In re C.D.M.
| Decision Date | 22 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 06-21-00118-CV |
| Parties | IN THE MATTER OF C.D.M., JR., A JUVENILE |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
Date Submitted: August 31, 2022
On Appeal from the County Court at Law Bowie County, Texas Trial Court No. 19JV0049-CCL
Before Morriss, C.J., Stevens and van Cleef, JJ.
After having been determined by a juvenile court to have engaged in delinquent conduct, by committing aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon, C.D.M., Jr., had been committed to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) for a determinate period of thirty years.[1] Later, the TJJD, by its letter dated October 26, 2021, had requested a hearing on whether C.D.M should be transferred to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) to complete his sentence.[2] See Tex Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11(a). Such a transfer hearing was held, resulting in his transfer to TDCJ. C.D.M. appeals the transfer.
On appeal, C.D.M. contends that the juvenile court erred by not sua sponte ordering a mental evaluation to determine whether he was unfit to proceed with the transfer proceeding. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 55.31. Because we find no evidence that C.D.M. was unfit to be subjected to the transfer hearing, we affirm the transfer.
A juvenile court's decision regarding whether probable cause exists to believe a child is unfit to proceed is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.[3] In re H.C., 562 S.W.3d 30, 42 n.9 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2018, no pet.). Under the Texas Family Code, a child "who as a result of mental illness or an intellectual disability lacks capacity to understand the proceedings in juvenile court or to assist in the child's own defense is unfit to proceed" and may not be subjected to juvenile proceedings.[4] Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 55.31(a).
Procedurally the Texas Family Code provides that, "[o]n a motion by a party, the juvenile court shall determine whether probable cause exists to believe that a child . . . is unfit to proceed as a result of mental illness or an intellectual disability." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 55.31(b). Consequently, under the statute, the juvenile court is not required to determine whether probable cause exists except on the motion of a party, but in its discretion may do so sua sponte. See In re J.K.N., 115 S.W.3d 166, 168-69 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); Tex. Fam. Code Ann § 51.20(a) ().
Nevertheless, C.D.M. argues that he has a constitutional right to not stand trial while incompetent and that, since Texas requires a trial court to sua sponte conduct an informal inquiry into an adult criminal defendant's competency when there is a bona fide doubt about the defendant's competency to stand trial,[5] we should find that due process requires the juvenile court to sua sponte conduct an informal inquiry into whether the juvenile is unfit to proceed when there is evidence the juvenile has mental health issues.[6]
The determination of whether a constitutional protection given to a criminal defendant must also be given to a juvenile defendant requires us to "balance[] the function that [the asserted] constitutional or procedural right serve[s] against its impact or degree of impairment on the unique processes of the juvenile court." In re H.C., 562 S.W.3d at 41 (alterations in original) (quoting Lanes v. State, 767 S.W.2d 789, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)). "This balancing 'requires an exploration of the specific purposes of both the juvenile system and the constitutional right being asserted.'" Id. (quoting Lanes, 767 S.W.2d at 794).
In this case, we need not decide whether due process required the juvenile court to sua sponte conduct an informal inquiry into whether C.D.M. was unfit to proceed with the transfer proceeding. Even assuming, without deciding, that due process required the juvenile court to conduct an informal inquiry on its own motion, the evidence before the juvenile court[7]did not show probable cause existed that C.D.M., because of mental illness or intellectual disability, lacked the capacity to understand the proceeding or to assist in his own defense.
Under the Juvenile Justice Code, "'mental illness' means an illness, disease, or condition, other than epilepsy, dementia, substance abuse, or intellectual disability, that: (A) substantially impairs a person's thought, perception of reality, emotional process, or judgment; or (B) grossly impairs behavior as demonstrated by recent disturbed behavior." Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 571.003(14) (Supp.); see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 55.01; In re H.C., 562 S.W.3d at 42. "'Intellectual disability' means significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that is concurrent with deficits in adaptive behavior and originates during the developmental period." Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 591.003(7-a); see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 55.40; In re H.C., 562 S.W.3d at 42.
As C.D.M. points out, both the testimony and a psychological evaluation report performed about two months before the transfer hearing indicated that he had experienced several mental health issues. He had been diagnosed at various times with conduct disorder, bipolar depression (schizophrenia not identified), attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and cannabis use disorder.[8] At the time of the hearing, C.D.M. was being treated with Naproxen, Minocycline, Latuda, Divalproex, and Sertraline. Those medications were prescribed for depression, anxiety, aggressiveness, and mood stabilization. The most recent psychological evaluation indicated that, at the time of his disposition, C.D.M. was in eighth grade special education but that he had 7.5 high school credits at the time of the evaluation. The results of two I.Q. tests resulted in composite scores of 61 and 66, which fell "within the mildly impaired range," but the examiner noted purposeful under performance and concluded that the I.Q. test results "did not appear to be valid."
The evidence also showed that, because of his mental issues, C.D.M. went into several mental health treatment programs during his time at TJJD and that he successfully completed at least one of them. However, it also showed that C.D.M. had a history of intentional medication refusal, which had an adverse effect on his behavior.
Significantly, there was no testimony and no indication in the psychological evaluation report that C.D.M.'s mental health issues or his mildly impaired intellectual functioning impaired his capacity to understand the juvenile proceedings or to assist in his own defense. To the contrary, at the beginning of the transfer hearing, C.D.M. attempted to replace his attorney and sought to replace her with another attorney that was representing him in another matter. When informed that the other attorney said he was not going to represent C.D.M. in the transfer hearing, C.D.M. chose to continue with his appointed attorney rather than represent himself. Also, at the end of his case-in-chief, C.D.M.'s attorney notified the court that she had consulted with him regarding his right to testify, that she had advised him not to testify, and that C.D.M had stated he did not want to testify. In addition, there is no indication in the record that C.D.M. made any outbursts or that he displayed any bizarre or inappropriate behavior during the hearing.
Although there was some evidence in the record that C.D.M. had some mental health issues and that he had mildly impaired intellectual functioning, there was no evidence that he lacked the capacity to understand the proceedings or to assist in his own defense. As a result, on this record, there was no evidence that C.D.M. was unfit to proceed with...
To continue reading
Request your trial