In re Butt
Decision Date | 09 May 2016 |
Docket Number | NUMBER 13–16–00132–CV |
Parties | In re Charles Butt, Craig Boyan, Carmen Gellhausen, and Kevin Holguin |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Rachel Anne Ekery, Amy Warr, Wallace B. Jefferson, Alexander, Dubose, Jefferson & Townsend LLP, Austin, TX, Victor A. Vicinaiz, Roerig, Oliveira & Fisher, McAllen, TX, for Relator.
Harold Kenneth Tummel, Lydia Casso Tummel, Tummel & Casso, Edinburg, TX, for Real Parties in Interest.
Aida Salinas Flores, Edinburg, TX, for Respondent.
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Benavides
1
Relators, Charles Butt, Craig Boyan, Carmen Gellhausen, and Kevin Holguin, who are corporate officials for H.E.B. Grocery Company, L.P. (“H.E.B.”), filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the above cause on February 26, 2016. Relators and H.E.B. are defendants in a premises liability case predicated on a slip-and-fall accident at an H.E.B. grocery store. Through this original proceeding, relators seek to compel the trial court to: (1) vacate its order denying relators' motion to dismiss under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a
; (2) grant their motion to dismiss; and (3) award them their costs and attorney's fees. See TEX.R. CIV. P. 91a ( ).2 We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus.
Arturo Garcia slipped and fell while shopping at a McAllen-area H.E.B. grocery store. He and his wife, Aurelia, sued H.E.B. for his injuries. In their fourth amended petition, the Garcias complained in two paragraphs of their petition that a wet floor created an unreasonably dangerous condition, that H.E.B. failed to use adequate methods to detect and remove foreign substances on its store floors, and that H.E.B. intentionally breached a duty to preserve the fluid Garcia purportedly slipped on, thereby justifying spoliation sanctions:
The Garcias' fourth amended petition also included claims against four apex corporate officials for H.E.B.: Charles Butt, H.E.B.'s chairman and chief executive officer; Craig Boyan, H.E.B.'s president; Carmen Gellhausen, H.E.B.'s “top risk management employee”; and Kevin Holguin, H.E.B.'s “top safety employee.” With regard to claims against these individuals, the petition alleged:
These corporate officials moved to dismiss the claims against them pursuant to Rule 91a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
on grounds that the corporate form of H.E.B. insulates them from liability and the Garcias failed to plead any cause of action which would result in personal liability. See generally id. The Garcias filed a response to the motion to dismiss and a brief in support of their response. After additional briefing by the parties, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss. After the hearing, the trial court denied the relators' motion to dismiss.
This original proceeding ensued. By one issue, relators contend that the Garcias' claims that apex corporate officials are individually liable for a slip and fall in a grocery store lacks any basis in law or fact. According to relators, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91
a mandates dismissal of claims like these and relators lack an appellate remedy for the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss. This Court requested and received a response to the petition for writ of mandamus from the Garcias. The Garcias argue generally that H.E.B. should be liable for Arturo's fall, and specifically contend that mandamus is premature because they have not “been provided basic information about relators' job duties” and relators should be required to respond to discovery requests before proceeding on a Rule 91a motion to dismiss. The Court has also received a reply to the Garcias' response from the relators.
“Mandamus relief is proper to correct a clear abuse of discretion when there is no adequate remedy by appeal.” In re Frank Motor Co., 361 S.W.3d 628, 630 (Tex.2012)
; see
Repair Co., 328 S.W.3d 883, 887 (Tex.2010) ; In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex.2004) ; Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex.1992) . A trial court abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable that it amounts to a clear and prejudicial error of law or if it clearly fails to correctly analyze or apply the law. In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., 328 S.W.3d at 888
; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. Mandamus will not issue “when the law provides another plain, adequate, and complete remedy.” In re Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 210 S.W.3d 609, 613 (Tex.2006) (quoting In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 135–36 ).
Angus Chem. Co. v. IMC Fertilizer, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 138, 138 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (); Aviles v. Aguirre, 292 S.W.3d 648, 649 (Tex.2009) (per curiam) (). Balancing the benefits of mandamus review against the detriments, the supreme court stated that it had “previously held that ‘mandamus relief is appropriate to ‘spare private parties and the public the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.’ ” In re
Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d at 528 ). The court thus concluded that, “[i]n light of the conflict of interest and prejudice [rationales for the “no direct action rule”], we conclude that mandamus relief is appropriate to spare the parties and the public the time and money spent on fatally flawed proceedings.” Id.
was promulgated at the behest of the Legislature who “directed that a more determined effort be made to reduce the expense and delay of litigation, while maintaining fairness to litigants.” Misc. Docket No. 12–9191, Adoption of Rules for Dismissals and Expedited Actions, (Tex. Nov. 13, 2012) (per curiam), available at http://www.txcourts.gov/AII_Archived_Documents/SupremeCourt/AdministrativeOrders/miscdocket/12/12919100.pdf. The concern for an expedited proceeding in matters regarding “baseless” causes of action is illustrated by the strict deadlines imposed by Rule 91a. See TEX.R. CIV. P. 91a.3 (...
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