In re James R.
Decision Date | 30 October 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 1751, Sept. Term, 2013.,1751, Sept. Term, 2013. |
Citation | 220 Md.App. 132,102 A.3d 875 |
Parties | In re JAMES R. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Bradford C. Peabody (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, MD, for appellant.
Susannah E. Prucka (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen., on brief), Baltimore, MD, for appellee.
Panel: GRAEFF, LEAHY, and RAYMOND G. THIEME, JR. (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
In this juvenile delinquency case, James R., appellant, asks this Court to review the adjudication of delinquency rendered by the Circuit Court for Cecil County. Following an adjudicatory hearing on September 25, 2013, the court determined that James was involved in the commission of an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute second degree rape in violation of Md.Code , § 3–304(a)(1) of the Criminal Law Article. (“Crim. Law”). Following a disposition hearing on October 23, the court ordered “commitment to the Department of Juvenile Services for appropriate placement.”
In his timely appeal from the adjudication of delinquency and disposition, appellant maintains that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the court's finding of rape, specifically the finding that the act was committed with force and without consent. We disagree and shall affirm the adjudication in all respects.
The State's case against appellant was based primarily on the testimony of the complainant, D.1 At the time of the incident in question, D was 14 years old and appellant was 13. The two had “dated” for a short time when they had both attended sixth grade, and continued to be friends and confidants.
Because the two had not seen each other “in a while,” they “wanted to catch up.” Accordingly, D's mother drove her to appellant's house at about 5:00 p.m. on the day in question. D arrived, and greeted James's parents. After this, the two went downstairs to appellant's room in the basement to watch a movie.
It was dark in the basement when appellant kissed D. The girl did not think much about this at first:
The two continued to watch the movie when they “laid down.” Appellant then told D that he was a “monster” and whispered in D's ear that she was “going to get fucked.” In the wake of these comments, D “was in shock” and she “froze.” She then testified that she got raped. D said that appellant got on top of her and “penetrated” her; that he “stuck his penis inside [her].” Appellant “had a hold of” her arms. When asked by defense counsel whether she had been struggling with appellant, D recounted that she was “ squirming” as appellant was removing her pants. During the intercourse, D “ said no” and then “started to cry[.]” At this, appellant got off of her. D did not consent to the sexual intercourse.
After this incident, appellant apologized, and admitted that “he's a monster.” D was “upset and scared.” After the police became involved, an investigating officer asked her to call appellant. Their conversation was recorded, and appellant apologized during this call. Appellant also sent text messages to D, in which he again apologized.
On cross-examination, D testified that while she did not scream, and did not alert the adults who were just upstairs, she was crying. She acknowledged that she was getting “flashbacks,” which the defense apparently sought to show were the true reasons for D's distress.2 D would not tell her mother about the incident until much later, after she spoke with friends who urged her to come forward.
Her mother, RM, testified next, and recalled that on the date in question she came to appellant's house to pick up and bring D home. RM recounted that D would not make eye contact with her, and that her daughter acted a “little bit shaky.” D was “very reserved” over the following week or two, and eventually revealed the details of the incident.
The State rested after RM's testimony, and appellant testified in his defense. He presented a conflicting version of the facts, and insisted that D consented to the intercourse.
Following testimony and argument, the court found that appellant was involved in the commission of rape. The court articulated its ruling as follows:
The parties to this appeal dispute the sufficiency of the evidence. Appellant insists that D consented to the intercourse, and that the record is insufficient to support an inference of the employment of force to compel D to engage in intercourse. He maintains that the circumstances of this case certainly do not show any reasonable fear on the part of the complainant. The State urges that we affirm, and points to the fact that appellant “used actual force when performing vaginal intercourse on the victim[,]” and that the complainant's resistance can be demonstrated by the fact that she “verbally resisted his advances,” and that she “squirm[ed]” while appellant was removing her pants.
When faced with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, Maryland courts have applied the test set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See Smith v. State, 415 Md. 174, 184, 999 A.2d 986 (2010). We must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781. Accord, Allen v. State, 402 Md. 59, 71, 935 A.2d 421 (2007). This inquiry is one of law, so that our review of this legal determination is plenary.See Hudson v. State, 152 Md.App. 488, 523, 832 A.2d 834, cert. denied, 378 Md. 618, 837 A.2d 928 (2003).
In re Timothy F.,
343 Md. 371, 380, 681 A.2d 501 (1996) (citation omitted). Cf. Branch v. State, 305 Md. 177, 182, 502 A.2d 496 (1986) ( ). “Absent clear error, an appellate court will not set aside the judgment of the trial court.” Matter of Tyrek S., 118 Md.App. 270, 273, 702 A.2d 466 (1997), aff'd on other grounds, 351 Md. 698, 720 A.2d 306 (1998).
On this record, we disagree with appellant's claim that the State's case falls far short of demonstrating the requisite “force or threat of force.” At the time of the events that drove the instant prosecution, the relevant statutory provision, Crim. Law § 3–304(a) read as follows:
Only the first of the above three modalities is at issue here. This has been a traditional means by which rape has been defined.3
Appellant directs our attention to this Court's decision in Goldberg v. State...
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