In re Buffelen Lumber & Mfg. Co., 30667.

• Citation: 32 Wn.2d 205,201 P.2d 194
• Decision Date: 29 December 1948
• Docket Number: 30667.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: In re BUFFELEN LUMBER & MFG. CO. et al.

201 P.2d 194

32 Wn.2d 205

In re BUFFELEN LUMBER & MFG. CO. et al.

No. 30667.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

December 29, 1948

Proceedings in the matter of the eligibility for unemployment compensation of certain employees of the Buffelen Lumber &amp Mfg. Company and others. From a judgment of the superior court which affirmed a decision of the commissioner of the employment security department allowing unemployment compensation benefits to the employees, the employers appeal.

Judgment reversed.

Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County; W. A. Richmond, judge.

McMicken Rupp & Schweppe and A. V. Stoneman, all of Seattle, for appellants.

Smith Troy and William J. Millard, Jr., both of Olympia, for employment security.

Wettrick Flood & O'Brien, of Seattle, for claimant-respondents.

SIMPSON, Justice.

This is an appeal to review the judgment of the trial court which sustained a decision of the commissioner of the employment security department allowing unemployment compensation benefits to certain employees of appellants.

The employees, whose unemployment compensation claims are in controversy, found themselves unemployed and filed claims for compensation. After examination of the facts, the authorized agent of the commissioner determined the claimants to be involuntarily unemployed, and eligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits. From that determination the employers appealed to the appeal tribunal of the employment security department. That tribunal approved the determination of the commissioner, and the employers appealed to the superior court of Pierce county.

The matter was presented to the court upon an agreed statement of facts, which were the same as had been presented to the appeal tribunal. The court decided that the employees were entitled to unemployment compensation benefits, and approved the actions of the department.

The assignments of error are: The trial court erred (1) in affirming the decision of the commissioner; (2) in holding the claimants eligible for compensation; (3) in holding that Rem.Supp.1945, § 9998-321 precludes the court from considering the provisions of the vacation agreement in determining eligibility of the claimants to compensation; (4) in failing to hold that the commissioner misapplied the law (5) in failing to hold that the commissioner acted arbitrarily and capriciously in determining eligibility of claimants; and (6) in holding the commissioner's decision final.

The agreed facts are these: All of appellants' employees, including those who were making claims for compensation in this case, were members of the Lumber and Sawmill Workers, Local Union No. 2669. The union just mentioned was the exclusive bargaining agent for all employees for collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment under the National Labor Relations Act, § 9, 29 U.S.C.A.§ 159.

The provisions of the bargaining agency agreement read:

'Article I. Bargaining Agency

'(a) The Employer recognizes the Union as the properly constituted body for collective bargaining for all of its Employees at the Tacoma plant of the Employer company, except foremen, superintendents, water scalers, office personnel, log buyers and other employees for whom the Union has not heretofore bargained.'

A supplemental agreement, relating to vacations, was entered into June 29, 1945. That agreement contained that following provisions:

'All regular employees of the firm on the payroll at the time of their vacation and who were on the payroll for one year prior to the vacation date shall be granted one week's vacation with pay. All regular employees of the firm on the payroll for five years prior to the vacation date shall be granted two weeks' vacation with pay. * * *

'It is understood that vacations may be given by closing down the entire plant during June, July or August, or a part thereof, or by staggering vacations throughout the year, in accordance with the requirements of operation and shipments. The employer shall give and post thirty (30) days' written notice thereof, in order that each employee may make vacation plans.'

The first question for determination is whether or not the courts are precluded from considering the provisions of the vacation agreement entered into between the union and the appellants. The statutes of our state relative to this question are as follows:

'Appeal to the courts. Within thirty days after any Commissioner's decision, involving review of an appeal tribunal's decision, has been communicated to any interested party, such interested party may appeal to the Superior Court of the county of his residence, and such appeal shall be heard as a case in equity, but upon such appeal only such issues of law may be raised as were properly included in the hearing Before the appeal tribunal. The proceedings of every such appeal shall be informal and summary, but full opportunity to be heard upon the issues of law shall be had Before judgment is pronounced. * * *' Rem.Supp.1945, § 9998-266.

'Jurisdiction of the courts. In all Court proceedings under or pursuant to this act the decision of the Commissioner shall be prima facie correct, and the burden of proof shall be upon the party attacking the same.

'If the court shall determine that the Commissioner has acted within his power and has correctly construed the law, the decision of the Commissioner shall be confirmed; otherwise, it shall be reversed or modified. * * *' Rem.Supp.1945, § 9998-269.

In Re St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 7 Wash.2d 580, 110 P.2d 877, 883, this court defined the power and duties of the courts when reviewing decisions of the commissioner under the Unemployment Compensation Act, which was the one just referred to. In that case we stated:

'Looking to the quoted portion of the act in question relative to appeals taken to the superior court, and having in mind our former decisions relative to statutes of this nature, we are constrained to hold that the administrative determination of the facts is conclusive on the court unless it be wholly without evidential support or wholly dependent upon a question of law, or clearly arbitrary or capricious. It seems certain that the court which tries the case sits as a court of equity with limited powers. The court shall review the issues of law which have been previously raised. The court shall review the power of the commissioner to act. The court shall review the facts only in so far as it is necessary to determine whether the commissioner has acted arbitrary or capriciously, and whether he applied properly the law to those facts.

'By virtue of the portion of the act which makes the decision of the director prima facia correct and imposes upon the attacking party the burden of proof, there is a presumption that the factual findings of the commissioner are not arbitrary or capricious. This presumption cannot be overcome by showing that there was evidence presented from which...