In re C.P.

• Docket Number: 1936-2021
• Decision Date: 21 July 2023
• Parties: IN RE: C.P.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

1

IN RE: C.P.

No. 1936-2021

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

July 21, 2023

UNREPORTED^[*]

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND ^[**]

Circuit Court for Wicomico County Case No. C-22-JV-21-000058

Ripken, Tang, Sharer, J. Frederick (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

OPINION

Ripken, J.

The State of Maryland charged Appellant, C.P.,^[1] with fourth degree burglary, malicious burning of property, and malicious destruction of property. Following an adjudication hearing, the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, sitting as a juvenile court, found C.P. involved as to all counts. Having found C.P. to be a delinquent child, the court released him on GPS monitoring amounting to supervised probation. C.P. now appeals to this Court, seeking reversal of the court's findings.

C.P. presents the following issue for our review: whether the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the court's finding of involvement as to all counts.^[2] For the reasons to follow, we shall affirm the court's judgments as to the fourth degree burglary and malicious destruction of property charges and reverse as to the malicious burning of property charge.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In June of 2021, Mr. M. and Ms. H.^[3] lived with two of Ms. H.'s children at a home in Wicomico County. Mr. M. and Ms. H. had a recreational vehicle ("RV") parked in the fenced area behind the home. On June 8, Ms. H. found C.P. inside the RV without permission to be there. At an adjudicatory hearing in August of 2021, Mr. M. testified that, while there was a "bed"^[4] inside the "fully loaded" RV, no one was to be living in the RV at that time. Mr. M. indicated that he "keep[s] it locked up" and that he "[had not] been [inside] in a while" prior to the alleged breaking and entering. Prior to August of 2019, Ms. H.'s eldest son slept in the RV at an off-premise location. Ms. H. testified that the RV has "plumbing," including a sink and toilet, but that it has not had running water since her son moved out and they relocated the RV to their property. According to Ms. H., the RV had been parked on their property since August of 2019, and it had not been in use since.

C.P. is a friend of another of Ms. H.'s children, J.H., and the two attend Mardela High School together. C.P. testified that, after school on June 7, he went to J.H.'s house to play video games with him. Later that day, C.P. decided "it was too late for [him] to go home" because he did not want to get in trouble. According to C.P., J.H. told C.P. that he could stay in the RV. C.P. denied that he broke into and caused destruction to the RV. Rather, C.P. testified that J.H. "opened the door from within" and that, when he entered the RV, he "saw a broken step underneath of the couch" and "a line going down the wall."

On June 8, having been informed by C.P.'s mother that C.P. had not returned home the night before, Ms. H. began to look for C.P. Ms. H. testified that she had decided to look for C.P. in the RV based on "a hunch" that he was "somewhere close by." Ms. H. and Mr. M. have the only keys to the RV, and Ms. H. specified that she used her key to enter the RV that day. According to Ms. H., when she unlocked the door, "[C.P.] jumped up off the couch[] and said, I'm sorry, I'm sorry." Ms. H. notified C.P.'s mother that she found him and took him home.

After Ms. H. took C.P. home, she went back into the RV and noticed that approximately four feet of the wood under the couch "was all busted out." Ms. H. testified that C.P. had told her that he entered the RV through the "storage compartment door" that goes under the couch. In addition to the damaged wood panels, Ms. H. saw a lighter on the couch and also observed that "one of the blinds and up the wall had been burnt[.]" Ms. H. testified that the damage to the RV had not been there when she last went inside, two weeks prior.

Deputy Howard Bowden, who was dispatched to Mr. M. and Ms. H.'s address "in reference to a burglary," corroborated Ms. H.'s testimony regarding the damage to the RV.^[5]However, on cross examination, Deputy Bowden conceded that Ms. H. "didn't tell [him] that [C.P.] admitted to her how he entered the camper," explaining that he "[w]ould have put it in [his] report" if Ms. H. had mentioned such information. In addition to noting the damage to the RV's interior, Deputy Bowden testified that he observed a Mardela High School baseball hat near the "small access door near the front of the [RV] . . . that leads to the underneath of the camper[.]" When questioned about the hat, C.P. implied that the hat did not belong to him, testifying that J.H. had "got[ten] it from a friend[.]" C.P. further testified that he does not wear hats due to a "sensitivity" that "makes [his] head itch."

The juvenile court made the following findings at the hearing's conclusion:

I find that the RV, as it was used by the parties in this case by [Ms. H.] and [Mr. M.], that the RV was simply used off premises and was [parked] in their fenced-in back yard and had been there since August of 2019, not used. There was no water hookup. It wasn't used as a residence. For all intents and purposes, it seems . . . to have been used as a storehouse. Therefore, an individual, if they are found to have entered without permission, they could, thereby, commit a burglary in the fourth degree.

I want to take the hat issue. So it has been argued that [C.P.] testified that the Mardela High School hat could not have been worn by [C.P.] because he had a sensitivity to wearing the hat. However, he said, and it's implied through the totality of what he said that he did wear hats before. And . . . it was not established when he stopped wearing hats. He very well could have stopped wearing hats the day he left the Mardela hat outside of the RV.

***

I find that [Ms. H.] was entirely credible in everything that she said. I find that [C.P.]-. . . I just have a hard time believing that aspect of this case.

I believe that door was locked. I believe that [Ms. H.] used the keys to get inside. And I believe that [C.P.] used the access panel to sneak into the RV, bust through the-the wood that was basically keeping him from getting into the RV and doing the damage.

I also find that in close temporal proximity to the incident in question-I mean, [C.P.] [was] present at the scene of the crime. And presence isn't enough, alone, but it is a factor to be considered. He says, I'm sorry when he's first encountered by [Ms. H.]

And for all of those reasons, the totality of the circumstantial evidence that has been produced in this case, indicate to me that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that [C.P.] committed burglary in the fourth degree, malicious burning, and the malicious destruction of property. So all three counts, I find him involved, and that all of the allegations of the State's Petition have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Additional facts will be provided herein as they become relevant.

DISCUSSION

When reviewing evidentiary sufficiency, this Court applies the same standard of review in juvenile delinquency cases as it does in criminal cases. In re Antoine H., 319 Md. 101, 107-08 (1990). The relevant inquiry is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." In re James R., 220 Md.App. 132, 137 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). In delinquency cases, it is not the essential elements of the crime that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt but, rather, "the allegations in the petition that the child committed a delinquent act." Md. Code, Cts. &Jud. Proc. ("CJP") § 3-8A-18(c)(1). "Delinquent act" is defined as "an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult." CJP § 3-8A-01(1).

Notably, "[j]udging the weight of evidence and the credibility of witnesses and resolving conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the sound discretion of the trier of fact." In re Timothy F., 343 Md. 371, 379 (1996). As such, "[a]bsent clear error, an appellate court will not set aside the judgment of the trial court." In re James R., 220 Md. at 138 (quoting Matter of Tyrek S., 118 Md.App. 270, 273 (1997)); see also Md. Rule 8-131(c) ("When an action has been tried without a jury, an appellate court . . . will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous[.]").

I. Analysis

C.P. contends that the juvenile court erred in concluding that the RV was a "storehouse" under section 6-205(b) of the Criminal Law Article ("CL") and that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he committed malicious burning and destruction of property under sections 6-105(b) and 6-301(a), respectively.^[6] C.P. thus avers that reversal of his convictions is warranted. We address the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's findings as to each count, in turn.

A. The Evidence Was Legally Sufficient to Establish the RV Was a Storehouse.

C.P. argues that the court erred in finding that the RV was a storehouse under section 6-205(b). Instead, C.P. posits that the RV constituted a dwelling and, accordingly, the State failed to prove all elements of the fourth degree burglary offense: breaking and entering the storehouse of another. CL § 6-205(b). The State disagrees, arguing that, because courts have given "storehouse" an "expansive definition" that encompasses "all buildings other than dwelling houses," Bane v. State, 327 Md. 305, 312 (1992), the court could reasonably conclude that the RV was being used as a storehouse and not a dwelling. We agree.

The crime of fourth degree burglary prohibits, in relevant part a person from "break[ing] and enter[ing] the...