VAUGHN v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 31 July 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-279,89-279
• Citation: 579 A.2d 170
• Parties: Jimmy J. VAUGHN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

579 A.2d 170

Jimmy J. VAUGHN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 89-279.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued April 23, 1990.

Decided July 31, 1990.

Appeal from the Superior Court, Joseph M.F. Ryan, Jr., J.

Thomas G. Ross, appointed by the court, for appellant.

William E. Lawler, III, Asst. U.S. Atty., Chevy Chase, Md., with whom Jay B. Stephens, U.S. Atty., and John R. Fisher and Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., Washington, D.C., Asst. U.S. Attys., were on the brief and supplemental memorandum, for appellee.

Before ROGERS, Chief Judge, and NEWMAN and BELSON, Associate Judges.

NEWMAN, Associate Judge:

Jimmy J. Vaughn appeals from the dismissal of his pro se motion, in which he challenged his transfer from Lorton to a county prison facility in Texas and alleged violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The trial court dismissed Vaughn's motion on jurisdictional grounds. Although we find that the trial court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over Vaughn's claims, we nonetheless affirm the dismissal of his motion challenging transfer, on grounds that he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and of his Eighth Amendment claims, on grounds of mootness, failure to join what appear to be necessary parties, and failure to allege the deprivation of his constitutional rights with specificity.

I

In 1983, Vaughn was convicted by a jury of four counts of armed robbery and one count of carrying a pistol without a license. Vaughn was sentenced to consecutive terms of five-to-fifteen years on each armed robbery count and two-to-six years on the pistol charge. Vaughn appealed his conviction to this court, and we affirmed. Vaughn then challenged his sentence and, after his motion to reduce sentence was dismissed by Judge Ryan, we again affirmed.

On February 6, 1989, Vaughn was transferred from Lorton to a correctional facility in Frio County, Texas. On February 15, 1989, Vaughn filed a hand-written pro se "Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255" with Judge Ryan, challenging his transfer from Lorton to the Frio County facility and alleging that his Eighth Amendment rights were being violated by the conditions of his confinement there. Vaughn demanded transfer back to Lorton.

In an Order dated March 1, 1989, the court dismissed Vaughn's "motion filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255" on jurisdictional grounds and without a hearing. Vaughn filed a pro se notice of appeal on March 6, 1989, charging that the trial court had erred by (1) failing to appoint counsel¹; (2) failing to conduct a hearing on Vaughn's motion before dismissal²; (3) failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in his Order dismissing Vaughn's pleading³; and (4) concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction over the claims stated in the complaint.

We appointed counsel to represent Vaughn on appeal. After oral argument on April 23, 1990, we ordered both sides to submit supplemental memoranda on the issue of whether Vaughn has joined all necessary parties for the trial court to afford him the relief he seeks pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). In his Supplemental Memorandum, appellant's counsel informs us that since the time of oral argument, Vaughn has been transferred back to Lorton, where he is presently confined.

II

Prisoner pro se complaints must be construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff, see, e.g., Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10, 101 S.Ct. 173, 176, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980) (per curiam). Although styled as a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988), Vaughn's pleading, liberally construed, contains two complaints. One part of his pleading challenges the legality of his transfer from Lorton to the Frio County facility. The other portion of his pleading invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to allege the violation of several of his Eighth Amendment rights, including access to the courts and access to adequate medical treatment.

The sufficiency of a complaint presents a question of law; therefore, our standard of review is de novo. Davis v. United States, 564 A.2d 31, 35 (D.C. 1989); United States v. Felder, 548 A.2d 57, 61 (D.C. 1988). De novo review requires us to make an original review of the record and from that review to reach an independent judgment. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 n. 31, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1967 n. 31, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984); Felder, supra, 548 A.2d at 61. Thus, as is the case when we review a motion for summary judgment, Holland v. Hannan, 456 A.2d 807, 814 (D.C. 1983), our standard of review is the same as the standard applied by the trial court when it originally considered the sufficiency of Vaughn's complaint. Moreover, since Super.Ct.Civ.R. 52(a) does not require the trial court to issue findings of fact or conclusions of law on motions under Rule 12(b), this court must, as a practical matter, conductan independent review of the record whenever the trial court, as was the case here, grants a motion to dismiss without issuing findings of fact or conclusions of law. Finally, we note that, "as we have held on numerous occasions, this court may affirm a decision for reasons other than those given by the trial court." Garrett v. Washington Air Compressor Co., Inc., 466 A.2d 462, 464 n. 5 (D.C. 1983) (citations omitted).

Vaughn's transfer claim.

In his complaint, Vaughn expressly invokes 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to challenge his transfer from Lorton to the Frio County facility. The trial court dismissed this claim on jurisdictional grounds. Since the court has jurisdiction over an action challenging the lawfulness of Vaughn's transfer, it was error to dismiss Vaughn's motion on jurisdictional grounds.

Although we conclude that there was no jurisdictional basis for the dismissal of Vaughn's motion challenging the transfer, we nevertheless affirm the dismissal on the ground that Vaughn fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

As Vaughn makes plain in his brief on appeal, his motion attacks the legality of his transfer. Relying on D.C.Code § 24-402 (1989),⁴ he contends that as a District of Columbia prisoner convicted of an offense against the United States, he may only be transferred from the District of Columbia correctional system into the federal correctional system. Thus, Vaughn reads D.C.Code § 24-402 as limiting the transfer power of the Attorney General to District and federal facilities. We do not agree. As we said in Cooper, supra, a prisoner confined to Lorton has

no legally recognized interest in remaining in Lorton Reformatory. Under D.C.Code § 24-425 (1981),⁵ persons convicted of crimes in the District of Columbia are committed to the custody of the Attorney General, who may "order the transfer of any such person from one institution to another if, in his judgment, it shall be for the well-being of the prisoner or relieve overcrowding or unhealthful conditions in the institution where such prisoner is confined, or for other reasons." This authority is "clear and apparently limitless." Curry-Bey v. Jackson, 422 F. Supp. 926, 932 (D.D.C. 1976). Obviously, as long as section 24-425 is in the Code, a District of Columbia prisoner can have no legitimate expectation that he will remain at Lorton throughout his term.

483 A.2d at 322. See also Nowlin v. Director, D.C. Dep't of Corrections, 689 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D.D.C. 1988) (prisoner has no legitimate expectation he will remain at Lorton throughout his term and, thus, noDue Process interest protecting him from summary deprivation); Pitts v. Meese, 684 F. Supp. 303, 315 (D.D.C. 1987) (defendant and her family had no justifiable expectation that she would be incarcerated within District or metropolitan area and transfer did not violate her constitutional or statutory rights).

In light of the express language of the statute and the caselaw interpreting it, we conclude that Vaughn fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted and, therefore, his motion was properly dismissed.

Vaughn's § 1983 claims.

Vaughn's pleading expressly invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the terms "civil rights complaint" and "cruel and unusual punishment";⁶ thus, it is plain on the face of the pleading that he raises Eighth Amendment claims under § 1983. The only question before us is the legal sufficiency of the complaint.

In judging the sufficiency of a complaint, we must "construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and assume, for purposes of the motion, that the allegations in the complaint are true." Vicki Bagley Realty, Inc. v. Laufer, 482 A.2d 359, 364 (D.C. 1984). "[A]ny ambiguities or doubts concerning the sufficiency of the claim must be resolved in favor of the pleader." Doe v. United States Dep't of Justice, 243 U.S.App.D.C. 354, 364, 753 F.2d 1092, 1102 (D.C. 1985). Moreover, a complaint must not be dismissed on grounds that the court doubts that the plaintiff will prevail. McBryde v. Amoco Oil Co., 404 A.2d 200, 202 (D.C. 1979).

As we noted above, prisoner pro se complaints must be construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff, Hughes, supra, 449 U.S. at 10, 101 S.Ct. at 176, and "should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). This rule applies with special force to pro se civil rights suits brought by prisoners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Johnson-El v. District of Columbia, 579 A.2d 163 (D.C. 1990); see also Rubin v. O'Koren, 621 F.2d 114, 117 (5th Cir. 1980).

In the body of his complaint, Vaughn alleges that incarceration in the Frio County facility has subjected him to "cruel and unusual punishment" stemming from allegedly inadequate or missing educational and rehabilitative programs; lack of a law library; lack of paid employment; inadequate medical care facilities; inadequate recreational facilities; and overcrowding. By these particulars, Vaughn...