In re C.L.

• Citation: 289 Ga. App. 377,657 S.E.2d 301
• Decision Date: 29 January 2008
• Docket Number: No. A07A2075.,A07A2075.
• Parties: In the Interest of C.L., a child.
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)

657 S.E.2d 301

289 Ga. App. 377

In the Interest of C.L., a child.

No. A07A2075.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

January 29, 2008.

Appeal from the Juvenile Court, Glynn County, Rivers, J.

Dante LeShawn Hudson, Atlanta, for Appellant.

Stephen D. Kelley, Dist. Atty., W. Franklin Aspinwall Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for Appellee.

BERNES, Judge.

The juvenile court adjudicated C.L. delinquent after finding that he was guilty of acts, which if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of criminal attempt to hijack a motor vehicle and aggravated assault. C.L. appeals, contending that the evidence was insufficient and that the juvenile court should have granted his motion for a continuance. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

1. C.L. argues that the juvenile court erred in adjudicating him delinquent because there was insufficient evidence that he committed the acts charged in the delinquency petition.

On appeal, we view the evidence from an adjudicatory hearing in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the juvenile committed the acts charged. The evidence is examined under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), with all reasonable inferences construed in favor of the juvenile court's findings.

(Citations omitted.) In the Interest of M.F., 276 Ga.App. 402-403(1), 623 S.E.2d 234 (2005).

So viewed, the evidence shows that at approximately 10:00 p.m. on May 12, 2007, Christal Davis, her husband Martin Davis, and their infant son were in the family car at an intersection in Glynn County. Mrs. Davis was driving the vehicle, while Mr. Davis sat in the front passenger seat. While waiting for the traffic light to change, the Devises noticed three males standing on the side of the road who appeared to be arguing with one another. The three males were later identified as C.L., Rudy Figueroa, and Brandon Crittendon. As the three males argued, Mrs. Davis saw C.L. throw his hands up into the air "like he was mad about something, frustrated and fed up." Crittendon then approached the Davises' vehicle, pulled out a handgun from under his shirt, tapped the gun on Mrs. Davis' window, tugged on her door, and began yelling. Mrs. Davis quickly drove the car away from the intersection as Mr. Davis called the police on his cell phone.

Minutes later, a second incident occurred in the parking lot of a restaurant located approximately 75 to 100 feet from the intersection. Travis McGauley and several of his family members had just exited the restaurant and were in the parking lot near McGauley's truck. As they climbed into the truck, McGauley noticed C.L., Figueroa, and Crittendon standing by the road under a streetlight, arguing loudly and cursing at one another. The three males then crossed together over a ditch separating the road from the parking lot. After crossing the ditch, Crittendon approached the driver's side of McGauley's truck, while C.L. and Figueroa stood approximately eight to ten feet away directly in front of the truck "watching," "looking around, [and] talking." Crittendon pulled out his handgun, fired a shot toward the ground, pointed the gun at McGauley, and yelled at him to get out of the truck. McGauley attempted to pull his truck out of the parking space, and Crittendon fired a shot at the truck, but missed. As McGauley maneuvered his truck out of the parking space, hit a curb, and sped away, the mirror on the passenger side struck Crittendon. McGauley then saw C.L. and Figueroa run over and help Crittendon off the ground. Like the Davises, McGauley immediately called the police after exiting file parking lot.

After receiving a description of the suspects, patrol units quickly began searching for them. C.L. and one of the other perpetrators were apprehended at a nearby apartment complex approximately ten minutes after the second incident. C.L. was "very sweaty" and "out of breath." After he was handcuffed, C.L. spontaneously divulged to the officers that he was out of breath because he had been "running from the police."

The state subsequently filed a petition alleging that C.L. was delinquent based on three charges: criminal attempt to hijack the Davises' motor vehicle; criminal attempt to hijack McGauley's motor vehicle; and aggravated assault against McGauley. At the adjudicatory hearing, the state called the Davises, McGauley, and the investigating officer, all of whom testified to the events as described above. The state also called Figueroa as a witness. On direct examination, Figueroa admitted that he was present with Crittendon and C.L. on the night of the two attempted vehicle hijackings. He further testified that Crittendon had stated to them, "I've got a gun, I'll get us a car." However, on cross-examination, Figueroa elaborated and explained that Crittendon had made the statement right before the first attempted vehicle hijacking while standing at the side of the road. According to Figueroa, both he and C.L. were surprised by Crittendon's statement and tried to dissuade him from attempting to hijack a vehicle. Figueroa also testified that prior to the first attempt, C.L. made it clear to Crittendon that he did not want to participate in any attempted hijacking of a vehicle. Finally, Figueroa testified that after Crittendon approached the Davises' vehicle brandishing his handgun, Figueroa and C.L. became angry with Crittendon and told him that he should not have done it.

On appeal, C.L. does not dispute that the person who brandished the handgun would be guilty of the three charged offenses. Rather, he maintains that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he was a party to those offenses. More specifically, he contends that the uncontradicted evidence shows that he was merely present at the time of the incidents and disapproved of the criminal acts that were committed.

Even if an accused does not directly commit the crime at issue, he can be found guilty as a party to the crime if he intentionally aids or abets its commission, or "[i]ntentionally advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another to commit the crime." OCGA § 16-2-20(b)(3), (4). The fact finder can infer that the accused shared in the perpetrator's criminal intent based on the accused's actions before, during, and after the commission of the crime. Millender v. State, 286 Ga.App. 331, 332(1), 648 S.E.2d 777 (2007). Likewise, criminal intent may be inferred "upon consideration of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. Bearing these principles in mind, we turn to the charges against C.L. in the present case.

(a) We conclude there was insufficient evidence to find that C.L. was a party to the criminal attempt to hijack the Davises' motor vehicle. The state's evidence as to this charge showed only that C.L. was standing by the side of the road with the two other males prior to the attempted hijacking, and remained on the side of the road when Crittendon approached the Davises' motor vehicle with a handgun and attempted to take their car by force and intimidation. But, "[m]ere presence, association or suspicion, without any evidence to show further participation in the commission of the crime is insufficient to authorize a conviction." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. State, 277 Ga.App. 499, 504-505(1)(b), 627 S.E.2d 116 (2006). The state presented no additional evidence that C.L. aided, abetted, counseled, encouraged, advised, hired, procured, or approved of Crittendon's actions. Indeed, the state's own witness, Figueroa, expressly testified that C.L. disapproved of Crittendon's conduct and became upset when Crittendon informed them that he had a gun and would get them a car. Figueroa's testimony, in turn, was corroborated by the Davises' testimony that they saw Crittendon, Figueroa, and C.L. arguing on the side of the road prior to the commission of the offense and that C.L. had appeared mad and fed up. Under these circumstances, the state's evidence was insufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that C.L. participated in the crime.

Jackson, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 LEd.2d 560. See Johnson, 277 Ga.App. at 504-505(1)(b), 627 S.E.2d 116.

(b) We reach a different conclusion with respect to the criminal attempt to hijack McGauley's motor vehicle and the aggravated assault of McGauley. After the first incident, C.L. was on notice that Crittendon was not bluffing and was intent on hijacking a motor vehicle. Nonetheless, C.L. chose...