe and reasonable under the conditions found to exist at the location." Second, and in the alternative, it looked to 18 D.C.M.R. § 2200.6, which at the time provided that "[o]n all streets and highways, unless otherwise designated in accordance with [ 18 D.C.M.R.] § 2200.2, the maximum lawful speed shall be twenty-five miles per hour (25 mph)."¹ Echoing the hearing examiner's rationale, the unanimous three-member Appeals Board reasoned that if Bright Ideas’ driver "did not observe a speed limit sign stating otherwise, he should have observed the 25 mph [default] limit under the regulations."

Bright Ideas next petitioned the Superior Court for leave to challenge the Appeals Board's decision. See D.C. Code § 50-2304.05. In its petition, the company asserted for the first time that the District was engaged in an unconstitutional practice of "conduct[ing] speed camera surveillance and ticketing in locations where speed limits are not reliably posted, and where drivers would not reasonably expect the speed limit to be just 25 mph." Bright Ideas contended that when drivers then challenge the speed limit as improperly posted, the District "sidesteps the protests by stating that it does not matter whether the speed limit is properly posted, because any street in the District has a speed limit of just 25 mph if not posted" under 18 D.C.M.R. § 2200.6. The company argued that this scheme violated its due process rights because, for speed limits, fair notice "means reliably posting those limits so that drivers can regulate their behavior accordingly."

The Superior Court denied Bright Ideas’ petition, finding that the "adequacy of the signage" was "not legally relevant." Citing the default speed limit, see 18 D.C.M.R. § 2200.6, it reasoned that if a speed limit sign "did not notify Bright Ideas of the speed limit," District law "imposed a 25-mph speed limit." The court likewise rejected Bright Ideas’ constitutional arguments, concluding that drivers have sufficient notice of the District's default speed limit.

Bright Ideas now appeals to this court. After Bright Ideas filed its opening brief, the District asked us to summarily affirm the trial court's order. See Carl v. Tirado , 945 A.2d 1208, 1209 (D.C. 2008) (summary affirmance is proper when the movant shows that "the basic facts are both uncomplicated and undisputed, and that the lower court's ruling rests on a narrow and clear-cut issue of law"). We denied the District's motion and directed it to file a supplemental brief concerning the constitutional issues raised by Bright Ideas. We also informed the parties that the case would be scheduled for argument on the regular calendar.²

The District did not submit the supplemental brief as directed. Instead, after seeking and receiving multiple extensions to file, it notified this court that it was "taking steps to provide the relief [Bright Ideas] request[ed]" by commencing the process to void the speeding ticket and refund Bright Ideas the already-paid $100 fine. The District then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot, stating that it had provided "all the relief available to the Company in this action." Bright Ideas opposed the motion, arguing that the District was attempting to "sidestep" judicial review of its practices.³

We now consider the District's motion to dismiss this appeal as moot, and because we conclude the appeal is not moot, we address the merits of Bright Ideas’ challenge to the speeding ticket.

II.

We begin with the question of mootness. "A case is moot when the legal issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or when the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Cropp v. Williams , 841 A.2d 328, 330 (D.C. 2004) (citation omitted). Thus, while an appeal is pending, "an event that renders relief impossible or unnecessary also renders that appeal moot." Settlemire v. D.C. Off. of Emp't Appeals , 898 A.2d 902, 905 (D.C. 2006) (quoting Vaughn v. United States , 579 A.2d 170, 175 n.7 (D.C. 1990) ).⁴

There are several important exceptions to this rule, however. As relevant here, "it is well established that ‘voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case.’ " Mbakpuo v. Ekeanyanwu , 738 A.2d 776, 782 (D.C. 1999) (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co. , 345 U.S. 629, 632, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953) ). This exception "traces to the principle that a party should not be able to evade judicial review, or to defeat a judgment, by temporarily altering questionable behavior." City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha , 531 U.S. 278, 284 n.1, 121 S.Ct. 743, 148 L.Ed.2d 757 (2001). A party claiming mootness because of its voluntary cessation of conduct faces "the heavy burden" of demonstrating that its challenged activity will not resume, so that "there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated." Mbakpuo , 738 A.2d at 783 (quoting W.T. Grant Co. , 345 U.S. at 633, 73 S.Ct. 894 ).

Our bottom-line inquiry under the voluntary cessation doctrine is thus whether the District has carried its burden of making "absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not...