In re Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co.

• Decision Date: 24 February 2000
• Citation: 12 S.W.3d 891
• Parties: <!--12 S.W.3d 891 (Tex.App.-Houston 2000) IN RE BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Relator NO. 14-99-01210-CV In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals Fourteenth Court of Appeals
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 891

12 S.W.3d 891 (Tex.App.-Houston[14th Dist.] 2000)

IN RE BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Relator

NO. 14-99-01210-CV

In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals Fourteenth Court of Appeals

February 24, 2000

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING WRIT OF MANDAMUS

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Panel consists of Justices Yates, Fowler and Frost.

OPINION

Wanda McKee Fowler

Relator, Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company ("Burlington"), seeks a writ of mandamus directing the Fort Bend County Court at Law No. 3 to vacate its injunction order in the underlying condemnation proceeding. Burlington contends the order is void for failure to comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683 and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because we disagree with Burlington on both points, we deny mandamus relief.

I. BACKGROUND

Burlington was the owner of a railway easement in Fort Bend County, Texas. The real party in interest, Fort Bend County ("the County"), initiated condemnation proceedings in the county court to acquire the easement for construction of a railroad crossing into an adjacent housing development. Burlington filed a motion to dismiss claiming the County had no authority to condemn the property under the prior public use doctrine.¹ The county court denied Burlington's motion and appointed special commissioners, who subsequently awarded Burlington $3,099.00 for the value of its easement. After the County deposited the funds into the registry of the court, and after the court accepted the special commissioners' award, Burlington objected to the award on grounds that the compensation was "grossly inadequate" and that the County lacked authority to condemn the property.

While the condemnation proceeding was pending, the County filed an application for injunction to require Burlington "to improve the roadbed within twenty feet of its tracks to an acceptable level" so that the County could complete construction of the railroad crossing. In response, Burlington filed a plea to the jurisdiction requesting a transfer of the injunction proceeding to the district court based on its claim that the amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdictional limits of the county court. At the injunction hearing, the county court denied Burlington's plea to the jurisdiction and granted the County's request for injunctive relief. That same day, the court signed an injunction order commanding Burlington to improve the roadbed.

Burlington subsequently filed this petition for writ of mandamus.² Burlington also filed a motion for temporary relief requesting that we enter orders staying the injunction order and restraining the Fort Bend County Clerk from issuing the writ. On the same day that we requested a response to the petition, the county clerk served Burlington with the writ of injunction. We subsequently granted Burlington's amended motion for temporary relief and stayed the injunction order pending consideration of its petition.

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION

Generally, mandamus relief is available if the trial court violates a duty imposed by law or clearly abuses its discretion, either in resolving factual issues or in determining legal issues, when there is no adequate remedy at law. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1991). Where the trial court's order is void, however, it is unnecessary for the relator to show it pursued other available remedies and mandamus will issue. See Dikeman v. Snell, 490 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. 1973); see also In re Rollins Leasing, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex. App. Houston [14 th Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]). Here, Burlington does not claim that the trial court violated a duty or abused its discretion; rather, it claims that the court issued a void order. An order is void only when it is clear that the court entering the order had no jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the order, or no capacity to act as a court. See State ex rel Latty v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex. 1995).

Burlington complains that the injunction order is void in two respects: (1) it did not comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683; and (2) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. As we explain below, the injunction order is not void. First, failure to comply with Rule 683 makes it merely voidable. Second, the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the eminent domain proceedings and issued ancillary injunctive relief to enforce that jurisdiction.

A. Rule 683 Complaint

An injunction order that does not comply with Rule 683 "is subject to being declared void and dissolved." Interfirst Bank San Felipe N.A. v. Paz Construction Co., 715 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1986) (emphasis added). Because an injunction order that does not comply with Rule 683 is merely voidable, it is subject to review by appeal; it is not subject to a mandamus. See Ludewig v. Houston Pipeline Co., 737 S.W.2d 15, 16 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1987, no writ). Accordingly, to the extent Burlington complains the injunction order does not comply with Rule 683, Burlington has an adequate remedy by appeal.³ In short, the failure to comply with Rule 683 does not make the order void, and, therefore, does not authorize this Court to issue a mandamus.

B. Jurisdictional Complaint

Burlington also complains that the county court had no authority to grant the injunction because it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. As we noted, an order is void when a court has no power or jurisdiction to render it. See Urbish v. 127 th Judicial District Court, 708 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex. 1986). Because Burlington complains of an allegedly void order, Burlington is entitled to mandamus review of that order without having to show that it pursued other available remedies. See Dikeman, 490 S.W.2d at 186; see also In re Rollins Leasing, 987 S.W.2d at 635. Here, there is no question that the court had jurisdiction over eminent domain proceedings; county courts share that jurisdiction with district courts, see TEX. PROP.CODE ANN. § 21.001 (Vernon 1984), and the Fort Bend County Court is to give preference to eminent domain cases. See, TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 25.0812 (Vernon Supp. 2000). Instead, the question is whether the trial court's jurisdiction over the eminent domain proceedings also gave it jurisdiction to issue the injunction order. Burlington claims that the court did not have authority to issue the injunction because the County did not allege an amount in controversy; according to Burlington, the court has jurisdiction to issue the writ of injunction only with an allegation of an amount in controversy. In response, the County claims that the court had jurisdiction to issue the writ of injunction because it had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the issuance of the injunction was an auxiliary action taken to enforce its jurisdiction in a controversy already lawfully before it.

We agree with the County that the court did have jurisdiction. We explain below, first discussing why the court had jurisdiction, and then addressing Burlington's claims that the court could not issue the writ in spite of its eminent domain jurisdiction.

1. Jurisdiction of the County Court.

First, as noted, the court had jurisdiction to hear this type of case. Section 21.001 of the Texas Property Code provides that " district courts and county courts at law have concurrent jurisdiction in eminent domain cases." TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.001(Vernon 1984). Section 25.0812 of the Government Code provides that a county court at law in Fort Bend County "is primarily responsible for and shall give preference to eminent domain proceedings and cases." TEX.GOVT. CODE ANN. § 25.0812(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2000).

Second, under the State Constitution and by statute, the court had authority to issue the injunction. Article 5, section 16 of the Texas Constitution states that ". . . county court judges shall have the power to issue writs necessary to enforce their jurisdiction." TEX. CONST. Art. 5, § 16. Section 25.0004 of the Texas Government Code states that "a statutory county court or its judge may issue writs of injunction . . . and all writs necessary for the enforcement of the jurisdiction of the court." TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 25.0004 (Vernon 1988).⁴ Section 65.021 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code also states that a county court "shall hear and determine applications for writs of injunction." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 65.021(a) (Vernon 1997).

Much has been written on article 5, section 16 with respect to the jurisdiction of county courts to issue injunctions. There are two lines of case both cited by the parties which, at first reading, appear to conflict with each other. However, as we explain below with the aid to two old cases, they are not in conflict.

The first line of cases, which begins in the nineteenth century, uses rather broad language in holding that "the power of the county court to issue writs of [injunction] under [article 5, section 16] of the constitution . . . [is] limited to cases exceeding $200 and not exceeding $1,000." See Ex Parte Bryant, 155 Tex. 219, 285 S.W. 2d 719 (1956) (holding that county court can issue a writ of injunction only when the matter in controversy exceeds $200 and does not exceed $1000 in value); Dewitt v. Wischkemper, 95 Tex. 436, 67 S.W. 882-83 (1902) (holding that the power of the county court to issue an injunction under article 5, section 16 was "limited to cases exceeding $200 and not exceeding $1,000," and because suit for injunction did not allege an amount in controversy, county court did not have jurisdiction to issue the injunction); State v. Johnson, 90 Tex. 321, 37 S.W. 601 (1896) ("county court has power to issue writ in any case where mere money demand is involved and the amount of that demand exceeds $200 and does not exceed $1,000."); Dean v. State, 88 Tex. 290, 30 S.W. 1047, 1048 (1895) (same); Martin v. Victoria Independent School...