In re Bristol
| Decision Date | 06 September 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 29,341.,29,341. |
| Citation | 142 P.3d 905,2006 NMSC 041 |
| Parties | In the Matter of Robert Matthew BRISTOL, An Attorney Licensed to Practice Before the Courts of the State of New Mexico. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Joel L. Widman, Deputy Disciplinary Counsel, Albuquerque, NM, for Petitioner.
Nancy Cusack, Esq., Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent.
{1} In this attorney disciplinary proceeding, we are called upon to clarify the standard of review to use when reviewing recommendations for sanctions under the Rules Governing Discipline. In so doing, we must resolve conflicting findings, conclusions and recommendations for discipline issued by two separate bodies — a hearing committee and a hearing panel — both appointed by the Disciplinary Board to conduct two different types of hearings during the course of this proceeding. For the reasons that follow, we determine that attorney Robert Matthew Bristol (Respondent) should be publicly censured for his violations of our Rules of Professional Conduct.
{2} Under our Rules Governing Discipline, when a formal disciplinary proceeding is initiated against an attorney, the chairman of the Disciplinary Board, or his designee, shall forthwith designate a hearing officer or a hearing committee to hear the matter. See Rule 17-309(C) NMRA; Rule 17-313 NMRA. The hearing committee may be comprised of New Mexico attorneys and non-lawyer members of the public. See Rule 17-104(A) NMRA. The role of the hearing committee culminates with the issuance of "its findings of fact, conclusions and recommendations for discipline or other disposition of the matter," which are submitted directly to the Disciplinary Board. See Rule 17-313(D)(8).
{3} Upon receipt of the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the hearing committee, the chair of the Disciplinary Board shall appoint one or more members of the board to serve as a hearing panel to review the recommended decision of the hearing committee. See Rule 17-314(A) NMRA. The hearing panel may allow oral argument or the submission of briefs, but the hearing panel is limited to considering the evidence of record presented to the hearing committee and may not accept additional evidence. See Rule 17-314(B) and (C). In conducting its review, the "[hearing] panel may accept, reject or modify or increase the sanctions contained in the recommendations of the hearing committee." See Rule 17-315 NMRA. However, the hearing panel "is not restricted to the findings of the hearing committee and may render its decision based upon the record and any additional findings that it may make." Id. If the hearing panel recommends disbarment, suspension, public censure, or probation by this Court under Rule 17-206 NMRA as the appropriate disciplinary sanction, it shall prepare a written report and recommendation to that effect and file it with this Court. See Rule 17-315(C).
{4} Depending on the type of disciplinary recommendation from the hearing panel, review by this Court may be sought by the filing of a request for hearing or petition for hearing. See Rule 17-316(A) NMRA. Upon review, this Court may accept or reject some or all of the hearing panel's findings, conclusions or recommendations, and may impose the recommended discipline or impose a greater or lesser discipline than what was recommended by the hearing panel. See Rule 17-316(D).
{5} In this case, a hearing committee of the Disciplinary Board found that Respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and recommended that Respondent receive an informal admonition. After reviewing the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the hearing committee, a hearing panel of the Disciplinary Board issued its own findings and conclusions, recommending to this Court the more severe disciplinary sanction of suspension from the practice of law for six months.
{6} Respondent then requested a hearing before this Court pursuant to Rule 17-316(A)(1), which we granted. At the conclusion of the hearing before this Court, and in a written order we subsequently issued, we adopted the findings of fact of the hearing committee rather than those of the hearing panel. However, we decided that Respondent should receive a public reprimand instead of the informal admonition recommended by the hearing committee or the suspension recommended by the hearing panel.
{7} Public reprimands are issued in two forms under our Rules Governing Discipline-formal reprimands issued through our Disciplinary Board and public censures issued directly by this Court. Compare Rule 17-206(A)(5), with Rule 17-206(A)(4). We directed disciplinary counsel and Respondent's counsel to work together to prepare a draft formal reprimand. However, counsel ultimately submitted separate draft reprimands to this Court because they could not agree on the substance of the reprimand. Because the parties could not agree on the substance of the formal reprimand to be issued against Respondent, and to bring these disciplinary proceedings to a conclusion, we issue the reprimand as a public censure from this Court. And because this case also has precedential value, the public censure is included as part of this Opinion issued pursuant to Rule 17-206(D) and Rule 17-316(D).
{8} Formal disciplinary proceedings were initiated against Respondent based on actions he took during his representation of a married couple who wanted to file for bankruptcy. During the course of preparing the bankruptcy petition and related bankruptcy schedules, Respondent discovered that the wife (the debtor) had an interest in a house in Roswell, New Mexico, that she received in a divorce proceeding involving a prior marriage. However, the nature of her interest in the house was unclear.
{9} After an initial investigation into the matter, Respondent advised the debtor to list her interest in the house on the personal property bankruptcy schedule as a life estate with a value of one dollar. Respondent subsequently learned that the marital settlement agreement from the divorce proceeding gave the debtor more than a life estate in the house and concluded the debtor would need to amend her bankruptcy schedules accordingly. However, Respondent failed to take steps to ensure that the relevant bankruptcy schedules were amended to reflect the debtor's true interest in the house before the bankruptcy proceeding was closed.
{10} Subsequently, the bankruptcy trustee filed a complaint to revoke the debtor's discharge in bankruptcy because of her failure to disclose her true interest in the house. In addition to revoking the debtor's discharge, the bankruptcy judge chastised Respondent for his role in misleading the court and referred the incident to the Disciplinary Board for further investigation.
{11} At issue below in this disciplinary proceeding was whether Respondent's failure to accurately disclose to the bankruptcy court the extent of the debtor's interest in the house violated our Rules of Professional Conduct. The hearing committee concluded that Respondent's failure to amend the bankruptcy schedules after determining the debtor's ownership interest in the house violated Rule 16-103 NMRA (), and Rule 16-303(A)(2) NMRA (). However, the hearing committee also concluded that Respondent's actions were the result of mistake and negligence, did not involve dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, and were caused in part by the debtor's failure to cooperate with Respondent to amend the bankruptcy schedules. Accordingly, the hearing committee recommended that Respondent only receive a private, informal admonition as his disciplinary sanction for violating our Rules of Professional Conduct.
{12} In contrast to the hearing committee, the hearing panel appointed to review the recommendation of the hearing committee took a much harsher view of Respondent's actions. In addition to the rule violations identified by the hearing committee, the hearing panel concluded that Respondent violated several additional Rules of Professional Conduct implicating his competence and fitness to practice law. Most significantly, and contrary to what the hearing committee concluded, the hearing panel concluded that Respondent violated Rule 16-804(C) NMRA by engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Ultimately, the hearing panel filed its final report and recommendation with this Court recommending the suspension of Respondent from the practice of law for six months. For the reasons that follow, we reject the hearing panel's recommendation, adopt the hearing committee's findings of fact, and independently determine that a public censure is the appropriate level of discipline for Respondent's misconduct.
{13} The decision of the hearing panel specifically states that it replaces the findings and conclusions of the hearing committee with the hearing panel's own findings and conclusions because "the findings of the hearing committee are incomplete and some of the findings of the hearing committee are not supported by substantial evidence." However, the hearing panel's decision does not specify the findings of the hearing committee that the hearing panel believed lacked substantial evidence, nor does the decision of the hearing panel discuss why the findings of the hearing committee were incomplete. As we explain below, the hearing panel does have the authority to issue its own findings under limited circumstances. But when it does so in future cases, review by this Court will be facilitated if the hearing panel explains in its report and recommendation to this Court why it has decided to reject or supplement...
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Skowronski v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep't
... ... In support of his contention, Skowronski discusses three New Mexico cases: In re Bristol, 2006NMSC041, 140 N.M. 317, 142 P.3d 905; Melrose, 106 N.M. 129, 740 P.2d 123; and Jennings, 98 N.M. 602, 651 P.2d 1037. Skowronski's authorities do not support his contention. {27} In re Bristol is distinguishable and inapplicable. In re Bristol involved attorney disciplinary proceedings ... ...
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Am. Fed'n of State v. City of Albuquerque
... ... The inquiry depends on the facts of each case[.] Bd. of Educ., Taos Mun. Sch. v. The Architects, Taos (Architects), 103 N.M. 462, 463, 709 P.2d 184, 185 (1985). While we generally show deference to a district court on factual questions, see In re Bristol, 2006NMSC041, 2627, 140 N.M. 317, 142 P.3d 905, where no facts are in dispute, we are faced with a question of law. See Ovecka v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2008NMCA140, 9, 145 N.M. 113, 194 P.3d 728. We review questions of law de novo. Wachocki v. Bernalillo Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, ... ...
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Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty. & Municipal Emps. v. City of Albuquerque
... ... The inquiry depends on the facts of each case[.]" Bd. of Educ., Taos Mun. Sch. v. The Architects, Taos (Architects), 103 N.M. 462, 463, 709 P.2d 184, 185 (1985). While we generally show deference to a district court on factual questions, see In re Bristol, 2006-NMSC-041, ¶¶ 26-27, 140 N.M. 317, 142 P.3d 905, where no facts are in dispute, we are faced with a question of law. See Ovecka v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2008-NMCA-140, ¶ 9, 145 N.M. 113, 194 P.3d 728. We review questions of law de novo. Wachocki v. Bernalillo Cnty. Sheriff's ... ...
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In the Matter of Stein, 17,349.
... ... A. Standard of Review ... {21} The findings of the hearing committee are reviewed for substantial evidence and the conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. See In re Bristol, 2006-NMSC-041, ¶ ¶ 16-18, 140 N.M. 317, 142 P.3d 905 (per curiam); In re Estrada, 2006-NMSC-047, ¶ 7, 140 N.M. 492, 143 P.3d 731 (per curiam). Both the hearing panel and this Court look to see whether substantial evidence exists to support the hearing committee's decision. See In re ... ...