In re C.D.
| Decision Date | 15 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 12-21-00045-CV |
| Parties | IN THE INTEREST OF C.D., J.D. AND T.D., CHILDREN |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
M.S appeals the termination of her parental rights. In three issues, she argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to show that she voluntarily and knowingly executed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights, that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion for new trial and that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion to dismiss. We affirm.
J.S.D.[1] is the father and M.S. is the mother of C.D., J.D., and T.D. On May 8, 2017, the Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) filed an original petition for protection of C.D., J.D., and T.D., for conservatorship, and for termination of J.S.D.'s and M.S.'s parental rights. After an adversary hearing, the Department was appointed temporary managing conservator for the children and the parents were appointed temporary possessory conservators of the children with limited rights and duties. According to the trial court's scheduling order, the one year dismissal date for this case was May 14, 2018, pursuant to Section 263.401 of the Texas Family Code. The dismissal date was continued to November 10, 2018.
The trial court ordered the parties to mediation which took place on September 12, 2018, and, as part of the Mediated Settlement Agreement ("MSA"), the parties agreed that an "interim order (in the form of a 'final' order for the purpose of complying with the dismissal date) would be entered appointing the Department as the children's managing conservator." On October 29, the trial court entered a Final Order in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship, stating that the MSA was attached to the Final Order. In the Final Order, the trial court appointed the Department as permanent managing conservators of the children, and appointed M.S. and J.S.D. as possessory conservators.
On June 6, 2019, the Department filed an original petition to modify the Final Order. The Department stated that the petition was being filed after the date the order denying termination was rendered, and that the circumstances of the children, parent sole managing conservator, possessory conservator, or other party affected by the Final Order had materially and substantially changed since the date that the Final Order was rendered. The Department alleged that M.S. committed one or more acts or omissions necessary to support termination of her parental rights under subsections (D), (E), (K), (O), and (P) of Section 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code before the date the order denying termination was rendered.
During a hearing on August 4, 2020, M.S. signed an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights to the Department regarding C.D., J.D., and T.D. On March 10, 2021, the trial court entered an Order of Termination, finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that M.S. engaged in one or more of the acts or omissions necessary to support termination of her parental rights under subsection (K) () of Section 161.001(b)(1). The trial court also found that termination of the parent-child relationship between M.S., C.D., J.D., and T.D. is in the children's best interest. Based on these findings, the trial court ordered that the parent-child relationship between M.S., C.D., J.D., and T.D. be terminated.
M.S. filed a motion for new trial on March 26, stating that her relinquishment of parental rights was not made freely and knowingly. She also filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on April 28. The trial court denied both motions and this appeal followed.
Involuntary termination of parental rights embodies fundamental constitutional rights. Vela v. Marywood, 17 S.W.3d 750, 759 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000), pet. denied per curiam, 53 S.W.3d 684 (Tex. 2001); In re J.J., 911 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied). Because a termination action "permanently sunders" the bonds between a parent and child, the proceedings must be strictly scrutinized. Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1976); In re Shaw, 966 S.W.2d 174, 179 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.).
Section 161.001 of the family code permits a court to order termination of parental rights if two elements are established. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (West Supp. 2020); In re J.M.T., 39 S.W.3d 234, 237 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999, no pet.). First, the parent must have engaged in any one of the acts or omissions itemized in the second subsection of the statute. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1) (West Supp. 2020); Green v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 25 S.W.3d 213, 219 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.); In re J.M.T., 39 S.W.3d at 237. Second, termination must be in the best interest of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2) (West Supp. 2020); In re J.M.T., 39 S.W.3d at 237. Both elements must be established by clear and convincing evidence, and proof of one element does not alleviate the petitioner's burden of proving the other. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001; Wiley, 543 S.W.2d at 351; In re J.M.T., 39 S.W.3d at 237.
The clear and convincing standard for termination of parental rights is both constitutionally and statutorily mandated. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001; In re J.J., 911 S.W.2d at 439. Clear and convincing evidence means "the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007 (West 2019). The burden of proof is upon the party seeking the deprivation of parental rights. In re J.M.T., 39 S.W.3d at 240.
When confronted with both a legal and factual sufficiency challenge, an appellate court must first review the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Glover v. Tex. Gen. Indem. Co., 619 S.W.2d 400, 401 (Tex. 1981); In re M.D.S., 1 S.W.3d 190, 197 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet.). In conducting a legal sufficiency review, we must look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its findings were true. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). We must assume that the fact finder settled disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable fact finder could do so and disregard all evidence that a reasonable fact finder could have disbelieved or found incredible. Id.
The appropriate standard for reviewing a factual sufficiency challenge to the termination findings is whether the evidence is such that a fact finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the petitioner's allegations. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). In determining whether the fact finder has met this standard, an appellate court considers all the evidence in the record, both that in support of and contrary to the trial court's findings. Id. at 27-29. Further, an appellate court should consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could not have reconciled that disputed evidence in favor of its finding. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. The trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Nordstrom v. Nordstrom, 965 S.W.2d 575, 580 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. denied).
In a parental termination case, an appellate court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Tex. 2006). "A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner without reference to any guiding rules or principles." Walker v. Gutierrez, 111 S.W.3d 56, 62 (Tex. 2003). "Under an abuse of discretion standard, the appellate court defers to the trial court's factual determinations if they are supported by evidence, but reviews the trial court's legal determinations de novo." Stockton v. Offenbach, 336 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Tex. 2011). The trial court is the factfinder and accordingly is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility. Hanners v. State Bar of Tex., 860 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ dism'd).
In her first and second issues, M.S. argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to show that she voluntarily and knowingly executed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment, and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for new trial based upon her execution of an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment.
The court may order termination of the parent-child relationship if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has executed before or after the suit is filed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(K) (West Supp. 2020). The petitioner, the Department, has the burden to prove the elements necessary to support termination of the parent-child relationship. In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 113 (Tex. 2014). Section 161.103 requires that the affidavit be for voluntary relinquishment, and implicit in Section 161.001(b)(1)(K) is the requirement that the...
To continue reading
Request your trial