Skowronski v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep't

• Decision Date: 01 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 31,119.,31,119.
• Citation: 298 P.3d 469
• Parties: Chad SKOWRONSKI, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. The NEW MEXICO PUBLIC EDUCATION DEPARTMENT and Veronica C. Garcia, in her official capacity as the Secretary of the New Mexico Public Education Department, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

298 P.3d 469

Chad SKOWRONSKI, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.The NEW MEXICO PUBLIC EDUCATION DEPARTMENT and Veronica C. Garcia, in her official capacity as the Secretary of the New Mexico Public Education Department, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 31,119.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Nov. 8, 2012.

Certiorari Granted, March 1, 2013, No. 33,928.

Law Offices of Nancy L. Simmons, P.C., Nancy L. Simmons, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Andrea R. Buzzard, Assistant Attorney General, N.M. Public Education Department, Willie R. Brown, General Counsel, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellees.

OPINION

SUTIN, Judge.

{1} The district court affirmed a decision of the Secretary of the New Mexico Public Education Department (the Department) revoking the teaching license of Chad Skowronski. Skowronski appeals. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} At this point, we only recite a few of the many facts underlying a story strewn with credibility issues seen completely differently by a hearing officer, who recommended dismissal of the Department's administrative charges against Skowronski, and the Secretary, who alone made the final decision to revoke Skowronski's teaching license. The underlying facts will be more fully presented in later sections of this Opinion.

{3} The Department charged Skowronski with engaging in inappropriate and improper sexual contact or behavior with a fourteen-year-old female (the Victim). Skowronski, a science teacher, had a teaching license issued by the Department. The alleged contact occurred in the living room of persons who owned and operated the charter school where Skowronski had been hired to teach and where the Victim was considering attending, and who were also the Victim's godparents. The Victim's godparents hosted an event that included a potluck followed by a poker game, which was attended, among other guests, by Skowronski, the Victim, and the Victim's parents. Following the party, the Victim's parents spent the night in a tent in a nearby field. The Victim, who had stayed overnight at her godparents' home many times, slept on the couch in the living room. Skowronski also slept in the living room, on the floor at a distance, according to Skowronski, of ten feet from the Victim, but according to the Victim and her father, within one to two feet of the Victim. The alleged contact occurred when the Victim and Skowronski were alone in the living room.

{4} The Department's notice of contemplated action to take disciplinary action against Skowronski's license went first to a hearing officer. SeeNMSA 1978, § 61–1–4(F) (2003) (explaining that if the licensee requests a hearing, a hearing shall be held within sixty days); 6.68.3.9(D)(1) NMAC (11/30/2005) (stating that all hearings may be conducted by a hearing officer who is a licensed New Mexico attorney and who is not employed by the Department). After an evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer made recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law followed by a recommended decision. See6.68.3.12(B) NMAC (11/30/2005) (stating that the hearing officer “shall submit a formal written report to the [S]ecretary consisting of [among other things] ... proposed findings of fact, proposed conclusions of law, and [a proposed] order”). The hearing officer found that the charges had not been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. And he recommended that the notice of contemplated action be dismissed with prejudice.

{5} The hearing officer's recommended decision went to the Secretary for final decision. SeeNMSA 1978, § 61–1–13 (1993) (stating that after a hearing has been completed, the members of the board shall consider the case and shall thereafter render a decision); 6.68.3.13(A) NMAC (11/30/2005) (stating that the Secretary “shall render a final decision and order based on a preponderance of the evidence”). The Secretary entered a decision and order which, after indicating that she had familiarized herself with the record before the hearing officer, and after adopting some of the hearing officer's recommendations and rejecting others, revoked Skowronski's license, ultimately concluding “that good and just cause hav[e] been established by a preponderance of the evidence to warrant revocation.” As reflected later in this Opinion, the essential difference between the hearing officer's view of the circumstances and that of the Secretary was how these two decision makers saw the credibility of Victim and Skowronski and the believability of their testimony.

{6} Skowronski appealed to the district court. SeeNMSA 1978, §§ 39–3–1.1, 61–1–17 (1999); Rule 1–074 NMRA. In its final decision on the Rule 1–074 appeal, the district court affirmed the decision of the Secretary. Skowronski appeals the decision of the district court and asserts the following points: (1) the Department erred as a matter of law in submitting his license revocation to the Secretary for final decision, (2) the Secretary erred in substituting her own credibility findings for those of the hearing officer, (3) the Department and the Secretary denied him due process of law, and (4) the Secretary's decision was not supported by substantial evidence.

DISCUSSIONI. The Issue of the Secretary's Authority to Make the Final Revocation Decision

{7} Skowronski contends that the Secretary did not have constitutional or statutory authority to delegate exclusive authority to a cabinet secretary to revoke a teaching license. He argues that Article XII, Section 6 of the New Mexico Constitution and the Uniform Licensing Act (the Licensing Act), NMSA 1978, §§ 61–1–1 to –33 (1957, as amended through 2003), required the Department to refer the hearing officer's recommended decision for a final decision by a quorum instead of by a single individual. The issue requires us to interpret constitutional and legislative acts, issues of law only, and our review is de novo. City of Aztec v. Gurule, 2010–NMSC–006, ¶ 5, 147 N.M. 693, 228 P.3d 477;see Att'y Gen. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n, 2011–NMSC–034, ¶ 10, 150 N.M. 174, 258 P.3d 453. We first set out the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions, plus administrative rules promulgated by the Department. Afterward, we analyze the question of what Article XII, Section 6 and the applicable statutes intended in regard to who makes the final revocation decision.

The Constitution

{8} Article XII, Section 6 states in full:

Public education department; public education commission.

A. There is hereby created a “public education department” and a “public education commission” that shall have such powers and duties as provided by law. The department shall be a cabinet department headed by a secretary of public education who is a qualified, experienced educator who shall be appointed by the governor and confirmed by the senate.

B. Ten members of the public education commission shall be elected for staggered terms of four years as provided by law. Commission members shall be residents of the public education commission district from which they are elected. Change of residence of a commission member to a place outside the district from which he was elected shall automatically terminate the term of that member.

C. The governor shall fill vacancies on the commission by appointment of a resident from the district in which the vacancy occurs until the next regular election for membership on the commission.

D. The secretary of public education shall have administrative and regulatory powers and duties, including all functions relating to the distribution of school funds and financial accounting for the public schools to be performed as provided by law.

E. The elected members of the 2003 state board of education shall constitute the public education commission, if this amendment is approved, until their terms expire and the districts from which the state board of education were elected shall constitute the state public education commission districts until changed by law.

{9} Before this amendment establishing the Public Education Department, the Secretary of Public Education and the State Board of Education had the final administrative say on revocation of licenses. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Melrose Mun. Sch. v. N.M. Bd. of Educ. (Melrose), 106 N.M. 129, 130–31, 740 P.2d 123, 124–25 (Ct.App.1987) (involving whether the State Board of Education erred in reversing the credibility determinations of a local board); Bd. of Educ. of Alamogordo Pub. Sch. v. Jennings, 98 N.M. 602, 604–05, 651 P.2d 1037, 1039–40 (Ct.App.1982) (involving whether the State Board of Education erred in reversing a local board), overruled on other grounds by Melrose, 106 N.M. 129, 740 P.2d 123. Upon amendment, the Public Education Commission (the Commission) was originally composed of the elected members of the 2003 State Board of Education. N.M. Const. art. XII, § 6(E). But the powers and duties of the Commission were not those given to the previous State Board of Education but, instead, were those “provided by law.” N.M. Const. art. XII, § 6(A).

The Licensing Act

{10} The Licensing Act pre-dated the amendment of Article XII, Section 6. The Licensing Act defines “board,” an operative word in the matter before us, as, among other things, “a board, commission[,] or agency that administers a profession or occupation licensed pursuant to Chapter 61 NMSA 1978 [.]” Section 61–1–2(A)(3). The Licensing Act also defines “board” as “any other state agency to which the ... Licensing Act ... is applied by law [.]” Section 61–1–2(A)(4). Taking several sections of the Licensing Act together, the Act provides the procedures required for revocation of licenses by boards. See, e.g., §§ 61–1–2(A)(3), (4), (C), (D); §§ 61–1–4 to –17, –19, –21. A licensee has a right to a hearing before the board that has authority to take revocation action. Section 61–1–3(F). The hearing can take place before the board or before a board-selected hearing officer who must submit a report to the board with findings of fact....